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Twenty years ago Frank Sander unveiled the concept of a "multi-door
courthouse" in which disputes would be allocated to various dispute
resolution mechanisms-court adjudication, arbitration, mediation,
negotiation and other processes-on the basis of rational criteria such as the
nature of the dispute, the relationship between disputing parties, the amount
in dispute and concerns regarding the speed and cost of dispute resolution.1
* The author is William L. Matthews Professor of Law at the University of
Kentucky. He is co-author, with Ian R. Macneil and Richard E. Speidel, of FEDERAL
AREIrRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AwARDs & REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL
A1rrATION AcT (1994). He is currently Academic Reporter for the Protocol for
Arbitration and Mediation of Consumer Disputes, Academic Advisor to the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Drafting Committee for Reform
of the Uniform Arbitration Act, Director of the National Commission on the Future of
Arbitration of the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, and a member of several
national policymaking bodies and advisory groups for construction and securities
arbitration. The author wishes to thank law students Matthew Gillies (Class of 1999),
Jason Jasper (Class of 1998) and Deborah Murphey (Class of 1997) for their research
assistance in the preparation of this Article. A special debt is owed to Elizabeth
Plapinger of the CPR Institute for her critical insights.
1 See generally Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, The Pound
Conference, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976). Professor Sander's vision, and trends in court-
connected conflict resolution approaches generally, have provoked a variety of positive
and negative responses. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TULANE L. REV. 1 (1987); Robert A. Baruch Bush,
Mediation and Adjudication, Dispute Resolution and Ideology: An Imaginary
Conversation, 3 J. CoNMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1990) (presenting a range of viewpoints
on "pluralist" court-connected ADR and questioning its appropriateness and feasibility);
Richard Delgado, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359; Owen Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the
Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute
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He envisaged a dynamic system premised on a flexible tailoring of the
process to the controversy aimed at better resolutions of existing disputes as
well as grievances that were not then being aired for lack of an appropriate
mechanism.
Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 1 (1993); Judith Resnik, Many Doors?
Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OMO ST. J. ON
DISP. REsOL. 211 (1995) (recognizing that ADR is a reality; raising a number of
specific issues implicated by current trends); Edward Sherman, Court-Mandated
Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Form of Participation Should Be Required?, 46
S.M.U. L. REv. 2079 (1993); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the
Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling
Adulthood, 11 OIo ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 297 (1996) (encouraging a "refined"
version of Sander's vision); Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization
of Justice Through ADR, 11 OHIo ST. J. ON DIsp. REsOL. 241 (1996) (considering pros
and cons of increasing emphasis on channeling disputes into "alternative dispute
resolution").
It is not my intent, however, to critique extensively Sander's original vision or
current evocations of that approach, but rather to suggest some parallels between theory
and practice in the judicial arena and developments and opportunities in the realm of
private agreement. In so doing, of course, I find company with others who have
expounded a "pluralist" view of conflict resolution. See, e.g., STmHN GOLDBERG ET
AL., DIsPUTE RESOLUTION 7-13 (1985). I then build upon the conceptual work of Ian
Macneil, Stewart Macaulay and other "relational" theorists. See infra text
accompanying notes 76-92.
Because my emphasis is on transactional settings which tend to bear the earmarks
of classical bargains, a number of evolving issues respecting dispute resolution
mechanisms in standardized adhesion contracts are addressed only fleetingly. See infra
note 185. That said, the special concerns of consumers and other "outsiders" drawn
into arbitration by standard boilerplate may require different treatment. See generally
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitration, 92
Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Punitive Damages] (discussing various
implications of widespread use of arbitration in consumer contracts, with special
emphasis on recent developments affecting the availability of punitive damages in
securities industry arbitration); see also Protocol for Arbitration and Mediation of
Consumer Disputes (forthcoming 1998) (on file with author) (due process protocol for
conflict resolution processes affecting consumer transactions).
A final caveat: This writing is the product not only of the usual filtering of the
thoughts of other academics and practitioners, but also of the reflections upon my own
empirical research and, for better or worse, my experience as a neutral in the public
(special master, court-appointed mediator and early neutral evaluator) and private
(arbitrator, mediator and facilitator) sector, as well as a participant in the establishment
of a court-connected mediation program and, more recently, in alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) rulemaking in the private sector. It partakes of the advantages as well
as the disadvantages of a personal perspective.
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In the intervening decades a good deal of progress has been made
toward realizing Sander's vision in the public realm. That the realization
has fallen well short of his ambitious scheme is not surprising in light of
political, practical and economic realities. The typical court-connected
"alternative dispute resolution" 2 program usually hinges primarily on a
single mechanism such as mediation or nonbinding arbitration, its size and
shape a reflection of state and local funding priorities, the received wisdom
of its sponsors and the personal predilections of influential members of the
bench and bar. A most significant limitation, of course, is that in the
context of public adjudication such processes have to be "retrofitted" into
the narrowly tailored schema of litigation-truly "alternatives" in the
procedural sense.
One might suppose that the realm of private contract, in which parties
have relative freedom to plan for conflict, would be a more fertile field for
the fulfillment of Sander's vision. Indeed, around the time Sander
announced his pluralistic vision for the courts, scholars were expounding
the essential principles of "relational contracts" and the mechanisms by
which parties plan for flexibility in long-term contractual arrangements. 3
While the broader legal framework provides some assistance in assuring
enforcement of provisions and filling gaps, effective governance of the
relationship demands a structure which reflects the specific character and
context of the transaction. Before Professor Sander unveiled the multi-door
courthouse concept, Ian Macneil reflected upon the advantages of various
2 ADR is convenient shorthand for a spectrum of approaches in which third parties
intervene in various ways in the conflict resolution process. It ranges from binding
adjudicatory processes such as consensual arbitration to court-connected arbitration (in
which the decision of the arbitrators is typically nonbinding) to other processes in which
disputants are exposed to third-party evaluations (early neutral evaluation, minitrial) to
mediated negotiation. For more extensive definitions, see Thomas J. Stipanowich,
Beyond Arbitration: Innovation and Evolution in the United States Construction
Industry, 31 WAKE FoRs L. REv. 65, 75 (arbitration), 84 (mediation), 86 (minitrial),
87 (summary jury trial, nonbinding arbitration) (1997) [hereinafter Stipanowich, Beyond
Arbitration]. In the realm of court-annexed ADR, it is common to include judicial
settlement programs. See Resnik, supra note 1, at 221-222.
3 See infra text accompanying notes 76-92. In his Primer of Contract Planning,
Professor Macneil acknowledged that insights might be found "not only in the many
academic overviews of contract, but also often in the nooks and crannies of more
directly practical works on particular kinds of contracts." Ian R. Macneil, A Primer of
Contract Planning, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 627, 631-632 (1975) [hereinafter Macneil,
Primer]. My own exploration of developments in the construction arena relies heavily
on such sources. See Parts 11-VI.
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forms of third-party intervention under long-term contracts, including
involved third-party determination of performance through binding
arbitration-a mechanism used for adjudicating existing rights as well as
filling gaps in performance planning. 4 He observed that this and other
forms of explicit planning were necessary to permit parties to a relational
contract "to continue in the face of serious conflict or even in the face of
some kinds of minor conflict. 5 Provisions for meeting together to discuss
problems, for mediation in the event of a dispute and for arbitration were
illustrative of approaches useful in maintaining relationships.
Ironically, significant innovation in developing governance mechanisms
for consensual relationships has been a long time coming. Despite the
freedom to choose among an expanding array of processes aimed at
resolving conflict short of adjudication, contract drafters tended to adhere
to established discrete processes (particularly binding arbitration),
attempting to maximize the utility of those processes by enhancing their
flexibility.
Part of the problem was a lack of awareness of choices and a
concomitant adherence to existing conflict resolution approaches, especially
among transactional lawyers. 6 Another, greater obstacle to change was the
practice of designing processes ab initio-at the time of contracting and
prior to the emergence of contract-related claims or controversies.7 The
result in most cases was a forced adherence to relatively static conflict
resolution provisions incorporating a single procedure-to wit, an
agreement to arbitrate disputes arising under or relating to the contract. A
third factor was the wide disparity in perspectives among industry actors
and their legal advisors. 8
Now, however, the pressure of recent legislative, judicial and
administrative developments and increasing awareness of the possibilities of
other alternatives is encouraging unprecedented experimentation in the
consensual arena. As public fora have experimented with a range of
solutions to more effectively address the many and varied controversies
presented to them, litigators have been exposed to the possibilities of
4 See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations
Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854,
867 (1978) [hereinafter Macneil, Adjustment].
5 Id. at 877.
6 See infra Section ll.B.2.
7 See infra Section lI.B.3.
8 See infra Section II.B.4.
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purposive third-party intervention prior to adjudication. 9 At the same time,
nonlawyers have recoiled from the perceived high costs of "Total Process"
in the litigation mode and have become more proactive in their approaches
to conflict. 10 Gradually, both these trends are feeding, together and
separately, into the process of contract planning with results which may
ultimately far transcend the capabilities of court settings.
The time is ripe to take stock of current developments in the arena of
private contract and assess the possibilities of movement beyond the stock
and static approaches of the past. Our model is the "relational" world of
construction contracting in which multiple parties are wedded for an
extended time to produce a one-of-a-kind product under a potentially wide
range of economic and climatic conditions.11 In this world, conflict is not
only likely, but well-nigh inevitable. These realities, which have long
conditioned parties to the use of out-of-court approaches to conflict, have
now stimulated a veritable reformation in contract planning and conflict
resolution. The active players are not only attorneys, but nonlawyers who
see themselves as rivals of the legal community and remediators of its
impact. 12
As in the public sphere, the result has been a reexamination of the
adjudicative model-most tellingly illustrated by recent reforms of the
American Arbitration Association's (AAA) construction arbitration
program13-and, increasingly, the retrofitting of various third-party
interventions, such as mediation and nonbinding evaluation, into existing
adjudicatory schema for the purpose of deliberately emphasizing and
facilitating interest-based negotiation or to clarify "rights boundar[ies]
within which a negotiated resolution can be sought." 14 A striking example
of the latter is the recent advent of mediation in the ubiquitous American
Institute of Architects contract document system. 15 In some cases, systemic
9 See infra Sections I.B.3, I.C., II.B.1.
10 See infra Section IV.B., Part V.
11 This habitually overlooked realm of contracting is treated at length in Thomas J.
Stipanowich, Rebuilding Construction Law: Reality and Reform in a Transactional
System, 1998 Wis. L. REv. _ (forthcoming) [hereinafter Stipanowich, Rebuilding
Construction Law].
12 See infra Section IV.B, Part V.
13 See infra Section m9I.C.
14 WILIA L. URY ET AL., GErrTnw DisPums RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO
CUT THE COSTS OF CoNFucr 16 (1988). See infra Section IV.
15 See infra Section IV.D.
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planning moves even further upstream, attacking the roots of conflict and
reinforcing the values of solidarity and reciprocity which animate the
relationships among contracting partners. 16 Probings beyond project
"partnering" include experiments with facilitated problem solving
transcending discrete contracts and new forms of integration which will
present novel challenges-and opportunities-for industry actors and the
lawyers who represent them. 17 Nearer the cutting edge of experimentation,
however, are systemic approaches which consider the specific interests and
goals of the parties, the range of conflict which is likely to emerge and the
relative cost and benefit of process choices within a particular transactional
setting. 18
I. THE MuLTI-DoOR COURTHOUSE: VISION MEETS REALITY
A. Dynamic Vision
In his seminal 1976 concept paper Varieties of Dispute Processing,
Frank Sander laid down the rough outlines of a proposal for making the
public justice system more responsive to the different kinds of conflict
which make their way to the courthouse. 19 Sander spoke of the need for "a
flexible mechanism that serves to sort out the large general question from
the repetitive application of settled principle. "20 By way of illustration, he
offered the example of a Swedish Public Complaint Board which performed
multiple functions, including mediation, nonbinding evaluation,
adjudication of small claims and identification of issues appropriate for
legislative or regulatory treatment, in the course of processing consumer
grievances. Sander envisioned that the traditional courthouse might be
supplanted by a public Dispute Resolution Center in which each grievant
would be channeled by a screening clerk into any of a number of processes
(such as mediation, fact-finding, arbitration, malpractice screening, court
adjudication or an ombud) or a sequence of processes. 21 Disposition would
16 See infra Section V.
17 See infra Section V.C.
18 See infra Section VI.
19 See generally Sander, supra note 1.
20 Id. at 119.
21 See id. at 130-132. Although Sander did not use the phrase "multi-door
courthouse," the label caught on. See Resnik, supra note 1, at 216 n.19.
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hinge on a variety of factors including the nature of the dispute, the
relationship between the disputants, the amount in dispute and concerns
regarding the cost and speed of conflict resolution.
Sander's multi-door courthouse concept incorporated three basic
notions: first, a choice among discrete approaches to conflict resolution;
second, a mechanism for channeling disputes into specific processes; and
third, sufficient information about a given dispute to facilitate a rational
pairing of problem and process. 22 In other words, he envisioned a synthesis
22 Recent developments suggest widespread acceptance of the notion that it is
possible to find a suitable match between dispute and ADR process. In fact, some courts
utilized the Civil Justice Reform Act "pilot period" as an opportunity to explore
suitability screening approaches. See, e.g., Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction
Plan for the Northern District of California 10 (Dec. 1991).
On the other hand, some thoughtful commentators have questioned whether it is
possible or beneficial to attempt to match problem and process, at least in the court
setting. See Bush, supra note 1, at 7 n.30 (questioning the "feasibility and
appropriateness" of screening and matching different types of cases to different ADR
processes in the court setting). See also generally John P. Esser, Evaluations of Dispute
Processing: We Do Not Know What We Think and We Do Not Think What We Know, 66
DENV. U. L. RV. 499 (1989) (arguing that the many differences among ADR
programs make objective description and transference of lessons from experience). I
agree that there are a number of barriers to the development of successful screening
mechanisms and that court programs (and private plans) have had, to say the least,
mixed success in developing such approaches. Moreover, personal and professional
perspectives make a great difference in defining problems and solutions in conflict
resolution, a point that is made repeatedly in this Article. See infra Section ILB.4.
Having accepted the fundamental value of some alternative "doors," however, I
believe that certain factors enhance the ability to make good choices. The first is a
sophisticated adviser with relatively broad experience with different approaches to
conflict. (Thus, I argue, the "process expert" such as an experienced magistrate judge
is a far better screener than the clerk described in Sander's original concept. See infra
Section I.C.3.) Second, choice is enhanced by the narrowness of a program's focus and
the depth of experience within that limited purview. (A planner charged with
establishing a framework for the universe of conflict within a county court may have a
far more difficult task than one addressing construction disputes, particularly within the
context of a single contractual relationship.) C. URY A., supra note 14, at 20-40
(discussing process by which an ADR systems designer "diagnoses" a limited arena of
conflict). A third factor is the ability to gain relevant input from all affected parties-that
is, present or prospective disputants. See id. at 69-74. A final factor is the ability to
address the specific circumstances of a particular dispute after it has arisen. (In this
case, ironically, court "screeners" have a leg up on contract planners, who generally
establish a framework for conflict resolution at the beginning of the relationship, prior
to the emergence of conflict.) See infra Section lI.B.3.
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of various conflict resolution approaches encompassing the broad spectrum
of interest-based and rights-based processes, a close tailoring (if not a
custom fit) of the method to the matter, and, finally, a dynamic system
which responds to the contemporary realities of relationships and other
specific circumstances surrounding discrete disputes.
In the two decades since Sander's proposal was aired much has
changed. 23 The judiciary has gradually come to acknowledge the value of
programmed third-party intervention in conflict. While judicial approbation
varies from wholehearted embracement to grudging acceptance, the growth
of federal and state court-connected programs centered upon mediated
negotiation, nonbinding arbitration and other interventions is truly
remarkable. 24
23 See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 1, at 229-236 (summarizing revisions to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 16, the Civil Justice Reform Act and other developments in
federal courts). Chief Justice Rehnquist spoke of traditional court models giving way to
"comprehensive justice centers, offering consumers a whole menu of dispute resolution
procedures." Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future
of the Federal Courts, 1993 WIs. L. REv. 1, 8-9.
From the vantage point of twenty years of developments in court-connected ADR,
one commentator describes aspects of Sander's vision as "almost quaint." Stempel,
supra note 1, at 327.
24 See generally NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS AND STATE JUSTICE
INSTITUTE, NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON COURT-CONNECTED DISPUTE RESOLUTION
RESEARCH (Susan Keilitz, ed. 1994) [hereinafter NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM] (summarizing
research findings on the use of various ADR processes in state and federal courts). For
an extensive treatment of ADR programs in the federal court system, see ELIZABETH
PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SEttLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES & LAWYERS (1996); see also ELIZABETH
PLAPINGER & MARGARET SHAW, COURT ADR: ELEMENTS OF PROGRAM DESIGN (CPR
Institute for Dispute Resolution 1992) [hereinafter COURT ADR].
Settlement-oriented approaches in the court setting include settlement conferences,
summary jury trials, various forms of mediation, early neutral evaluation, and
arbitration, and special masters. For an extensive listing see AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: A HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES Annotated Table of Contents (Philip Harter
ed., 1991). A more extensive but accessible summary of alternatives is provided in
COURT ADR, supra, Appendix A.
The value of court-connected ADR remains a subject of intense discussion. A
recent report by the RAND Corporation regarding the impact of pilot projects in federal
district courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CIRA) renewed debate over
its relative costs and benefits. See generally JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., JUST, SPEEDY
AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996) (summarizing three reports produced under the auspices of
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Among these programs are notable schemes embodying the multi-door
courthouse along the lines envisioned by Sander.25 Such programs are
remarkable, however, mainly because of their very uniqueness. Most court-
connected ADR programs do not incorporate a smorgasbord of approaches,
the RAND Institute for Civil Justice). The Rand Report, which examined six ADR
programs established under the CJRA and found little positive impact on the cost or
timing of conflict resolution, ignited a minor firestorm of criticism. See, e.g., Pamela
Chapman Enslen, Insights on Participant Satisfaction May Be Real Significance of
RAND Report, DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 1997, at 14; Statement of Concerns
Regarding the RAND ADR Study, Issued by the CPR Judicial Project Advisory Council
of the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution and Other ADR Experts (1997); see also
Craig A. McEwen & Elizabeth Plapinger, RAND Report Points Way to Next Generation
of ADR Research, Disp. RESOL. MAO., Summer 1997, at 10 (examining RAND Report
for lessons for future ADR research). A concurrent study of several other federal court
programs by the Federal found evidence of cost and time savings. See DONNA
STIENSTRA ET AL., REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT
ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF FIVE DEMONSTRATION
PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CIvIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 (Federal
Judicial Center 1997); see also Elizabeth Plapinger, Twilight of CJRA Means Unsure
Future for ADR, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 22, 1997, at B23 [hereinafter Plapinger, Twilight].
Although our recent experience with empirical research regarding court ADR
emphasizes the danger of over-generalizing, there is some evidence that court ADR is
usually a relatively positive experience for representatives of leading corporations and
members of large law firms-a group whose perceptions are probably not dissimilar to
the body of construction industry practitioners. Recently, the CPR Judicial Project
conducted a fax poll of 200 corporate and law firm counsel regarding their experiences
with court ADR. See Court ADR: How Much Do Lawyers Use It?, 13 ALTERNATIvES
TO HIGH COST ITIG. 36, 36 (1995). The 100 responses (from 63 law firm practitioners
and 37 corporate counsel) indicated that 83 lawyers had participated in court ADR
(mediation, early neutral evaluation, arbitration, summary jury trial, magistrate
settlement programs and case valuation) in the past two years. Nearly 75% of
respondents said that such programs produced "speedier resolutions" and two-thirds
indicated that the resolutions were "more economical." See id. Results were deemed
"more satisfactory" and also "better than experiences with traditional court
procedures" about 58% of the time and "as good as" traditional court procedures
another 30% of the time. See id.
25 Multi-door programs have been established in several federal district courts and
state courts in New Jersey, Texas, Massachusetts and the District of Columbia. See
PLAPiNGER & STmNSTRA, supra note 24, at 67; see also generally Gladys Kessler &
Linda J. Finkelstein, The Evolution of a Multi-Door Courthouse, 37 CAT. U. L. REv.
577 (1988) (discussing development of multi-door program in the District of Columbia).
See infra Section I.C.2.
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but reflect more selective use of settlement-oriented third party
interventions. There are several reasons for this state of affairs.
B. Realities of Court-Connected ADR
1. Selling the Concept
Most court-connected programs first arose through the initiative of
relatively few individuals, including influential members of the bench and
bar.26 They were made aware of programs operating in other jurisdictions
and came to the effort with those models in mind. From such sources came
rules and procedures, forms, administrative guidelines and, most
importantly, anecdotal evidence from the field-in other words, all of the
building blocks for the establishment and operation of a program.27
There was also the matter of educating prospective users-a critical
component of successful implementation. Although the ultimate impact of
26 See, e.g., Kessler & Finkelstein, supra note 25, at 587 (noting importance of
active involvement of judges in ADR reform). Sharon Press recently related the
important role of the Florida Supreme Court and the Office of the State Courts
Administrator in the evolution of Florida's groundbreaking statewide ADR program,
which is effectively a mediation-based program. See Sharon Press, Institutionalization:
Savior or Saboteur of Mediation?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 903, 905-906 (1997).
Florida's pioneering effort provided inspiration for a number of other programs,
including the state-supported model mediation program established in my own state. The
latter was made a reality with the strong support of an influential judge on our local
circuit court and the Chief Justice of the Kentucky Supreme Court. See generally
Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Quiet Revolution Comes to Kentucky: A Case Study in
Community Mediation, 81 Ky. L.J. 855 (1993).
27 Increasingly, such efforts will be aided by data from the field and affected (for
better or worse) by the rapidly growing experience of the trial bar with alternative
conflict resolution approaches in the full range of public and private venues. The
National Center for State Courts, the National Institute for Dispute Resolution, and the
CPR Judicial Project, among other organizations, spearheaded educational initiatives
aimed at federal and state court judges. See, e.g., COURT ADR, supra note 24;
NATIONAL SyMposiuM, supra note 24; see also HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES, supra note 24;
D. MARIE PROVINE, SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL DISTRIcT JUDGES (Federal
Judicial Center 1986).
In the federal system, of course, widespread experimentation with ADR has
occurred pursuant to the mandate of the Civil Justice Reform Act. See COURT ADR,
supra note 24, at ix. In addition, a growing number of states have enacted statewide
ADR legislation or have establish state ADR commissions or task forces for planning
purposes. See id. at x n.A6.
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the process would be on those whose disputes make their way into the court
system, it is not they but the bench and bar-the gatekeepers of the temple
of justice-who would ultimately pass upon procedural reform. 28 The first
hurdle for any procedural innovation is to address the concerns of a critical
mass of sponsors and users (which in a program of court-mandated
intervention may initially be no more than one or two key judges) and
persuade them of the desirability of the change. The idea must initially be
explained and sold to those responsible for bringing the program into being
and ensuring its proper funding-members of the judiciary or court
administrators. Equally important are those expected to channel disputes
into the process-judges who will mandate referral and practitioners who
will counsel resort to the process.
Inevitably, the response of bench and bar was conditioned by their
prior experience in the existing system and their expectations regarding the
probable impact of innovation on their caseload or practice. The concerns
of attorneys might be expressed as lofty sentiments regarding impositions
on the right to trial, or more pragmatic (if misguided) complaints about loss
of fees or of forfeiting control of the client or the negotiation process.
Judges tend to think in terms of the impact on the docket or on the court's
bottom line.29 Would-be reformers who could speak clearly and with
authority (that is, from the perspective of a legal professional) to such
issues had the greatest chance of success. Best, therefore, to have a
proposal which was simple, straightforward and not overly threatening to
the status quo, with the help of testimonials from those connected with
programs of the kind to be emulated. 30
2. Administrative Costs
Selling judges and practitioners on the concept of a third-party
intervention was merely part of the problem. With any programmatic
28 1 take issue with colleagues who insist that our profession functions merely as
the instrument of the popular marketplace. See Stempel, supra note 1, at 355-356
(noting the often overlooked role of lawyers in the success or failure of judicial
reforms).
29 See, e.g., Raymond Broderick, Court-Annexed Compulsory Arbitration: It
Works, 72 JUDICATnR 217, 222-223 (1989) (evaluating court-connected arbitration in
light of cost and time savings).
30 Such realities help to explain why the great majority of court-appointed neutrals
are attorneys. See PLAPiNGER & STiENsTRA, supra note 24, at 9.
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change came a myriad of administrative issues, all of which depended upon
the scope and function of the program and what support personnel would
be required to assist the court in running it. These considerations begat a
host of questions: How would disputes be channeled into the program?
What would be the source of neutrals? How, if at all, would they be
selected and trained? Should neutrals be evaluated or subjected to
continuing education requirements? Who would schedule sessions, arrange
for the requisite location, handle payment, address the inevitable
contingencies and oversee the accompanying paperwork? What of
maintaining accounts, case files, neutral files and program statistics and
arranging for insurance for neutrals? Of preparing and revising form
letters, policies and procedures and creating ethical rules for neutrals? A
seemingly endless progression of tasks surrounds even a relatively simple
program. Internal responses to administrative needs can cost a good deal of
money, particularly if supporting personnel are expected to play more than
a strictly ministerial role. The cost of an administrator with a broad range
of knowledge and experience in multiple conflict resolution techniques
might be comparable to hiring another judge. The leaner and meaner the
program, and the fewer the financial and administrative strings, the greater
its probable acceptability. 31
For all of these reasons, it is not surprising that relatively few existing
programs aspire to the full synthesis of approaches proposed by Sander. 32
31 This is especially so in rural jurisdictions, although it is by no means confined to
such environs. Not surprisingly, most multi-door programs are located in large
metropolitan areas with a large, variegated volume of disputes justifying the economic
and human investment in a commensurately variegated program. See, e.g., Kessler &
Finkelstein, supra note 25 (discussing D.C. program).
32 See James Podgers, Maine Route: Multi-door proposal reflects growing role of
ADR, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 118 (although the multi-door model was considered by
35 states, relatively few have actually implemented programs along those lines). The
limited focus observed in most court-connected ADR programs is also observable in
related scholarship. See Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L.
REV. 691, 726 (1974) [hereinafter Macneil, Many Futures]. While the tendency of
scholars and other writers to aim research at a particular conflict resolution mechanism
in a particular setting is eminently justifiable, the relative lack of comparative studies
and syntheses probably reinforces the tendency to examine the potentialities of
individual mechanisms and inhibits the conceptualization of broader visions for public or
private conflict resolution. A straightforward comparison of various processes is set
forth in Frank E. A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A
User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 49 (1994).
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The same realities help to explain the predominance of mediation in court-
connected programs.
3. Predominance of Mediation
Among ADR processes involving the intervention of third-party
neutrals, mediation is far and away the most popular choice.33 This should
be no surprise for a variety of reasons. Mediation is a uniquely flexible
form of intervention which permits facilitated exploration of disputants'
interests (and, in some applications, a consideration of rights and power
issues), is perceived as less of an imposition on the trial lawyer and, at first
blush, the simplest and easiest to administer of programs of third-party
intervention. 34
The allure of mediation is in the wondrous simplicity of the idea of
third persons stepping into a dispute for the purpose of helping frame
issues, find a framework for communication and resolve conflict. In
concept a far cry from the adjudicative role, the mediative function is
nevertheless something judges understand well because they have been
doing it behind closed doors for years.35
33 See PLAPINGER & STMNSTRA, supra note 24, at 4 (discussing predominance of
mediation in federal district court programs); see also generally Janice Fleischer,
SPIDR Court Sector, Court-connected Mediation Activities, Annual SPIDR Conference
(Oct. 1994) (state-by-state survey of court-connected programs) (unpublished report, on
file with the International SPIDR Office).
34 On closer examination, of course, it becomes clear that the conceptual simplicity
of mediated negotiation masks a host of political and practical questions which a
sponsoring institution must address. See infra p. 13 and text accompanying notes 38-40.
Much of the research on court-connected mediation is summarized in NATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM, supra note 24, at 5-12, 55-89, 113-139.
35 See generally PROvINE, supra note 27, at ch. I (discussing the role of trial
judges in settlement negotiations); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L.
REV. 374 (1982) (criticizing judicial strong-arming tactics aimed at forcing settlement).
And now, of course, they have been assured by amendments to Federal Rule 16 that
they have a specific role to play in settling cases. See David I. Levine, Wayne D.
Brazil, Effective Approaches to Settlement: A Handbook for Lawyers and Judges, 4
OmIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 123, 123 (1988) (book review).
By "outsourcing" mediation, of course, they substantially transform its character-
for the better, most would agree, at least from the standpoint of preserving the integrity
of the respective mediative and judicial functions. See Resnik, supra note 1, at 248
n.146 (noting commentators' "concern that employing judges to conduct ADR, may
prompt coercive behavior in their pursuit of settlement"); cf Stempel, supra note 1, at
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As ADR reforms go, moreover, mediation is among the mildest of
threats to the status quo. There is usually only the obligation to sit down
with a neutral third party to discuss the issues and explore settlement
opportunities-no requirement of a formal case presentation involving a
revelation of trial strategies or other information and no condition that the
neutral address the merits, at least in the company of all parties. 36
The dichotomy of mediation is that the very simplicity of the concept
obscures the considerable range of intervention associated with the label.
Mediation is an enormously flexible approach which is uniquely
"tailorable" to a wide variety of conflict scenarios. If, as is often explained,
mediation defines a range of activities aimed at facilitating discussion and
problem solving consonant with party interests, the term is also popularly
associated with approaches in which a third party employs evaluative
342 (favorably comparing ADR to other mechanisms judges use to procure settlement of
cases).
36 The latter concerns have factored in judicial decisions limiting the ability of
courts to mandate participation in summary jury trial. See In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154
(6th Cir. 1993); Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988); see also
NATIONAL SYMPOsIUM, supra note 24, at 38 (summarizing constitutional and practical
concerns regarding court-annexed arbitration).
Although questions are sometimes raised regarding the ability of courts to order
parties to mediate, the question remains relatively uncontroversial among courts. See
Press, supra note 26, at 907-908 ("The mandatory order to mediate has not been
heavily litigated in Florida."). Mandatory mediation has arguably played a major role in
educating legal and lay communities about mediation, laying the groundwork for
broader use of that process and other alternatives. Whether mandatory mediation will be
an essential component in programs of the future remains to be seen, although it is a
common feature of federal and state programs. See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note
24, at 66 (stating that most federal mediation programs authorize judges to order parties
to mediation without their consent).
Although the American Bar Association officially opposes court-mandated
arbitration, the Legislation Committee of the ABA Dispute Resolution Section may
propose that pending federal legislation be revised to drop mandatory arbitration
provisions and substitute a provision that would grant federal district court specific
power to mandate mediation in appropriate cases. See Memorandum from Cecilia
Morgan, R. Larson Frisby et al., to Council, ABA Section of Dispute Resolution 2,3
(Jan. 15, 1998) [hereinafter ABA Legislation Memo]. In a recent fax poll on court-
connected ADR conducted by the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution of member
attorneys, 43 % of those responding preferred court programs where ADR use was
completely optional. Another 38% preferred programs which gave the parties a choice
of ADR process. See CPR Fax Poll, How much experience do you have with ADR and
has it helped resolve your cases? (Oct. 31, 1997) (on file with author).
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techniques-that is, which factor in some perspectives on party rights and
power issues. 37 A common practice in mediation of personal injury and
malpractice cases is for the neutral (usually an experienced trial
practitioner) to offer a confidential prediction of the fate of a case in
litigation, administering the dose of reality that will trigger more realistic
assessments of settlement prospects. 38 This narrowly focused evaluative
model reflects not only the de facto breadth of the "mediation" label, but
also the impact of the trial lawyer's perspective on court-annexed
mediation. 39
Finally, the conceptual simplicity of mediation may lead some to infer
that a mediation program may be developed and administered with
commensurate ease. As experienced sponsors will attest, however, a well-
administered mediation program may actually entail greater effort than
similar efforts focusing on nonbinding arbitration or evaluation.40
37 See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 24, at 65-66 (discussing the emergence
of "facilitative" and "evaluative" approaches among mediators in court-annexed
programs); see also NATIONAL SYMPOsIUM, supra note 24, at ix (observing that ADR
research is complicated by range of so-called mediation processes). Some courts provide
specific guidelines for mediator strategies, others do not. See PLAPiNGER & STmNSTRA,
supra note 24, at 65-66.
The practice of employing evaluative strategies in mediation has fueled a continuing
debate among those who believe that such approaches are functionally distinct from
mediation and those who do not. See, e.g., James J. Alfini, Evaluative Versus
Facilitative Mediation: A Discussion, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 919 (1997) (dialogue
presenting various viewpoints on the issue); John Bickerman, Evaluative Mediator
Responds, 14 ALTERNATrVE TO HIGH CosT LmG. 70 (1996); Kimberlee K. Kovach &
Lela P. Love, "Evaluative Mediation" is an Oxymoron, 14 ALTERNAIVES TO HIGH
COST LIG. 31 (1996).
As we will see, wide variances in mediator styles and strategies are observable in
mediation of construction contract disputes. See infra Section W.C.
A helpful, straightforward guide to understanding the range of approaches in the
field is set forth in Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations,
Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REv. 7
(1996) (providing a graphic tool for analyzing mediator approaches).
38 See, e.g., PovNE, supra note 27, at 51-57 (discussing evaluative procedures
involving "lawyer-mediators"). Indeed, the recognition of this fact of life has prompted
more than one local program to consider instituting a nonbinding evaluation program for
certain classes of cases. But see infra text accompanying note 43.
39 As we will see, the influence of trial lawyers is also evident in one evolutionary
strand in the consensual arena. See infra Section W.C.
40 See generally Press, supra note 26 (discussing the continuing evolution of a
regulatory structure for court-connected mediation in Florida). Identifying, training and
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An extensive survey of the federal system reveals that although
nonbinding arbitration is an option in a number of programs, it is not
nearly as popular as mediation. 41 In the state courts, nonbinding arbitration
programs were organized in a number of states by the late 1980s.42 A
number of programs have since been abandoned, however, and the rate of
program adoption has dropped off steeply since 1990. 43
The federal survey found early neutral evaluation programs in only
fourteen federal courts and noted that one of the first courts to adopt the
process had abandoned the procedure as "unnecessary in light of the
court's substantial mediation program." 44 Summary jury trial, although
authorized by many federal districts, is "used only occasionally. " 45
supervising mediators is every bit as difficult as performing similar functions with
respect to arbitrators and case evaluators. In light of the relative difficulty of the
mediator's interactive role and critical importance of intensive skills training for
mediators, it is arguably much more difficult. See COURT ADR, supra note 24, at ch. 5
(comparing qualification and training requirements for mediators, arbitrators and case
evaluators in court-connected programs); see also NATIONAL SYMPOsIuM, supra note
24, at 155-171 (summarizing research on qualification and training of mediators).
41 See PLAPINGER & STmNSTRA, supra note 24, at 4; Plapinger, Twilight, supra
note 24, at B25 (mediation has "eclipsed" arbitration in federal court programs under
the CJRA).
42 See Susan Keilitz et al., State Adoption of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Where
Is It Today?, 12 STATE CT. J., Spring 1988, at 8 (stating that approximately half of the
nation's state trial court systems adopted some form of mandatory court-administered
non-binding arbitration by the end of the 1980s); see also NATIONAL SYMPOsniM, supra
note 24, at 37-50 (summarizing research findings relating to court-annexed arbitration
programs).
43 See Telephone Interview with Susan Keilitz, National Center for State Courts
(Nov. 7, 1997). "Arbitration, once the most common ADR method [in federal court
programs], saw almost no growth under the CJRA." Plapinger, Twilight, supra note 24,
at B25. Recently, however, Congress permanently reauthorized the 20 federal district
court pilot arbitration programs. See P. L. 105-53, 111 Stat. 1173 (1997). In addition,
on March 3, 1997, Representative Howard Coble of North Carolina introduced a bill
known as the Alternative Dispute Resolution and Settlement Encouragement Act. H.R.
2603 would, among other things, expand the use of both voluntary and mandatory
arbitration in federal district courts. A related bill, S. 997, was introduced on July 8,
1997, by Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa. The ABA officially opposes the mandatory
arbitration provisions. See ABA Legislation Memo, supra note 36, at 5.
44 PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 24, at 5. See Plapinger, Twilight, supra
note 24, at B25 (noting that although the use of early neutral evaluation has expanded
under the CJRA, the process "remains significantly less popular than mediation"); see
also NATIONAL SYMPOsIUM, supra note 24, at 12-17 (summarizing research findings
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C. Glimmerings: Greater Breadth and Depth in Court ADR
Although Professor Sander's vision, encompassing a synthesis of
various conflict resolution approaches which enables a tailoring of the
method to the matter and a dynamic response to the changing circumstances
of the disputants, has not been realized, evidence suggests that many court
programs and other public initiatives are evolving to embrace similar ends.
Such opportunities should expand as users become more sophisticated in
the application of mediation and other intervention approaches and more
cognizant of the range of possibilities in and out of the court system.
1. Polishing the Stone: Variations on the Mediation Theme
The unprecedented focus on mediated conflict resolution, largely driven
by the growth of court-annexed procedures, proved to be a wellspring of
creativity in the development of variations on the mediation theme. In
Kentucky, a partnering between the court system and a nonprofit mediation
program has evolved in a number of different directions, with discrete
procedural or mediator training guidelines for divorce and child custody
disputes, personal injury actions and small claims. Other initiatives include
relating to court-annexed case evaluation programs in state and federal courts). Again,
this phenomenon may be in part the result of an effective "lumping in" of evaluative
processes in mediation. See supra note 37. During a recent meeting of the Securities
Industry Conference on Arbitration, for example, discussion centered on whether an
industry-sponsored pilot project on mediated negotiation should be supplemented by an
early neutral evaluation program. The brief response was that, in light of the fact that so
many mediators employed evaluative strategies, a separate program would be
superfluous.
As noted before, of course, there are many who believe evaluative processes should
be distinguished for the benefit of users. In Kentucky, a growing recognition that many
users of the court-connected mediation program desire a non-binding evaluation of their
case has spurred an initiative to develop a "subsidiary" voluntary non-binding
arbitration program.
45 PLAPINGER & STmNsTRA, supra note 24, at 68; see also Plapinger, Twilight,
supra note 24, at B25 (noting that use of this resource-intensive process is low in federal
court programs, with most courts reporting only one or two summary jury trials a year);
NAToNAL SYMPoSIUM, supra note 24, at 17-20 (summarizing research findings relating
to the use of summary jury trial in federal and state courts). "The cases for which
[summary jury triall is suitable are those in which attempts at settlement negotiations
and dispute resolution processes have failed and which are on the verge of a lengthy,
and costly, trial." Id. at 17.
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a mediation program for real estate transactions, a city/county government-
sponsored program for mediation of planning and zoning disputes and a
nonprofit center built on a "transformative" mediation concept. 46 The
relatively mature Florida program comprehends a spectrum of variations on
the mediation principle and, most importantly, has spurred intense activity
in the private realm.47 Now, the reality of judicially mandated mediation
has led legal practitioners to encourage clients to mediate even before filing
a complaint and to select mediators of their choice. 48 In all of these ways,
intense experimentation within a single ADR mode has maximized its
usefulness in a wide range of applications 49 and permitted closer tailoring
of the intervention strategy to the conflict.
2. Variegated Approaches: Multi-Door Programs and Stepped
Processes
Despite the relative emphasis on mediation, many courts have specific
authority to bring other procedures into play in appropriate cases. Plapinger
and Stienstra reported it "not uncommon ... to find at least two ADR
46 The program was inspired by ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FoLGER,
THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION (1994). See also NATIONAL SYMPOSIuM, supra note 24, at
5-12, 20-31, 51-89, 113-129 (summarizing research relating to different applications
of the mediation concept, including general civil case, medical malpractice, divorce and
child custody, juvenile, small claims, appellate, community justice and victim-offender
mediation).
47 See generally Press, supra note 26; Sharon Press, Building and Maintaining a
Statewide Mediation Program: A View from the Field, 81 Ky. L.J. 1029 (1993).
Although it tends to be mediation-focused, Florida represents the paradigm of an active,
intensive statewide program. Such efforts are significant in the current generation of
ADR initiatives. See Judith M. Filner & Margaret Shaw, Update: Development of
Dispute Resolution in State Courts, NIDR FORUM, Summer/Fall 1993, at 36, 37-38.
48 See Press, supra note 26, at 908.
49 As noted previously, there are debates about what is and is not a proper strategy
in mediation. See supra note 37. My point is that given any particular conflict resolution
approach, over time user groups will maximize their potentialities by evolving their own
variants on the process. See, e.g., Section III.C.1. (addressing changes to the AAA
Construction Industry Arbitration Rules). Once the limits of the process have been
revealed, however, other techniques will be explored. See supra note 44 and see infra
Parts IV, V.
In both public and private conflict resolution, the identity and perspective of the
person(s) in control of conflict resolution strategies makes a big difference. See infra
Section II.B.4. and Parts III, IV, V.
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procedures available in many federal courts[;] ... at least six courts now
offer a full array of options, including arbitration, mediation, early neutral
evaluation, and summary jury trial." 5" They also identified state multi-door
programs in New Jersey, Texas, Massachusetts and the District of
Columbia. 51
Perhaps the best known of federal multi-option programs is that
sponsored by the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
California, a pilot program superimposed on a pre-existing scheme for
court referral. The program, which was developed for the express purpose
of assessing the potential of various ADR processes, includes options for
nonbinding arbitration, mediation, early neutral evaluation, early magistrate
judge settlement conferences, later judicial settlement conferences,
summary jury trial and appointment of special masters. 52 In cases subject to
the program, counsel must discuss the range of nonbinding ADR options
(including court-sponsored programs and private alternatives) and, if
possible, agree upon a choice. Failing agreement, the decision to refer a
case to ADR may be postponed until the initial case management
5 0 PLAPNGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 24, at 5.
51 See id. at 67. See generally NATIONAL SYMOsIUM, supra note 24, at 90-112
(summarizing research on state multi-door courthouse projects). Multi-door programs
were implemented in Washington, D.C., Houston, Texas, and Tulsa Oklahoma in the
mid-1980s with the support of the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on
Dispute Resolution. Programs were later established by other sponsors in Burlington,
New Jersey and Cambridge, Massachusetts. See id. at 92-93.
A number of other jurisdictions, such as New Hampshire and Minnesota, permit
litigants to select from a menu of ADR mechanisms. See COURT ADR, supra note 24, at
5-6. The menu approach is also appearing in some federal courts such as the Western
District of Missouri. See id. at 6-7. Rules in a number of federal district courts and
some state courts explicitly authorize judges to direct any case to any ADR process
offered by the court. See id. at 7-9.
In San Mateo County, California, an innovative collaboration of the courts,
community organizations and members of the bar promises to provide a unique multi-
option ADR referral program. See Multi-Option ADR Project: A Partnership of the San
Mateo County Courts, Bar and Community, Strategic Plan 1997-2003 (June 1997) (on
file with author).
52 See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 24, at 90-102. An extended treatment
of the early neutral evaluation (ENE) component of the program appeared in Joshua D.
Rosenberg & H. Jay Folberg, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Empirical Analysis, 46
STAN. L. REv. 1487 (1994). See also generally David I. Levine, Northern District of
California Adopts Early Neutral Evaluation to Expedite Dispute Resolution, 72
JuDIcATURE 235 (1989).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
conference with the assigned judge. After discussing the matter in
conference, the parties may agree on a procedure or the judge may refer
the case to an ADR process unless persuaded that no ADR process will be
beneficial. 53 The multi-pronged program, which is administered by a
special Office of ADR Programs (assisted by a magistrate judge as liaison)
functions within the framework of extensive procedural and neutral
eligibility and training requirements. 54 Such an experiment, one of the
closest embodiments of the Sander model, may only be possible in the
context of a high-volume jurisdiction with a committee panel of judges and
targeted supplementary funding. 55
In some cases, ADR approaches are being employed seriatum. 56 A
stepped approach is a featured option of the three-track ADR program
developed by the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama. 57 Parties electing the option first engage in mediation. If
mediation is unsuccessful the neutral proceeds to the arbitration phase
during which the parties may offer evidence and arguments at a hearing
which may be placed on the record. The neutral then issues a decision on
the merits. If a party rejects the neutral's decision, proceeds to trial de novo
and fails to obtain a better result, that party must pay all the opponent's
costs and attorney fees incurred from the date the arbitrator received notice
of rejecting the award. 58
53 See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 24, at 90-92.
54 See id. at 93-102.
55 The Northern District of California was one of ten courts authorized to establish
a mandatory, nonbinding court-annexed arbitration program. See 28 U.S.C. § 658(1)
(1993); see also COURT ADR, supra note 24, at 25-26 (describing differential case
management or "case tracking" systems which assign cases to different ADR schemes
based on various criteria).
56 Stepped approaches have long been employed under American automobile lemon
laws. In many cases an unhappy customer's complaint sets into motion an informal
telephonic mediation process which results in satisfactory settlement. If not, the case is
put before an arbitration panel which renders a decision which binds the auto
manufacturer but not the customer; the latter still has the option of a de novo court trial.
57 See PLAPINGER & STMNsTRA, supra note 24, at 73-76. The program permits
counsel to meet with the court soon after the filing of a complaint to determine whether
the case is appropriate for mediation, a mediation-arbitration option or some other form
of court-sponsored or private ADR, including summary jury trial. (The mediation
option was, with few exceptions, the most widely elected at the time of reporting.) See
id.
58 See id. at 75.
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In the last decade, federal and state agencies have reacted to a series of
mandates to embrace ADR.59 The Veterans Administration Contract
Appeals Board (VACAB) provides an example of the kind of creative,
flexible approach that may become increasingly common in the fourth
branch of government. VACAB, like other tribunals established to
adjudicate appeals of government contract claims, was an experiment in
ADR. Congress, however, gave VACAB and other contract appeals boards
conflicting marching orders.60 On the one hand, the boards were to proceed
in a quick, informal manner to avoid the delays and inefficiencies of
traditional litigation. On the other hand, they were admonished to act like a
federal district court-to make a record and to provide both parties with a
full and fair opportunity to present their case, including full discovery
rights. The result was that VACAB and other appeals boards fell prey to
the same inefficiencies and delays as courts of more general jurisdiction.
Then came the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990,61 which
admonished appeals boards and other administrative agencies to develop
alternatives to traditional adjudicative procedures. Responding to this
5 9 Federal agencies were required to adopt an ADR policy by the Administrative
Dispute Resolution Act of 1990 (ADRA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-593 (1990). The use of
ADR was also encouraged by an Executive Order during the Bush Administration. See
Memorandum of Preliminary Guidance on Implementation of the Litigation Reforms of
Executive Order No. 12778, 57 Fed. Reg. 3640, 3641 (Dep't Justice 1992). See
generally ADMINsTRATI CONFERENCE OF THE UNrrED STATES, SOURCEBOOK:
FEDERAL AGENCY USE OF ALTERNATIVE MEANs OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1987); Frank
Carr et al., The Untapped Potential of ADR in the Construction Industry, 42 FED.
LAW., June 1995, at 32; Senator Charles E. Grassley & Charles Pou, Jr., Congress, the
Executive Branch and the Dispute Resolution Process, 1992 J. DISP. RESOL. 1; Maria
R. Lamari, The Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Government Construction
Contract Disputes, 23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 205 (1994).
In the construction arena, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has pioneered the use
of a wide range of alternative dispute resolution approaches, as well as facilitated
"partnering" and consensus building initiatives aimed at improving communications
among project actors and other "stakeholders" in Corps projects. See generally
PARTNmuNG, CONSENSUS BUILDING, AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
CURRENT USES AND OPPORTUNITms IN THm U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS (IWR
Working Paper No. 96-ADR-WP-8, May 1996) [hereinafter IWR WORKING PAPER].
See infra Part V.
60 See Guy H. McMichael, 111, ADR at the Veterans Administration Board of
Contract Appeals, Commonwealth Council for Cooperation in the Construction
Community, Louisville, Kentucky, Jan. 14, 1994.
61 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-593 (1990).
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challenge, the Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA) developed a menu of
options available to parties at the time a case is filed. Typically, the choice
involves abbreviated presentations, usually lasting a day or less, before a
settlement judge. The settlement judge, either an outside neutral or a board
judge recused from later hearing the case, renders a nonbinding opinion to
inform the parties of the strengths and weaknesses of their case. The
precise form of the hearing, the selection of the judge and other features of
the process are determined by the parties. The neutral is also responsible
for various aspects of case management. Chief Administrative Judge Guy
McMichael indicates that eighty-five percent of cases referred to such
processes settle. In light of this success within the appeals system, the VA
is considering a pilot project which would involve third-party participation
in ADR prior to initiation of the appeals process. As in other cases, the
process of exploring ADR options would typically be initiated by a member
of the board assigned for the purpose.
3. The Evolving Roles of Magistrates and Other Neutrals in ADR
and Case Management
A more subtle but highly significant theme in recent court ADR is the
expanding role of the magistrate judge, the special master and other court-
appointed neutrals. At least one-third of federal courts have designated
magistrate judges as the primary settlement officer; 62 some courts rely
heavily on the case management assistance of special masters and other
neutrals. Their function is, increasingly, to explore a range of conflict
resolution strategies, to tailor methods to the issues at hand and to respond
dynamically to the circumstances of the case and the needs of the parties. 63
Magistrate judges have come to play a key role in many federal district
court programs.64 Their evolution as "chief ADR officers" for a court
62 See PLAPiNGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 24, at 6.
63 These developments appear to be part of a larger trend to integrate more closely
ADR and the management of the overall case. As Plapinger and Stienstra observe, "the
newer forms of ADR expect the judge to be very much at the center of ADR use,"
educating parties about the possibilities and exploring ADR options. Id. at 7.
64 See, e.g., PLAPiNGER & STiENSTRA, supra note 24, at 230-236 (summarizing the
magistrate judge-supervised program in the Western District of Oklahoma); Resnik,
supra note 1, at 248 (concluding that ADR was one of several factors prompting
Congress to authorize increased reliance on magistrate judges); Weinstein, supra note 1,
at 271-272 (discussing role of magistrate judges in coordinating all pretrial discovery
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system offers several important benefits. First of all, the arrangement
bifurcates the adjudicative function and settlement functions of the court,
preserving the integrity of the trial process while permitting greater
flexibility in the process of encouraging settlement. It also encourages the
development of a cadre of professionals with a breadth and depth of ADR
experience beyond the typical part-time neutral. A fully dedicated master
"ADR manager" is arguably the most effective means of exploiting the
potentialities of ADR intervention strategies and related case management
opportunities within the judicial system. 65 Their involvement at the critical
juncture of case and court process offers the possibility of informed and
deliberate consideration of multiple doors and multiple paths, including
sophisticated hybrid approaches, with the advice and consent of the parties.
ADR choices may be considered alongside other case management issues,
including discovery and dispositive motions. Although the magistrate's role
is in some respects the functional equivalent of the screening clerk of the
Sander multi-door courthouse, magistrates may bring into play greater
preparation, broader discretion and coercive authority and greater emphasis
and performing factfinding regarding pretrial issues in the Eastern District of New
York); see also COURT ADR, supra note 24, at 26-27 (describing court programs
employing professional ADR "suitability screeners" to match cases to particular ADR
processes).
65 The recent Rand study on ADR and other forms of case management in various
federal district courts concluded that "increased magistrate judge activity on civil cases
is a strong and statistically significant predictor of greater attorney satisfaction," in part
because of their relative accessibility to parties. KAKALK ET AL., supra note 24, at 21.
In one "procedurally remarkable" case, the parties agreed that a federal magistrate
would "act as arbitrator" to resolve any impasses on elements of loss in a contract
action. See generally DDI Seamless Cylinder v. General Fire Extinguisher, 14 F.3d
1163 (7th Cir. 1994). With some tongue-in-cheek asides on the subject of judges
moonlighting as arbitrators, Judge Richard Posner upheld the agreement as an inartful
attempt to structure "an abbreviated judicial procedure rather than an unauthorized
arbitral one." Id. at 1165-1166.
In the United Kingdom, commercial disputes may be referred to the Official
Referee's Court. In such cases the referee assigned to the case is not authorized to
discuss settlement with the parties, but will attempt, by ordering disclosure of
documents, exchange of expert's reports and other information, to afford both parties an
objective view of their opponent's case and their own prospects of success. The referee
may also order a meeting of the experts to attempt to stipulate to technical facts and to
narrow issues. The result is that approximately 85% of the cases referred to referees
settle between the time of filing and the date fixed for trial. See Judge John Newey, The
Construction Industry, in CONSTRUCON CoNFLicr MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION
21, 24 (Peter Fenn & Rod Gameson eds., 1992) [hereinafter FENN & GAMEsON].
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on the needs of the particular conflict, and more involvement of the
affected parties. 66 Their continuing participation, coupled with an
opportunity for appropriate evaluation and feedback by users of the
program, enhances the likelihood of developing an institutional memory
regarding ADR options and related case management issues.
Special masters 67 and other court-appointed neutrals may also perform
tasks which transcend the more traditional focus on factfinding, evaluating
or facilitating resolution of substantive issues. Some courts now utilize
special masters for all aspects of pretrial case management, usually with the
deliberate intention of preparing the case for mediation or other
intervention aimed at resolving disputes short of trial. In California, for
example, a number of courts are coupling a voluntary or compelled case
management order with the appointment of a special master to manage
litigation, including complex multiparty disputes such as construction defect
cases. 68 The special master, typically a retired judge or attorney with
pertinent expertise, manages limited discovery and investigation and then
mediates the case or facilitates ADR with another third-party neutral.69
66 See supra note 22 (discussing four factors for enhancing the "match" between
conflict and approach); see also Stempel, supra note 1, at 370-373 (proposing that
Sander's "screening clerk" be replaced by "a judicial officer of substantial training and
discretion" who may "require basic but modest discovery... in order to determine
which ADR method to require" or what other alternatives, such as a dispositive ruling,
might be appropriate).
The example par excellence of the sophisticated magistrate judge is Wayne Brazil,
who has frequently reflected in print upon his wide experiences with intervention
strategies in the federal court system. See generally WAYNE D. BRAZIL, EFFECTVE
APPROACHES TO SETTLEMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES (1988).
67 Under the Federal Rules, special masters may be appointed when "the issues are
complicated" and "only on a showing that some exceptional condition requires it."
FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b). Within the scope of the judicial order of referral, special masters
have a good deal of flexibility to tailor procedures "to the particular requirements of the
case." Weinstein, supra note 1, at 271.
68 See Richard H. Glucksman & Glenn T. Barger, Managing Construction Defect
Cases, LAw., July 1996, at 7.
69 See id. at 8, 11; John R. Griffiths, Use of Special Masters to Facilitate Early
Settlements (Nov. 3, 1993) (outline describing role of court-appointed special master for
case management and mediation of disputes, with exemplary pretrial orders) (on file
with author); see also Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 112 F.R.D. 367, 370 (N.D. Tex. 1986)
(holding appointment of special master to implement settlement agreement was
appropriate); John W. Cooley, Query: Could settlement masters help reduce the cost of
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In some courts, mediators facilitate information exchange and work
with the parties and the court to find the most effective method for
resolving the case. 70 In the Northern District of California, even case
evaluators sometimes help the parties develop a discovery plan and
schedule follow-up negotiation sessions. 71 In this way, court-appointed
neutrals, like magistrate judges, may serve as "process architects." 72
litigation and the workload of federal courts?, 68 JuDIcATuiE, 59, 59-60 (1984)
(describing pioneering efforts in the use of settlement masters in federal courts).
Of course, special masters have been utilized to assist in case management in a
number of widely-publicized complex tort cases. See, e.g., Eric D. Green & Francis E.
McGovern, Ohio Asbestos Litigation, Case Management Plan and Case Evaluation and
Apportionment Process, Judge Thomas D. Lambros, United States District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio (1983) (on file with author). Among the best known of
special masters, Francis McGovern continues to be a leading innovator in the
development of new strategies for resolution of mass tort cases. See, e.g., Frances E.
McGovern, Rethinking Cooperation Among Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 44
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1851 (1997). The use of court-appointed settlement masters has
raised a number of concerns, including lack of pertinent experience in the neutral, and
excessive costs. See Richard Reuben, The Dark Side of ADR, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1994, at
53.
70 See, e.g., Ronald H. Kahn, A Mediation Protocol for the Complex Case,
Presentation to Division 1, ABA Forum on the Construction Industry Annual Meeting
(Apr. 25, 1997) (on fie with author). My own experience as a special master in federal
district court was a traditional appointment as a neutral factflnder with no
responsibilities for managing the case prior to trial. As a federal court mediator,
however, I have, among other things, supervised limited information exchange in
furtherance of settlement discussions, arranged for court hearings on selected issues by
agreement of the parties and facilitated the appointment of arbitrators for out-of-court
adjudication of a major commercial case.
71 See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 24, at 100; see also NATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM, supra note 24, at 45-46 (discussing handling of discovery and discovery-
related motions by court-appointed arbitrators).
72 Of course, unless an outside court-appointed neutral has extensive experience
within the court system, she may be less effective than a magistrate judge in addressing
larger case management issues. As is always the case with independent contractors,
moreover, there may also be legitimate concerns regarding quality control. See Stempel,
supra note 1, at 373-374. Finally, the costs associated with an outside neutral may be
significant. In some cases, such expenses may become a strategic consideration.
Outside neutrals may, of course, work in tandem with judges or magistrate judges.
See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 270 (discussing Judge Weinstein's use of magistrate
judges and special masters in complex multiparty litigation). In one case I performed the
role of early neutral evaluator, and the magistrate mediated the subsequent negotiations.
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In all of these ways, court programs imbue some or all of the attributes
of the multi-door courthouse in case management programs. If such is the
range of experimentation within the public justice system, what might be
accomplished by the consensual arrangements of private parties, acting
within a long tradition of out-of-court conflict management? That is the
question to be considered in the context of a veritable minefield of
conflict-the U.S. construction industry.
II. CONSENSUAL APPROACHES IN A CRUCIBLE OF CONFLICT
A. The Need for "Proper Structures"
An earlier study detailed the factors which make the process of creating
and improving the built environment a "recipe for conflict": 73 (1) a unique
undertaking by a large and varied cast; (2) performance over an extended
period of time and in a wide variety of environmental conditions; (3) a
complex one-of-a-kind product and (4) modem delivery systems, which
sometimes fragment work efforts and emphasize speed over other
concerns. 74 In the face of these realities, even the most assiduous contract
drafting has proven ineffective. The use of contract boilerplate has
The evolution of ADR "conflict managers" within the court system provides a
helpful analogy for more ambitious facilitation schemes in the arena of relational
contracting. See infra Part VI.
73 See Ron Baden Hellard, Construction Conflict-Management and Resolution, in
FENN & GAMEsON, supra note 65, at 35 (Peter Fenn & Ron Gameson eds., 1992)
[hereinafter FEmN & GAMESON]. See generally Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration, supra
note 2, at 31. This study followed up on an earlier empirical treatment of binding
arbitration. See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63
IND. L.J. 425 (1988) [hereinafter Stipanowich, Rethinking Arbitration]. See infra text
accompanying notes 108-146.
74 Since World War II the industry has moved from the scenario in which work
was carried on by a single contractor who employed nearly all tradesman to a position
in which most of the work is performed by specialty contractors. See Steven T.
Halverson, The Future of the Construction Industry, SuRErYscomE, Autumn 1994, at 3.
Increasing budget and time constraints on designers make it more likely that details of
the design will be omitted. See generally S. G. Revay, Can Construction Claims Be
Avoided?, in FENN & GAMESON, supra note 65, at 202 (discussing Canadian survey of
hundreds of North American projects).
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expanded with the perceived risks of contracting in the postwar era. Such
boilerplate is at best a Band-Aid and at worst salt in the wound.75
Contractual arrangements facilitating building design and construction
are the ultimate evocation of the "relational" contract paradigm explored
by Macneil, 76 Macaulay 77 and others.78 The relational theorists pointed up
the shortcomings of classic contract theory in the context of extended
commercial relationships, 79 in which the discrete front-end bargain may be
of less significance than norms and standards which evolve during the
75 See Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration, supra note 2, at 73, 76. A recent empirical
study of the British construction industry suggests that "projects were completed
successfully in spite of the contract documents, rather than because of them." Sandi
Rhys Jones, How Constructive is Construction Law?, 10 CoNSTRUCTON L.J. 28, 33
(1994).
76 See generally IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEw SocAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO
MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELAnTONS (1980); Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract:
Internal and External, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 340 (1983); Ian R. Macneil, Economic
Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shorfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classificatory
Apparatus," 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 1018 (1981) [hereinafter Macneil, Economic Analysis];
Macneil, Adjustment, supra note 4; Macneil, Primer, supra note 3; Macneil, Many
Futures, supra note 32.
77 See generally Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963) [hereinafter Macaulay, Non-
contractual Relations]; Stewart Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the
Complexities of Contract, 11 L. & Soc. REv. 507 (1977) [hereinafter Macaulay,
Elegant Models]; Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L.
Rv. 465 [hereinafter Macaulay, Empirical View].
78 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial
Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990); Richard E. Speidel, The New Spirit of
Contract, 2 J.L. & COM. 193 (1982); Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price
Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 369 (1981);
Oliver E. Williamson, The Organization of Work: A Comparative Institutional
Assessment, 1 J. ECON. BmiAv. & ORG. 5 (1980); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction
Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233
(1979) [hereinafter Williamson, Transaction Cost].
79 See Macaulay, Elegant Models, supra note 77, at 508-509. A condensed list of
the differences between contractual relations and discrete transactions include
considerations relating to: (1) commencement, duration and termination; (2)
measurement and specificity; (3) planning; (4) sharing vs. dividing benefits and
burdens; (5) interdependence, future cooperation and solidarity; (6) personal relations
among, and numbers of, participants; and (7) power. See Macneil, Economic Analysis,
supra note 76, at 1041-1056.
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course of performance 8° and relationships of trust and confidence between
individual actors. 81
In such transactions, moreover, change is inevitable, as heavily
integrated procedures in construction contracts attest. Adjustments may be
necessary due to modified plans, misunderstandings, external events and
the very translation of promise into action. 82 Even well-planned
transactions cannot address all contingencies and may leave considerable
room for differing interpretations. 83 In many cases, to the chagrin of
transactional counsel, the client's desire to get the deal done leads to
purposeful vagueness. 84  Prenuptial optimism also leads to an
underemphasis on the effect of nonperformance or defective performance.85
Most of the time, adjustments will occur without dispute. When
disputes do occur, they are frequently settled without resort to contract
terms or the threat of legal sanctions-often because of personal
relationships between individuals at the interface of the contractual
relationship.8 6 But when these informal processes fail and parties must turn
to the legal system for assistance, the realities of the relational contract
collide with a formalistic system which assesses risks and assigns blame by
an inordinate emphasis on the original agreement and past events. 87 The
rules which help courts to resolve cases may seem particularly
inappropriate to parties in a contractual relationship; the system, which is
80 See Macneil, Many Futures, supra note 32, at 733-734; see also Williamson,
Transaction Cost, supra note 78, at 238. Williamson observed "that specialized code
words or expressions can and do arise in the context of recurring transactions." Id. at
243. This specialized vocabulary may yield economies within the relationship, but also
operates as a barrier between those inside and those outside the relationship. See id.
81 See Williamson, Transaction Cost, supra note 78, at 240.
82 See Macneil, Adjustment, supra note 4, at 873-875.
83 See Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations, supra note 77, at 58 (relating
statements by some in manufacturing business that most contract disputes arise as a
result of ambiguity in specifications).
84 See id. (explaining that such practices persist despite disagreement on the
details); see also id. at 59 (describing the realities of "the battle of the forms"); id. at
66 (providing a treatment of the differing perspectives of salespersons and attorneys).
85 See id. at 60.
86 See id. at 60-67.
87 See Macneil, Adjustment, supra note 4, at 890-891; cf. J.D. Nyhart & E.A.
Dauer, A Preliminary Analysis of the Uses of Scientific Models in Dispute Prevention,
Management and Resolution, 1986 J. DIsP. RESOL. 29, 32-33 (discussing the
disadvantages of traditional litigation).
330
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only indirectly a mechanism for cooperative problem solving, may not only
ignore but also do serious harm to the relationship.88 The result may be a
net loss for both or all parties. 89
Because the legal system provides limited assistance in effective
governance of long-term relationships, contracting parties are well advised
to develop internal governing structures commensurate with the specific
character and circumstances of the transaction and the goals of the parties
to the relationship-a system that not only appreciates the essential
characteristics of the relationship as it has evolved, but also anticipates its
continuing evolution in accordance with the aspirations of the contracting
parties. 90 The longer and more complex the relationship, the more
emphasis can and should be placed on the development of such
mechanisms. 91 Macneil offered the example of the collective bargaining
88 As Macneil puts it, "[sluch a system Will... continue to rub in an
unnecessarily abrasive manner against the realities of coexistence with relational needs
for flexibility and change." Macneil, Adjustment, supra note 4, at 888. See also
Williamson, Transaction Cost, supra note 78, at 256 (quoting remarks of Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, The Adversary Society, Baron di Hirsch Meyer Lecture, University of
Miami School of Law, Feb. 2, 1978).
89 On the other hand, Macaulay argues, partial but incomplete use of the litigation
process may serve several functions, including relieving private decisionmakers of
immediate responsibility for handling problems, placing official sanctions upon
negotiated concessions, providing an ever-growing body of information regarding the
risks and rewards of various alternative courses of action and serving as a looming
threat which tends to keep managers and negotiators honest. See Macaulay, Elegant
Models, supra note 77, at 517-518. To an extent, of course, these same goals may be
fulfilled by nonbinding third-party evaluative processes. See infra Section IV.B.
90 See Macneil, Adjustment, supra note 4, at 895, 898.
91 Unlike the discrete transaction in which planning focuses on the substance of the
exchange, in the relational contract "the planning of processes for conducting exchanges
and other aspects of performance in the future, as well as conducting further planning,
assume equal or even greater importance." Macneil, Economic Analysis, supra note 76,
at 1029-1030. Oliver Williamson posited that a trilateral system of governance
(involving binding arbitration) will be sufficient when parties only occasionally enter
into mixed or idiosyncratic transactions (those market transactions which are not purely
discrete). See Williamson, Transaction Cost, supra note 78, at 249-254. As the
transaction becomes more idiosyncratic and uncertainty increases, it becomes more and
"more imperative that the parties devise a machinery to 'work things out'-since
contractual gaps will be larger and the occasions for sequential adaptations will increase
in number and importance." Id. at 254. The recurrent or ongoing nature of the
relationship will permit the cost of the specialized government structure to be recouped.
See id. at 250.
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agreement, with its stepped, variegated procedures for addressing labor
grievances. 92
B. Factors Shaping Structural Evolution
Given the mix of circumstances-a long-term, high stakes endeavor
fraught with many and varied perils, a large cast of participants with
overlapping needs and interests, an endemic mistrust of the court system
and a great freedom to explore consensual governance mechanisms-one
would reasonably expect the construction industry to be in the forefront of
development of new conflict resolution strategies and techniques. Indeed,
the industry has always embraced out-of-court conflict resolution and is
today a laboratory for experimentation not only in conflict resolution
processes, but in approaches aimed at enhancing group communications,
prospective problem solving and minimizing job-site conflict. For a number
of reasons, however, present-day realities are less the result of a gradual
evolution than a wave of reaction by an industry to the perceived
inadequacies of traditional approaches and a range of responses reflecting
different professional perspectives.
1. Spurs to Change
The wave of reform which recently swept over conflict resolution in
the construction industry reflects a confluence of two developments: (1)
widespread industry dissatisfaction in the wake of a gradual but dramatic
increase in the volume of construction-related litigation and arbitration,
mirroring trends in other contractual realms and (2) parallel
experimentation with settlement-oriented processes by courts and agencies.
In the years following World War II, the expanding volume of public
and private construction, increasing competition, the evolving new building
technologies and changing concepts of liability led to an increase in
construction conflict and the coalescence of a growing corps of lawyers
92 See Macneil, Primer, supra note 3, at 684-685; cf. URY ET AL., supra note 14,
at 101-133 (describing design of a conflict management system for labor-management
relations at a coal mine). As we will see, stepped approaches are becoming increasingly
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specializing in such cases. 93 These realities stimulated a variety of
responses and, ultimately, a re-evaluation of traditional approaches to
conflict.
Current developments in the construction industry are part of a more
comprehensive revolution in conflict resolution which led to the evolution
of the public sector programs described in Part I. Parties and attorneys,
confronted with new approaches in courts and agencies, naturally pondered
their applicability in the private realm.
But the path to the present day was (and remains) strewn with
obstacles, including the inertia of traditional processes, the difficulty of
tailoring all-purpose conflict resolution programs ab initio (at the time of
contracting and prior to the emergence of conflict) and the differing
perspectives of lawyers and nonlegal professionals and businesspersons.
2. Traditional ADR and Process Inertia
The construction industry long adhered to its own patented brand of
ADR: an initial evaluation by the project architect or engineer and, if
necessary, binding arbitration (usually before an AAA tribunal).94 The two-
step system was itself a recognition of the need for specialized internal
mechanisms aimed at addressing conflict early and efficiently-and in a
manner acknowledging the special customs, practices and interests of
contracting parties. As most performance issues were likely to be of a
technical variety, the notion of referring questions to the architect or
engineer who designed the project had a lot of appeal. In addition to
providing technical expertise, the project's creator would be in the best
position to clarify the design intent and reliably inform the process of
working out the problem. In the event that this first-tier determination did
not resolve the conflict, the possibility usually existed to submit the matter
to arbitration before a panel of industry "insiders" with a mixture of
expertise. Even here, the goal would be resolution of job-site conflict with
minimal negative impact on project progress.
Until very recently that template, if not accepted unquestioningly as
standard boilerplate, established the parameters for the conflict resolution
93 See Joseph Dundin, A Hundred Years (Or So) of AA Standard Documents,
ARCHITECTURE: THE AIH JouRNAL, Oct. 1988, at 119. But cf. Robert A. Kagan, Do
Lawyers Cause Adversarial Legalism? A Preliminary Inquiry, 19 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 1,
11-15 (1994) (discussing political culture, justice and a fragmented government).
94 See infra Part III.
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debate. 95 Ultimately, however, these time-honored mechanisms for
resolving conflict-a preliminary determination by the project design
professional followed, if necessary, by binding arbitration-were held up to
the harsh light of public scrutiny and found wanting in the eyes of
contemporary disputants. 96 Yet even today, the old two-step program
remains a common starting point for reform efforts.97
3. Difficulties of Front-End Contingency Planning
Another barrier to change in this consensual arena is, ironically, the
world of possibilities inherent in long-term contractual relationships.
Although ADR planners addressing a specific commercial setting have a
considerable advantage over the typical court program planner in that their
purview is much more focused, it is still difficult to design a template
compatible with all contingencies. Contractual conflict resolution provisions
must provide a framework which grapples more or less successfully with
everything from a minor dispute over the profile of a curb to an aesthetic
question regarding the precise tint of a brick to megaconflicts implicating
multiple parties and multiple legal and factual issues. At the same time, it
must necessarily limit the ambit of mutual choice after disputes have
arisen-for the simple fact that in the wake of disputes, it is often difficult
to agree about anything. Unlike the court system, where a judge may
mandate participation in ADR, there is no third party to offer impartial
advice and, if appropriate, directives regarding engagement in ADR. Thus,
contractual ADR provisions place heavy emphasis on fixed menus and
default mechanisms. 98
4. Differing Perspectives
Discordant perspectives among major industry actors are another factor
affecting the pace and direction of innovation. Although it would be an
oversimplification to portray the problem as nothing more than a schism
95 See infra text accompanying notes 110-114; 199-205.
96 As Ury, Brett and Goldberg would put it, conflict resolution in the construction
industry was a "system in distress." URY ET AL., supra note 14, at 30. See infra
Sections I.A., III.B; IV.B.
97 See infra Parts I, IV.
98 See infra text accompanying notes 149-163; 249-251; 255-260.
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dividing lawyers and clients, 99 there is no question that professional and
business perspectives have everything to do with the way one defines a
problem and, thereby, permissible solutions.
A decade ago, many industry actors-contractors, owners, design
professionals, insurers and sureties, and others-were beginning to re-
examine and put into practice the principles which animated traditional
approaches to conflict. Among other things, they reached the following
conclusions:
(1) Most parties in the relational environment of construction have mutual
interests and goals which are best served by preserving relationships and
facilitating performance;
(2) The failure to identify or to promptly and properly respond to issues-
even insignificant ones-may sow the seeds of serious conflict;
(3) The best time to resolve construction contract disputes is as early as
possible, before positions harden, costs mount and conflict poisons the job
environment. 100
Their efforts have been enhanced by the growing opportunities to employ
approaches aimed at finding integrative solutions rather than defending
positions and competing for tactical advantages.' 01
Many lawyers, on the other hand, have moved toward this realization
cautiously and, in some cases, reluctantly, preferring instead to approach
innovation incrementally: changing the rules of engagement, setting higher
standards for neutrals and, if necessary, adopting a few new tools. A
decade ago, professional debates centered on modifying the existing
arbitration system; today, attorneys are still adjusting to the advent of new
ADR approaches in the public justice system and an increasingly restive,
activist client base.'102
99 See Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration, supra note 2, at 77-78.
100 See Newey, supra note 65, at 21, 24.
101 See P.D. Gardner & J.E.L. Simmons, The Relationship Between Conflict,
Change and Project, in FENN & GAMESON, supra note 65, at 110, 112. Building
contracts in China usually contain a provision that the parties will attempt to settle
disputes prior to adjudication. See Anthony Houghton, Alternative Dispute Resolution-A
Far East Perspective, in FENN & GAMESON, supra note 65, at 298, 300.
102 See CPR INSTITTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, BUILDING ADR INTO THE
CORPORATE LAW DEPARTMENT 7 (Catherine Cronin-Harris ed., 1997) [hereinafter
BUILDING ADR] (noting likely resistance to change by in-house attorneys and outside
counsel).
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At the same time, major segments of the construction industry see
lawyers as the problem 03 and seek true reformation in approaches to
conflict. Their return to first principles involves a metaphorical cleansing of
the temple which restores control of conflict resolution to those who own,
design and build buildings and consigns legal advocates to the back porch-
if not the outer darkness.
The realities of process inertia, the limitations of front-end program
design and the impact of discordant perspectives will be evident at each
point in our progression from the "old ADR"-site-based professional
evaluation followed by binding arbitration'04-to a rethinking of settlement-
oriented approaches using third-party intervenors, 105 to partnering
arrangements 06  and beyond. 107 Whatever the limitations, recent
developments portend a future for variegated systems tailored to the
particular needs of the parties and the issues in dispute-a private structure
imbued with the positive attributes of the multi-door courthouse.
1Il. STASIS IN CONSENSUAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION: REFORM OF THE
ADJUDICATORY PROCESS
A. Arbitration: The "Old ADR"10o Experiences Growing Pains
The construction industry, like some other commercial sectors, 109 has
always placed strong emphasis on resolving grievances and disputes
During a recent long-range planning session involving 28 leaders of the
construction bar which I facilitated, I queried the group regarding trends in professional
practice. The group identified changing approaches to conflict and expanding use of
conflict avoidance and resolution mechanisms as one of the major challenges for
practitioners in the coming decade). See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Facilitator's Report on
Long Range Planning Session, American Bar Association Forum on the Construction
Industry (July 10, 1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter Stipanowich, Facilitator's
Report].
103 See, e.g., Ronald S. Davies, Construction Conflict-The Specialist
Contractor's View, in FENN & GAMMON, supra note 65, at 59, 61 (complaining that
construction industry was at the mercy of lawyers and accountants).
104 See infra Part I.
105 See infra Part IV.
106 See infra Part V.
107 See infra Part VI.
108 Stempel, supra note 1, at 334.
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informally, efficiently and outside the court system. Motivated by the
desire to achieve a profit and to maintain good working relations with
clients and other project participants, most successful design and
construction businesses generally sought to avoid the burdens of litigation,
including potentially disastrous consequences for project management and
morale. If something more than face-to-face negotiation was required, the
choice was typically an informal process guided by one or more informed
industry insiders. Traditionally, as we have seen, this usually meant
referring disputes and other questions to the project architect or engineer,
who rendered an advisory (or, under some arrangements, a binding)
determination, 0 followed by binding arbitration.111 In the AIA document
system, these mechanisms were collectively enshrined in an increasingly
complex dispute resolution process. 1 2 For parties designing construction
contracts, arbitration before an impartial panel held out the promise of an
expedited, private hearing before one or more experts-often a panel
offering a range of pertinent knowledge and experience. The common goal
was a quick and final resolution of construction-related controversies
guided by technical principles and familiar commercial norms rather than
the "over-objectivity" borne of ignorance. Through the use of neutrals
conversant in the language and norms of the relationship, arbitration held
out the promise of an equitable result and a rectification of the law where
the law was defective because of its generality." 3
109 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
110 See Jusn SwEET, LEGAL AsPEcTs OF ARCHrrECrURE, ENGINEERING AND THE
CONSTRUCTION PROCEss 519-520 (2d ed. 1977); Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration,
supra note 2, at 54-55.
III See generally JAmES ACRET, CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATION (1985);
Stipanowich, Rethinking Arbitration, supra note 73. See also Penny Brooker & Anthony
Layers, Perceptions of Alternative Dispute Resolution as Constraints upon its Use in the
UK Construction Industry, 15 CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT & ECON. 519, 519-520
(1997) (discussing role of arbitration as the British construction industry's alternative to
litigation).
112 See THE AMERICAN INsTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT A201:
GENERAL CONDmnoNs OF THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION arts. 4.3-4.5 (1997)
[hereinafter AIA A201]; see also Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration, supra note 2, at
75-80. The forthcoming edition of the primary AIA documents calls for mediation
of disputes prior to binding arbitration. See infra Section IV.C.
13 See Aristotle, Nicomeachean Ethics Book V, in CLARENCE MoRms, THE GREAT
LEGAL PamiosopHmRs 25 (1959).
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That, at least, was the theory. By the mid-1980s, however, a vague
sense existed that all was not well in construction industry arbitration.
There were indications, if the anecdotal evidence was to be believed, that
the much-vaunted advantages of private arbitration were often more
ephemeral than real. 114 The promise of an accelerated first hearing was
often undercut by defenses to arbitrability and other courtroom tactics, 115
as well as problems with ministerial staff responsible for administering the
arbitration. 116 Expecting a decisionmaker with expertise, parties were
sometimes surprised and disappointed by arbitrators' paucity of pertinent
qualifications. 117 Having saved time and money by foregoing discovery,
parties often found themselves mired in long, inefficient fishing expeditions
at hearings, punctuated by hiatuses for midstream document exchange. 118
Efficiency was further reduced by arbitrators' reluctance to make
dispositive orders prior to full-blown hearings on the merits, or to cut off
cumulative or redundant evidence. 119 When all was said and done, justice
might not have been speedier or cheaper.' 20 Some came away wondering
whether justice had been served by the award, a question made more
difficult by the fact that arbitrators rarely issued any supporting
rationale. 121
Such concerns prompted the nation's largest organization of
construction attorneys, the American Bar Association Forum on the
Construction Industry, to survey its membership regarding experiences with
arbitration under the widely-used AAA Construction Industry Arbitration
114 See generally Stipanowich, Rethinking Arbitration, supra note 73, at 441-453
(discussing the " other side of the coin").
115 See id. at 441-443.
116 See id. at 451.
117 See id. at 447-450.
118 See id. at 443-445, 450-452.
119 See id. at 444-445.
120 See id. at 452-453.
121 See id. at 450. Evaluating arbitration according to the four factors advanced by
Ury, Brett & Goldberg for analyzing the effectiveness of an approach to conflict
resolution, (1) transaction costs, (2) satisfaction with outcomes, (3) effect on party
relationships and (4) durability of solutions, there is no question that for many,
arbitration added up to an unsatisfactory experience. See URY ET AL., supra note 14, at
11-13.
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Rules. 122 The result, a rare glimpse into the workings of a private system,
provided fodder for proponents of arbitration as well as its critics.
When it came to perceived fairness in decisionmaking, arbitrators
generally compared favorably with judges and juries. 123 On average,
moreover, arbitration was a speedier means of dispute resolution than
either jury trial or bench trial, 124 and somewhat less costly overall. 125
However, a number of red flags existed, particularly among group
perceptions of arbitrator qualifications, training and selection. Although
most respondents rated arbitrators as generally "good" or "excellent,"
more than a third found them only "fair" or "poor."1 26 Arbitrator training
was, on average, deemed "fair," 127 and much criticism was leveled at the
quality of information provided by the AAA on prospective arbitrators. 128
Not surprisingly, negative views regarding the quality of arbitrators tended
to translate into support for broader judicial review of arbitral awards,
requirements that arbitrators prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law
in support of awards, limitations on arbitral remedy-making power and less
satisfaction with all aspects of arbitration. 129
Another range of concerns had to do with the differing needs of small
and large cases. Attorneys and clients alike tended to be more satisfied with
the speed, cost, quality of decisionmaking and fairness of arbitration in
cases involving less than $250,000, and were significantly more likely to
arbitrate again. 130 Case size also had an impact on perceptions regarding
procedural reforms involving prehearing conferences, statements of claim
and discovery. 131
The Forum inquiry also pointed out the continuing tension between the
concept of arbitration as a consensual alternative to court adjudication and
its growing role as a court substitute.
122 See Stipanowich, Rethinking Arbitration, supra note 73, at 453-472.
123 Almost 40% of those responding viewed arbitrators as generally fairer than
juries, while another 43% considered them equally fair. See id. at 458.
124 See id. at 460-461.
125 See id. at 461-462.
126 See id. at 454-455.
127 See id. at 455-456.
128 See id. at 456.
129 See id. at 458-459.
130 See id at 462.
131 See id. at 463-466.
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B. The Arbitration Dichotomy: Consensual Alternative vs. Court
Surrogate
There has long been a struggle implicating two models for commercial
arbitration. The first, which I will call the Commercial Moot, comprehends
the notion of quick, informal justice between members of a commercial
community. Participants know and respect the judge, who is one of their
own and who acts out of obligation, like Cincinnatus pulled from his plow.
He derives authority from this fact and from the willingness of the
community to acknowledge and abide by his decisions. With the help of
their peer-arbitrator, the parties meet, conclude their dispute and get on
with business, all without recourse to the court system. This model
embodies the principles of party autonomy, arbitral expertise, speed,
economy and finality.
The other model, the polar opposite of the first, is the "Total Process"
afforded by the public justice system. It consists of formalized pretrial
practice, including mechanisms for addressing dispositive motions,
extensive discovery and third-party practice, procedural formalities to
ensure the fairness of the hearing, exemplary remedies and the right to
appeal.
Few (if any) would advocate either model as the all-purpose paradigm
for commercial arbitration. Most would acknowledge the importance of
giving parties a true choice in out-of-court process, but the model of the
Commercial Moot, however appropriate it might be to, say, resolving
disputes over the quality of goods, is not acceptable for the broad range of
construction disputes. Usually, there will be multiple disputes and multiple
disputants, one or more of whom will be from outside the construction
industry and related professions. There will also be lawyers and legal
issues. The problem is finding the right meld of party autonomy, efficiency
and due process for a wide range of circumstances.
Thus, construction lawyers supported the use of preliminary hearings
before the arbitrators for the purpose of arranging for discovery, narrowing
issues and planning the hearing schedule. 132 They favored requiring parties
to provide explicit statements of claim and other information prior to
hearings, 133 and the development of mechanisms to join necessary parties
132 See id. at 463.
133 See id. at 465-466.
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or consolidate arbitrations addressing the same disputes. 134 They also
supported a rule authorizing arbitrators to order and supervise document
discovery. 135
Most attorneys were, however, unwilling to support a rule authorizing
pre-arbitration discovery along the lines of civil discovery. 136 They were
also generally averse to a rule explicitly authorizing arbitrators to award
punitive damages. 137 They were at best lukewarm toward higher standards
of judicial review of arbitration awards. 138 A slight majority favored
including findings of fact in awards in big cases, while a slight majority
disfavored findings of fact in smaller cases. 139 The group strongly rejected
including conclusions of law in awards. 14 Finally, lawyers voiced strong
support for a rule authorizing arbitrators to award attorney fees-in part
because tactical delays by lawyers required appropriate sanctions, as in
court.14
1
The arbitration-as-altemative/arbitration-as-court-surrogate debate has
intensified in the past decade, as arbitration has rapidly evolved into a
surrogate court system. 142 As arbitration has been called upon to take on
134 See id. at 463.
135 See id. at 464-465.
136 See id. at 465.
137 See id. at 467. The trend to recognize such authority in arbitrators has
continued, but the issue remain a controversial one. See generally Stipanowich,
Punitive Damages, supra note 1.
138 See Stipanowich, Rethinking Arbitration, supra note 73, at 468. The inquiry
was phrased in terms of an amendment to the AAA Construction Industry Arbitration
Rules that would provide for greater judicial scrutiny of arbitral awards. The issue of
contractual provisions for greater review has since been addressed in several decisions,
with mixed results. Most support the concept. See Stipanowich, Punitive Damages,
supra note 1, at 55-57.
139 See Stipanowich, Rethinking Arbitration, supra note 73, at 469.
140 See id.
141 See id. at 461, 467. The lawyers acknowledged that fellow lawyers were the
leading cause of delay in arbitration. See id. at 461. The request for sanctions was in
effect a plea by lawyers to "save us from ourselves."142 Although the battle has long been portrayed as a struggle for the soul of
arbitration between attorneys and businesspersons, the ABA survey and other evidence
indicates that the legal profession is also divided. See, e.g., John W. Hinchey, Do We
Need Special ADR Rules for Complex Construction Cases? Yes, We Do Need Special
Rules for Complex Construction Cases, 11 CONSTRUCTION LAw., Aug. 1991, at 1;
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the burden of almost the entire spectrum of civil rights and remedies-
including claims for exemplary damages and class actions, Title VII cases
and RICO-based claims, the needs of users have stressed and strained
traditional arbitration processes to the limit and raised a host of questions
regarding the structure and shape of commercial arbitration. 143 Although
the debate is sharpest in other arenas such as employment' 44 and securities
brokerage arrangements 145 and other contexts in which adhesive elements
in the contracting process raise additional concems, 146 construction
arbitration continues to grapple with process issues, particularly as regards
the handling of complex controversies involving multiple parties: Who
should make determinations regarding procedural questions affecting
arbitration? How should multi-party disputes be handled? Should arbitration
be administered by an impartial organization such as the American
Arbitration Association, or can administrative duties be effectively handled
by the arbitrator(s)? How much discovery should be available in
arbitration? Should arbitrators write opinions in support of their award?
Should arbitrators have the authority to award punitive damages or attorney
fees?
Luther P. House & Brian G. Corgan, No, Don't Inhibit Arbitration with Courtroom
"Due Process," 11 CONSTRUCTION LAW., Aug. 1991, at 1.
In 1990, an ABA-sponsored task force chaired by John Hinchey attempted to
formulate a number of recommendations for the industry for the handling of complex
construction cases. This author, an adviser to the task force, supported some aspects of
the resulting report but disagreed with other conclusions.
143 See generally Stipanowich, Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 5-10
(describing expansion of arbitrability concepts under Federal Arbitration Act and related
challenges).
144 See generally David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big
Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration,
1997 Wis. L. REv. 33.
145 See generally Stipanowich, Punitive Damages, supra note 1.
146 As discussed below, the debate regarding construction arbitration has not
centered on the fairness of arbitration to non-industry "outsiders" such as homeowners
and small businesses. But then, there has always been a lack of focus on the special
concerns of the residential market among construction attorneys, who practice primarily
in the commercial, industrial and public procurement markets. See generally
Stipanowich, Rebuilding Construction Law, supra note 11.
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C. Reform at the AAA
The American Arbitration Association, the IBM of conflict resolution
organizations, grew with the modem era of arbitration to shape arbitration
theory and practice in a wide range of commercial venues. 147 After many
years of hegemony in construction conflict resolution, its supremacy was
challenged by a growing array of new providers and by the increasing
tendency of parties to make their own arrangements for arbitration (even
where the arbitration provision incorporated the AAA Rules). After years
of seemingly incremental change (and nearly a decade after the ABA
Forum's critical census), it was essential to take significant steps to
improve user satisfaction.
In 1995, the AAA appointed a multidisciplinary task force to
"undertake a comprehensive review of the AAA's Construction Dispute
Avoidance, Management and Resolution Services," including its well-
known arbitration program. 148 Among other things, the broad-based user
147 The AAA is a non-profit organization headquartered in New York City. It
offers a spectrum of conflict resolution services (including model rules, ADR
administration, training, research and education) through a network of regional offices
throughout the country. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, On the Cutting Edge: Conflict
Avoidance and Resolution in the Construction Industry, in ADR AND THE LAW 65, 66-
67 (1997) [hereinafter Stipanowich, Cutting Edge]. The AAA opened a total of 70,516
case files in 1996-a number which amounts to approximately one-third of the civil
docket of the federal court system. Of these, 4,114 were construction-related filings.
See Mark E. Appel & George H. Friedman, Role of Arbitration and Mediation Under
the American Arbitration Association's New Construction Industry Arbitration Rules,
AIA Contract Documents: Generation Next 1,2 (Oct. 23, 1997) (on file with author).
Construction claims and counterclaims totaled $927 million in 1996. See id. at 3.
148 Stipanowich, Cutting Edge, supra note 147. See also Steven A. Arbittier, The
New and Improved Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, 19 PuNcH LIsT, Spring
1995, at 1; George H. Friedman, Major Changes Coming to AAA Construction
Arbitration, 15 CONSTRUCTION LAw., Nov. 1995, at 25. The Task Force, which
consisted of equal numbers of construction attorneys and non-attorney representatives of
all of the major sectors of the construction industry (including institutional owners),
conducted a number of meetings over the period of a year. I was the sole academic
member.
The group's deliberations, while sometimes lively, did not involve the sometimes
intense clash of perspectives which I have experienced in ADR rulemaking in securities
arbitration, where the viewpoints of investors and brokers frequently conflict. The
perspectives of AAA Task Force members were less a function of the broad agenda of
contractors, owners or design professionals than a reflection of personal philosophy and
experience. The ability of group members to achieve a high degree of consensus on the
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group recommended sweeping changes to the AAA Construction Industry
Arbitration Rules and construction arbitration panel-an overdue effort to
address the widely varying needs of users and improve the quality of
arbitration.
1. Changing the Rules
In reforming its Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, the AAA had
to confront the continuing challenge of styling a system which would
function effectively across a broad spectrum of conflict. The solution was a
revamping of the Rules to present three clear alternative paths for cases of
different sizes-a "default menu" of options which are effectuated in the
absence of contrary agreement by parties. 149
Essentially in accordance with Task Force recommendations, the
construction arbitration rules were modified to incorporate a "Fast Track"
scheme for cases involving claims under fifty-thousand dollars; a "Standard
Track" aimed at cases involving claims up to a million dollars; and a
"Large and Complex Track" for cases involving more than a million
dollars. 150 Each scheme represents a different prioritization of various
process attributes. Fast Track procedures emphasize speed and simplicity:
procedures include abbreviated timetables, limited extensions of time,
expedited arbitrator appointment, limited information exchange and
streamlined hearings. 151
shape and substance of the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules suggests that some
of the issues confronting the industry can be resolved by truly integrative solutions.
14 9 See generally CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ARBITRATION RuLs (American
Arbitration Ass'n 1996). In the wake of recent revisions to the American Institute of
Architects Contract Documents, see infra text accompanying notes 252-257, the
Arbitration Rules were further revised and incorporated in the AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASS'N, CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES (1997)
[hereinafter AAA PROCEDURE].
150 Although the Task Force recognized that the dollar value of claims is not a
perfect surrogate for complexity, the experience of the AAA and Task Force members
was that a greater amount in controversy often corresponded to a greater number of
issues, or inherently difficult issues such as delay and disruption claims. See
Stipanowich, Cutting Edge, supra note 147, at 68.
151 See AAA PROCEDURES, supra note 149, §§ F-1 to F-13. In cases in which no
party's claim exceeds $10,000 and no one requests an oral hearing, the option is "desk
arbitration" (involving submission of documents alone). See id. § F-9.
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Standard Track procedures represent an updating of traditional
arbitration procedures aimed at more competent arbitrators, clarified
arbitrator authority and enhanced speed.' 52 Revisions to standard forms
permit parties input regarding desired arbitrator qualifications. In a
departure from long-standing tradition, the AAA eliminated the
requirement of a free day of service, providing that arbitrators were to be
compensated from the outset at the arbitrator's "stated rate of
compensation."1 53 Other reforms made more clear the arbitrator's authority
to control discovery "consistent with the expedited nature of
arbitration"; 154 a more explicit statement of arbitral authority to control
hearings'5 5 and to take interim protective measures, "including measures
for the conservation of property. ' 156 The new rules also admonish
arbitrators to provide a "concise, written breakdown of the award" and a
"written explanation" if requested by all parties or if the arbitrator believes
it to be appropriate. 157
Large and Complex Track procedures feature an elite panel of neutrals
and special supplementary prehearing procedures, including arbitrator-
15 2 See Stipanowich, Cutting Edge, supra note 147, at 70-72.
153 AAA PROCEDURES, supra note 149, § R-51.
154 Id. § R-10.
155 See id. §§ R-29, R-31. The procedures now make clear that an arbitrator may
control the order of proof, bifurcate proceedings, exclude cumulative or irrelevant
testimony, direct the focus of the presentation, entertain dispositive motions, make
preliminary rulings or request offers of proof. Although arbitrators could presumably do
virtually all of these things under existing law, see IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., I
FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AwARDs & REMEDIES UNDER THE
FEDERAL ARBrIRATION ACT chs. 32, 35 (1995 supp.) [hereinafter Ill MACNEIL ET AL.],
a clear statement in the rules may be of great help in clarifying the matter for arbitrators
and parties.
156 AAA PROCEDURES, supra note 149, § R-34.
15 7 Id. § R-42. The AAA did not, however, implement a Task Force proposal that
the Demand and Answering Statement forms used by AAA be modified to permit
parties to indicate their preference for a written explanation of the award. This is
unfortunate, because unless the issue is specifically raised by arbitrators at a preliminary
hearing, the choice cannot be brought to the parties' attention.
The Task Force might have taken the opportunity to clarify the authority of
arbitrators to award attorney fees in appropriate cases, but did not. They thus failed to
take account of the strong sentiment expressed by attorneys in the Forum survey. See
supra text accompanying note 141.
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supervised discovery; 158 they may be further tailored to the specific needs
of the case by agreement of the parties. 159 The process commences with an
administrative conference with an AAA officer to discuss the parties'
needs, including views on arbitrator qualifications, and to consider the use
of mediation or other nonadjudicative approaches. 16° A later "preliminary
conference" is conducted by the arbitrators to discuss discovery and other
preparations for arbitration and, once again, to explore the possibility of
mediation and other alternatives. 161 In addition to directing the production
of documents, the rules make clear that arbitrators may order depositions
or interrogatories for good cause and may place limits on discovery in
accordance with the expedited nature of arbitration. 162
In all of these ways, the AAA sought to maximize the flexibility of its
arbitration procedures and permit a tailoring of the process to the particular
needs of different cases. 163  Ultimately, however, the best-crafted
procedures mean little in comparison to the capabilities of arbitrators in
whom so much discretion is placed.
158 See id. §§ L-1 to L-6.
159 See id. § L-l(a).
160 See id. § L-2.
161 See id. § L-4.
162 See AAA PROCEDURES, supra note 149, § L-5.
163 The AAA has also sought to take advantage of the possibilities inherent in the
Internet and the World Wide Web. In a joint venture with other national organizations,
the AAA is participating in an online dispute resolution program aimed at conflicts
between users of online systems, system operators and others who allege harm due to
wrongful online messages or postings. The program is among the first forays into what
will likely become a burgeoning domain for conflict resolution in all commercial
venues, including building design and construction. Applying online technology to
arbitration and other forms of ADR is likely to enhance greatly the speed, economy and
efficiency of conflict resolution in the twenty-first century. See id. at 94-95. See also
George H. Friedman, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Emerging Online
Technologies: Challenges and Opportunities, 19 HASTnNGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 695
(1997). The AAA has established website links to major construction industry
organizations and has issued a computer diskette with information on construction ADR
rules and procedures. See Appel & Friedman, supra note 147, at 6. These efforts
parallel similar initiatives in some courts. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 272-275.
Securities industry arbitration rules have also evolved to provide different
procedures for cases of varying size and complexity. See, e.g., NATIONAL ASS'S OF
SECURrrIES DEALERS, INC., NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE (1996).
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2. Improving the Pool of Neutrals
The single most important step taken by the AAA was the substantial
paring-down of its burgeoning national rosters of arbitrators and a
heightening of standards in an attempt to enhance the quality of neutrals. 164
Because arbitration offers fewer procedural safeguards than trial, including
more limited judicial review of the ultimate decision, and gives arbitrators
more commensurate leeway throughout, the choice of arbitrators is critical.
A system predicated on the finality of a judgment places a premium on
respect for the judge; an approach which reposes significant discretion in
the manager hinges on her managerial capabilities and innate good sense.
In many respects, the arbitration process is the arbitrator. All too often,
construction clients have complained of arbitrators' lack of understanding
of pertinent issues and their inability to manage hearings.
The AAA looks to stricter experiential standards for panelists and
enhanced training requirements to have an immediate effect on arbitrator
quality. Hopefully, smaller pools of arbitrators will mean more
appointments for each of those remaining. In addition, the rules now
provide for compensation on the basis of each arbitrator's customary rates.
Continuing arbitrator training and regular feedback and evaluation should
also have an impact. Although it is too early to tell if the AAA's reforms
will have a significant impact on public perception, there is no question that
its ambitious program of change is a large step in the right direction. 165
Success depends, first and foremost, upon faithful execution by staff in the
field.166
164 See Stipanowich, Cutting Edge, supra note 147, at 73-74.
165 Early indications are that at least some aspects of the program have been
successfully put into place. For example, in 1996, approximately 56% of the
construction cases were subject to the "Fast Track" expedited arbitration rules. See
Appel & Friedman, supra note 147, at 3. Early case statistics indicated that fast track
cases were processed in an average of 49.5 days. See id. at 7.
As of July 1, 1997, the panel of construction arbitrators was reduced from a 1995
pool of 20,000 to approximately 4,000 members.
166 Another key is the integration of the arbitration program with the larger conflict
avoidance and resolution program. See infra Section lII.E.
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D. The Broader Framework of Private Adjudication: Statutory
Reform
Modem arbitration statutes provide a general framework for the
enforceability of private agreements to resolve conflicts by out-of-court
adjudication. They are forceful recognition of the value of permitting
people to structure their own varying paths to fairness, subject only to very
limited procedural protections at the front and back ends of the process.
For many years, there has been growing controversy over the need for
statutory reform to clarify certain points, including issues of arbitrability
and arbitral authority; the hottest debate of all involves enhanced judicial
review of arbitration awards. 167
Currently, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) is redrafting revisions to the Uniform Arbitration
Act (UAA), 168 the model upon which most state arbitration statutes are
based. Although the Act was published more than forty years ago, it has
never been modified. While the role of state arbitration law has been
diminished sharply by preemptive judicial expansion of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), 169 state versions of the UAA are still cited as
controlling authority on various arbitration issues (either properly or
through ignorance of federal law). Moreover, it is thought by many that the
current effort will be the precursor to reform of the FAA. Substantive
issues on the table are virtually all significant in construction disputes;
possible reforms range from a clarification of the division of responsibilities
between courts and arbitrators respecting questions of arbitrability of
167 Heating up the controversy is the expanding use of arbitration in all forms of
standardized agreements. As court enforcement of arbitration agreements has reached
broad new categories of transactional conflict, including investor/broker disputes,
statutory employment discrimination claims and a host of consumer complaints (and,
simultaneously, nonadjudicative processes such as mediation) have appeared on the
scene, critics have increasingly compared arbitration unfavorably to the "total process"
of court trial. See Stipanowich, Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 7-9; Thomas J.
Stipanowich, The Growing Debate Over "Consumerized Arbitration": Adding Cole to
the Fire, DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 1997, at 20. As previously noted, the concerns
of consumer/outsiders have not figured prominently in the approach of the construction
sector (including institutional owners) and its legal representatives. See supra note 146;
infra note 185.
16 8 See UNIFoRM ARBrrRAnON AcT, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1997).
169 See Stipanowich, Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 6-10.
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disputes to standards for judicial review. 170 The Drafting Committee will
produce amendments addressing at least some of these issues. Generally
speaking, the amendments will probably function as default rules subject to
the contrary agreement of the parties.
Yet again, rulemakers are confronted with the tension between the
traditional policies associated with arbitration, including "party autonomy,
speed, lower cost, efficiency, and finality," and concerns over the
enhanced fallibility associated with abbreviated process. 171 Here, however,
the field of concern is the judicial role in the entire spectrum of domestic
arbitration agreements, and the drafter paints with the broadest of brushes.
As Academic Advisor to the Drafting Committee, I queried the
membership of the American College of Construction Lawyers (a group of
approximately 100 prominent construction specialists) and several dozen
members of steering committees of the ABA Forum on the Construction
Industry regarding possible statutory reforms. These individuals were asked
whether various possible reforms were "essential," "appropriate,"
"unnecessary" or "a bad idea." The seventy-three responses reflected a
considerable variance in attitudes toward statutory reform172 and the ever-
170 Other possible reforms identified by the NCCUSL Study Committee include:
(1) express recognition of the judicially well-recognized doctrine of quasi-judicial
immunity of arbitrators;
(2) a provision authorizing judicial consolidation of arbitration hearings in cases
involving common parties, evidence or facts;
(3) specific provisions governing the disclosure obligations of arbitrators and the
consequences of nondisclosure;
(4) express recognition of the authority to hold prehearing conferences;
(5) express recognition of the authority of arbitrators to order and supervise limited
discovery;
(6) a provision authorizing interlocutory review of arbitral preaward orders (a
particularly questionable proposition in light of the arbitral goals of speed and
efficiency);
(7) express recognition of the authority of arbitrators to render provisional or
interim awards;
(8) a provision authorizing arbitrators to award attorney fees in appropriate cases;
(9) a provision recognizing the authority of arbitrators to award punitive damages,
and, possibly, further provisions addressing that issue.
171 Cf. H.L.A. HART, Tm CONCEPT OF LAW 139-144 (1961).
172 See Memorandum from Thomas J. Stipanowich to the NCCUSL Drafting
Committee for Reform of the Uniform Arbitration Act 8-10 (on file with author)
[hereinafter NCCUSL Memo]. Simultaneously, a survey was taken of members of
various subdivisions of the American Bar Association Litigation Section regarding
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present tension between the "Commercial Moot" and "Total Process"
models.
For example, nearly four of five responding construction specialists
supported a statutory amendment defining the respective responsibilities of
courts and arbitrators regarding the determination of whether issues are to
be arbitrated. In fact, more than a quarter viewed such a term as
"essential." A similar percentage favored express statutory recognition of
quasi-judicial immunity for arbitrators. 173 Various majorities registered
support for statutory provisions giving courts authority to consolidate
arbitration hearings 174 and acknowledging the authority of arbitrators to
conduct prehearing conferences, 175 direct and supervise discovery176 and
grant interim relief177 and attorney fees. 178
possible reforms to the Uniform Act. The 319 respondents, while a small percentage of
the total membership of the subdivisions surveyed, reflect a fair cross section of the
Section's membership. Thirty-five percent identified their primary area of practice as
commercial litigation, twenty-five percent construction and eighteen percent
employment law. Smaller numbers represented labor, securities, ADR and other
specialties. Almost one-third (32%) had participated in more than twenty-five completed
arbitrations; nearly three-quarters of the group had arbitrated to final award more than
ten times. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, A Snapshot of Responses to the Litigation
Section 1997 Arbitration Survey 1 (1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter Stipanowich,
Snapshot]. Respondents conveyed opinions regarding what methods, if any, were
appropriate to address various arbitration issues, statutory reform, private agreement or
standard arbitration rules. Like the other respondents, their answers reflected a wide
range of opinion which varied considerably by issue. See generally id.
173 See NCUSSL Memo, supra note 172, at 1 n. 1, 2. Eighteen respondents (25%)
viewed such a provision as "essential." See id. at 8.
174 See id. at 2. More than four out of five construction attorneys favored a
statutory provision; about 25% viewed the provision as "essential". See id. Whatever
statutory reforms occur with regard to multiparty practice, however, are unlikely to
undo a significant shortcoming of construction arbitration under the American Institute
of Architects contract scheme-the prohibition on multiparty arbitration absent post-
dispute written agreement by all parties. See AIA A201, supra note 112, § 4.3.10.1.
This long-standing exculpatory scheme by the AIA disserves owner-clients by saddling
them with the potential burden of multiple proceedings to resolve a single multiparty
dispute. In the face of such specific anticonsolidation terms, however, courts must
honor the expressed intent of the parties and forbear from ordering consolidation unless
the parties agree otherwise.
175 See NCCUSL Memo, supra note 172, at 3. Seven of ten construction attorneys
were positive regarding statutory reform; roughly 29% viewed such a provision as
"essential." See id. While 31% of Litigation Section respondents desired express
statutory recognition of the authority of arbitrators to conduct prehearing conferences, a
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The Commercial Moot model was implicit in some other responses.
Most construction practitioners were unsupportive of a statutory provision
authorizing punitive awards179 and overwhelmingly rejected the notion that
pre-award orders by arbitrators (such as orders dealing with document
production, disclosures, scheduling and the like) should be reviewable on-
an interlocutory basis by courts.180
Construction practitioners were almost evenly split on the
appropriateness of a provision recognizing the ability of parties to agree to
more extensive judicial review. They tended to be less supportive of a
far greater number (62%) preferred to leave the matter to private agreement or to
incorporate arbitration rules. See id.
176 See id. at 3. More than three-quarters of responding construction specialists
were positive toward a statutory provision recognizing the authority of arbitrators to
order limited discovery, although only about 29% viewed the provision as "essential".
At the same time, there was strong resistance to the concept of identifying specific
limits (such as permitting document discovery only in the absence of a specific
agreement). See id.
Although nearly all Litigation Section respondents favored granting arbitrators
some authority to order and supervise prehearing discovery, the response was mixed on
the proper method for addressing the matter. Forty-nine percent of those responding
favored some form of statutory treatment of the issue. See id.
177 See id. at 4. Only seven of the responding construction practitioners deemed it
"essential" to have a statutory provision addressing the authority of arbitrators to render
interim relief, although about 70% of those responding thought it "appropriate." See id.
178 See id. Among construction practitioners, 16% thought a specific provision
authorizing arbitral awards of attorney fees was essential; another 45% thought it
"appropriate". Forty-six percent of Litigation Section respondents favored express
statutory treatment; 49% preferred to leave it to private agreements or rules. Fewer than
half of the latter favored giving arbitrators authority to award attorney fees "under
circumstances comparable to F.R.C.P. 11." Id.
179 See id. Fifty-five percent of responding construction lawyers thought it a "bad
idea," and another 10% viewed it as "unnecessary." On the other hand, 58% of
Litigation Section respondents favored some statutory treatment of arbitral awards of
punitive damages. Twenty-nine percent wished to leave the matter solely to private
agreement or incorporated rules. See id.
180 See id. at 5. Eighty-three percent of construction practitioners viewed statutory
authorization of interlocutory review as "unnecessary" or a "bad idea." Eighty percent
of Litigation Section respondents said "No." More than half of the latter (53%)
preferred to leave statutory provisions governing judicial review of arbitration awards as
they are, while 38% supported some form of change. See id.
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provision setting forth specific guidelines for review pursuant to such
agreements. 181
The response of leading construction attorneys lends few clear
messages for drafters, aside from their visceral rejection of the concept of
interlocutory review. In no case did as many as a third of practitioners
describe a possible reform as "essential." A strong note of caution,
however, was sounded in the comments proffered by many who feared that
overzealousness in imposing universal due process requirements for
arbitration would undercut the essential elements which make arbitration a
true alternative. As one Birmingham attorney lamented:
The "golden goose" is about to be killed. As is so often true, it is
being killed by lawyers, in some cases those who use arbitration.
If one wants (i) procedures in detail, (ii) discovery, [and] (iii)
judicial review, [one can] go to the court house. If one wants to
set the rules by contract, to have a limit to procedures and
a... [more expeditious] result, let's stick with arbitration as it
was. We are now generally recommending
against ... [arbitration under the rules of a major provider]
because it is becoming [a] courthouse in disguise. We need
quality arbitrators, not rules and procedures. 182
This, recall, is a lawyer speaking. His comments and others
underscored widespread concerns even among lawyers regarding over-
legalism and restricted flexibility in the structuring of private arbitration
agreements. 183 Consistent with the longstanding concerns of users and the
181 See id at 5-6. Forty of seventy responding construction attorneys thought the
latter "unnecessary" or a "bad idea." See id. at 6.
Seventy-four percent of Litigation Section respondents were against a statutory
provision supporting judicial review for errors of fact. The group was fairly evenly split
regarding the appropriateness of a statutory provision supporting judicial review for
errors of law (44% yes, 48% no). This split extended to review of punitive awards
(48% yes, 40% no). See id. at 5.
On the other hand, 67% favored a statutory provision explicitly permitting parties
to contractually provide for judicial review of awards. However, the group was
significantly less supportive of a "predispute exercise of an option for a standard-limited
single level judicial review of the legal and factual basis of the award" (27% yes, 50%
no). See id.
182 See id. at 6.
183 A few examples illustrate the general tenor of comments by construction
specialists:
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mixed response of the bar, great care must be taken to balance the
perceived need for a specific reform against the potential costs to parties,
arbitrators, administrators and courts. This is especially so because, in the
usual case, an arbitration agreement and incorporated arbitration rules (like
the AAA Construction Industry Arbitration Rules) fill the broad gaps left
by the statute. 184 In the case of the AAA Construction Industry Arbitration
Rules, as we have seen, this task has been performed with care to enhance
procedural flexibility and tailor procedures to the widest possible range of
circumstances. From the perspective of the construction industry and its
legal advisors, therefore, proponents of reform must bear a heavy burden
to demonstrate the necessity of system-wide change in the structure of a
conflict resolution mechanism that is built upon notions such as efficiency,
flexibility and party autonomy. 185
Arbitration is not litigation. Injecting litigation procedures like broad judicial
review will make arbitration less attractive as an alternative dispute resolution
process. Good arbitrators can handle the legal issues just fine. (Seattle attorney.)
Attempting to cross-breed [arbitration and litigation,] ... two entirely different
forms of dispute resolution [,] will defeat the whole purpose. By definition,
arbitration is alternative dispute resolution-alternative to the court system, not a
watered-down semi-court system. (Dallas attorney.)
(1) Arbitration is a contractual agreement, and the UAA should not be encumbered
with obvious contractual options (such as [proposals regarding review of
award]) ... (2) The UAA should not mandate quasi-litigation procedures and
techniques. If discovery is appropriate, leave its scope to the discretion of the
arbitrator. I know of no empirical evidence that discovery is being abused in
arbitration. (Minneapolis attorney.)
The theme of all the changes is to make the process more legalistic and friendly to
lawyers. The changes help lawyers try more polished and costly cases-they are not
designed to help clients much at all. My contractor clients would hate the changes-
their attorneys would like them. (Portland, Maine attorney.)
Id. at 7 n.4.
184 We might heed the lessons of the securities industry, in which binding
arbitration is heavily regulated: as more than one veteran of securities arbitration reform
has observed, in this of all contexts one must not lose sight of the virtue of simplicity.
See Robert S. Clemente & Karen Kupersmith, Grabbing the Bull by the Horns, Bus. L.
TODAY, May-June 1997, at 18 (concluding that securities industry arbitration has
developed all of the negative features of litigation); Memorandum from William J.
Fitpatrick to Members of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (Nov. 5,
1996) (on file with the author).
185 But what of consumers as signatories to standardized agreements, whose
concerns provided great impetus for the current effort? Their concerns, while beyond
the scope of this paper, are not insignificant. And while not championed by the
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E. Current Challenges: Arbitration in the Larger ADR Scheme
Binding arbitration, long the mainstay of construction dispute
resolution, will probably remain the preferred alternative to litigation for
many when settlement efforts fail. Particularly for disputes which do not
involve more than a few hundred thousand dollars, arbitration before a
competent tribunal is likely to result in a less costly, more timely and more
informed decision than trial before a judge or jury. 186 The expansion of
arbitration processes to accommodate virtually the full spectrum of civil
construction bar, there may be owners of new or improved homes who, like other
recipients of household goods and services, find themselves in an agreement to arbitrate
with terms of questionable fairness.
Although the general public may be benefited by a number of the proposed reforms
to the Uniform Arbitration Act, it remains to be seen whether the revised UAA will
address legitimate concerns regarding consent and due process issues associated with
boilerplate arbitration agreements in consumer contracts.
In this regard, Litigation Section members were asked whether arbitration statutes
should specify certain minimum formal requirements for enforceability of arbitration
agreements, including (1) conspicuousness requirements; (2) a statement of differences
between arbitration and litigation and (3) separating, signing or initialing requirements.
Seventy-two percent of those responding favored a statutory requirement that arbitration
agreements be conspicuous, although more than half of these respondents would limit
the requirement to "consumer" contracts. There was significantly less support for other
kinds of formal requirements; the separate signing requirement was disfavored by 52%
of those responding. See Stipanowich, Snapshot, supra note 172, at 2.
NCCUSL is not known for risking the defeat of legislation by taking strong stands
on behalf of consumers; controversies surrounding recent efforts to strengthen consumer
provisions in the Uniform Commercial Code reflect the difficulty of producing strong
consumer legislation in this body.
In any event, there are other efforts afoot to address consumer concerns. This
author is Academic Reporter for a National Consumer Due Process Advisory
Committee assembled under the auspices of the American Arbitration Association and
co-chaired by former California appellate court judge Winslow Christian and consumer
advocate William Miller. The group's membership consists of individuals affiliated with
leading national consumer groups and national providers of consumer goods and
services. The group is developing a Consumer Due Process Protocol setting forth a set
of standards for ADR agreements in consumer contracts. It is hoped that the standards
will provide a source of information regarding the reasonable expectations of consumers
that provide some guidance to courts in the enforcement of standardized agreements.
See Protocol for Arbitration and Mediation of Consumer Disputes (forthcoming 1998)
(on file with author); cf. Cole v. Burns International Security Services, 105 F.3d 1465
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
186 See Stipanowich, Rethinking Arbitration, supra note 73, at 460-462.
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controversy has, however, recharged the ongoing debate over the adequacy
of existing arbitration procedures as a "surrogate" for the court system.
Perhaps for the same reasons, arbitration is now subject to many of the
same criticisms heaped upon litigation.' 8 7 Today, fairly or unfairly, many
see only the problems and not the promise of binding arbitration. 88 Thus,
the coming years will remain a time of unprecedented challenge.
Arbitrators must confront many of the same issues regarding
professionalism which fuel debates among mediators. 189 While the days of
Cincinnatus-pulled-from-the-plow may not be over, there is no question
187 The trend toward adversary legalism in American commercial arbitration is
paralleled by the observed "Americanization" of international commercial arbitration, a
field increasingly dominated by the strategies and styles of litigators from major U.S.
firms. Cf. Robert A. Kagan, Do Lawyers Cause Adversarial Legalism? A Preliminary
Inquiry, 19 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 34 (1994) (discussing transformation of state workers
compensation program from informal, inexpensive process into "an intensely
adversarial and legalistic system"). See generally Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth,
Merchants of Law as Moral Entrepreneurs: Constructing International Justice from the
Competition for Transnational Business Disputes, 29 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 27 (1995).
Recently, two careful observers of conflict resolution trends in the British
construction industry reported:
It was to avoid the notorious deficiencies of the court system (delay, cost,
procedural technicality and generation of antagonism) that arbitration became
adopted widely, but evidence has existed for some years that arbitration has been
falling into disrepute, as it is seen to suffer from similar deficiencies. . . . Th[e]
imitation of legal procedures [in arbitration] has been described as the
'juridification' of arbitration.... Lawyers have been accused of hijacking the
arbitration process, most obviously to protect their own position and
authority .... Arbitration, instead of being an alternative to litigation... is
regarded as part of the problem.
Brooker & Layers, supra note 111, at 520.
188 For some attorneys, the advantages of a quick and final settlement were
perceived as less significant than the price paid in terms of "enhanced fallibility" or,
seen another way, a loss of control. Yet the resulting reforms aimed at making
arbitration more like litigation carry a price of their own. In recent years, I have heard
persons inside and outside the ranks of the legal profession insist that in discussions of
emerging alternative dispute resolution approaches, arbitration should be lumped with
litigation as a process to be avoided through resort to other mechanisms. See JOHNSON
& HIGGINS, RISK MANAGEMENT STUDY OF LARGE DESIGN FIRMs 10 (1996) [hereinafter
RISK MANAGMENT STUDY] (noting preference of large design firms for dispute
resolution methods other than arbitration).
189 See e.g., Wade Lambert, Calls Increase for Guidelines for Mediation, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 22, 1993, at Bl..
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that modem commercial arbitration places many demands on arbitrators.
Given the wide discretion they are granted and the relative finality accorded
their determinations, arbitrators must possess a high degree of integrity, a
judicial mindset, considerable process sophistication and a willingness to
take firm action when necessary (as in the handling of dispositive motions,
redundant testimony and delay tactics). It is time to look more closely at the
model of the full-time professional arbitrator and the framework necessary
to insure maintenance of professional standards, including ethical norms. 190
Moreover, arbitration cannot and should not stand alone. The very
policies supporting the use of the process in contractual relationships-
economy, efficiency, privacy and getting on with business-augur in favor
of avoiding an adjudicated result wherever possible. Leading court ADR
programs feature mechanisms to advise parties and encourage reflection
upon alternative intervention strategies to meet the needs of disputing
parties. Court adjudication is treated as just another form of problem
solving-one, to be sure, of unique importance to society-but certainly not
an approach of broad utility for commercial relationships and, potentially,
the costliest in financial and human terms. 191 It is, appropriately, the final
step in what is increasingly a deliberate, layered process.192
Recognition of the need for a midpoint in the passage from face-to-face
negotiation to binding arbitration-an interim stocktaking to permit
deliberation, reflection, discussion and resolution-inspired the traditional
190 Although cost concerns and the desire for the continued involvement of active
businesspersons may limit the use of professional neutrals in arbitration, they might be
effectively used in appropriate settings-for example, as chair of a three member panel
in a major construction case.
191 Cf. Brooker & Lavers, supra note 111, at 523 (commenting on English
research concluding that arbitration often contributes to alienation between parties and
affects future relationships).
192 Moreover, the importance of "settlement events"-points in the process at
which attorneys have to open the case file and make decisions-in promoting settlement
of cases is widely appreciated. See Stempel, supra note 1, at 354 (noting comments of
panelists). One little-noted irony of binding arbitration is that the relative absence of
prehearing "events" has contributed to the reality that a relatively high percentage of
cases in which an arbitration demand is filed actually go to a hearing on the merits. For
example, recent figures compiled by the NASD Regulation, Inc., the regulatory arm of
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), indicate that in 1996, 33% of
the cases that closed were resolved by arbitrator decision. See NASD Regulation, Inc.,
All Arbitration Close Cases Classified by Why the Case was Closed (Nov. 11, 1997)
(on file with author).
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first-tier determination by the project design professional. 193 More recently,
it prompted AAA rulemakers to encourage resort to mediated negotiations
prior to arbitration-an option which was exercised with increasing
frequency in recent years, 194 potentially reinforcing and facilitating interest-
based problem solving. 195 Whatever flexibility is produced within the ambit
of binding arbitration-and, within current AAA procedures, there appears
to be a good deal-arbitration is only one among a growing number of
"doors" for consensual conflict resolution.
IV. RETROFITTING OF MEDIATION AND OTHER INTERVENTION
TECHNIQUES
A. Toward Informality and Flexibility
In the past half-decade, the environment of conflict resolution in the
construction industry has undergone dramatic change. The 1990s have seen
unprecedented movement toward the use of intervention procedures aimed
at furthering settlement prospects through interest-based bargaining and low
cost third-party perspectives on rights and power dynamics; the movement
was fueled largely by widespread frustration with the perceived limitations
and the costliness of traditional alternatives. 196 The trend in private
contractual arrangements has been reinforced by recent developments in
federal and state courts and administrative agencies and by industry work
groups and studies here and abroad. 197 As in the case of developments in
binding arbitration, the evolution of third-party interventions aimed at
settlement reflects the struggle of competing philosophies.
193 See supra text accompanying notes 95-96 and infra text accompanying notes
198-203.
194 See Appel & Friedman, supra note 147, at 3-4 (noting gradual growth in use of
mediation in construction cases under AAA auspices, including "arbitrations converted
to mediations").
195 Cf. URY Er AL., supra note 14, at 32.
196 See generally Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration, supra note 2.
19 7 See generally id. See also Philip J. Richter & Ramzi G. Saaty, National
Construction and Building Goals: An Industry Sector Perspective-Industrial, White
House-Construction Industry Workshop National Construction Goals White Paper 15-
17 (1995) (on file with author).
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B. The "Engineered Solution": Standing Neutrals, Dispute Review
Boards and Other Evaluative Approaches
The custom of referring construction project disputes to the design
professional responsible for planning the project dates back to mid-
nineteenth century England, during the period of massive canal-building
projects. 198 The project engineer, a professional of considerable status, was
apparently accepted as a judge by both parties. The same arrangement
appeared in the United States during the railroad boom of the 1870s and
1880s and survived in state roadbuilding projects (where disputes were
judged by the state engineer subject to very limited review). 99 Vestiges
still remain, most notably in New York City.200
More commonly, the design professional, or A/E, is assigned the
responsibility of rendering an interim decision which, if unacceptable to
either party, is subject to further claims process. 20' Today, the rationale for
making the project architect or engineer a judge-albeit a first-tier judge
subject to de novo review-is efficiency. For quick and informed
determinations regarding questions of contract interpretation and related
claims and controversies, it is reasoned, the logical source is the design
professional responsible for drafting the documents. Even if non-binding,
the architect's or engineer's decisions may encourage abandonment of
claims or establish grounds for settlement. Most significant, however, is the
prospect that the A/E may propose practical solutions to the problem at
hand.
198 See JusTIN SWEET, SWEET ON CONSTRUCON LAW 38-39 (1997).
199 See id. at 39.
200 See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. New York City Transit Auth., 623
N.E.2d 531 (N.Y. 1993); Robert MacPherson, In Your Face ADR: New York City's
Construction Contract Dispute Procedure, 25 PUB. CoNT. L.J. 301, 302-311 (1996).
The practice of conferring contractual authority to render final and binding decisions on
the owner's design professional is inconsistent with the fundamental principal that no
party should judge its own case. See generally III MACNEL ET AL., supra note 155, §
28.2.5.2. Respondents to a recent multidisciplinary survey conducted by the Associated
General Contractors, Inc. and DPIC, Inc., including design professionals, strongly
supported the notion that A/E decisions should not be final and binding unless the
parties agree after the dispute has arisen. See Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration, supra
note 2, at 165. Most design professionals, however, thought they should have final
decisionmaking authority over disputes involving aesthetic questions. See id.
201 The concept is embodied in the nation's leading standard form construction
contract. See AIA A201, supra note 112, § 4.2.12.
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But the practice of conferring judicial authority-even limited, first-tier
authority-has come under increasing fire. How, ask contractors'
advocates, can an architect or engineer whose fee-or livelihood-depends
upon the owner, exercise independent judgment when the owner is a party?
And in the all-too-likely event that the design professional's own work is at
issue, shouldn't she be disqualified as a de facto party? Europeans have
never understood this Anglo-American custom; indeed, the issue raises
conflicts in international agreements. 202 As all parties have become more
sensitive to cost and more concerned regarding the disposition of legal
rights and remedies, the quasi-adjudicatory role of the design professional
has been assailed from all sides. Viewed by many as a hopeless conflict of
interest in light of the design professional's concurrent role as agent of the
owner, and, even worse, a de facto party to many jobsite disputes, the
A/E's determination is sometimes nothing more than a meaningless charade
which contributes little to the prospect of settlement and merely postpones
arbitration. 20 3
Today, support for the first-tier adjudicative role is mixed. Responding
to a recent survey by the Associated General Contractors, Inc. (ACG),
nearly half of those who answered the question agreed that A/Es "should
not play an adjudicative role with respect to any owner-contractor
disputes," although there is still evidence that many contractors as well as
designers still support the traditional approach of initial referral to the
design professional with a reservation of the right to arbitrate. 20 4
202 See SwEET, supra note 198, at 39, 131.
203 See Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration, supra note 2, at 74-75. The process has
strong advocates, however. Architect William Reiner, an active participant in American
Institute of Architects drafting as well as the AAA Task Force on Construction Conflict
Resolution, insists that the interim-decision system works because "[t]he Architect's
interpretations and decision ... must be consistent and reasonably inferable from the
Contract Documents and must be rendered without partiality." William B. Reiner,
Construction Claims and Disputes, AIA Contract Documents: Generation Next 279
(Oct. 23, 1997). Reiner continues:
An Architect soon develops the reputation for either being fair and highly
principled or unfair and Owner-bias[ed]. The ethical Architect and his/her clients
will enjoy sharp competitive bidding, fair pricing and a minimum of claims. The
Architect with the latter type [of] reputation will be rewarded with inflated pricing
to compensate for anticipated hassles and a plethora of claims and disputes.
Id.
204 See Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration, supra note 2, at 165.
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To the engineer, however, the world remains a series of problems to be
solved through rational application of scientific principles. Who better, by
predisposition and training, to fashion true and lasting solutions than the
engineer-systematic, rational-minded, and schooled in applied physics and
higher mathematics? By the 1980s, thanks, in the engineers' view, to
"outside influences"-namely lawyers and claims consultants-construction
industry conflict resolution was totally out of control. 205 More and more,
design and building was driven by claims, controversy, legal process and
the threat of process. Here, front and center, was a problem on the grand
scale just begging for an "engineered solution."
So, what to do? The rational approach was to structure a problem-
solving system which would reduce or eliminate the role of "outsiders" and
put engineers and other principal players back in control of the process.
The logical starting point was an early expert evaluation of the issue, timed
to resolve conflict before positions harden, memories wane and parties
resort to outside help. The only problem was that the traditional
embodiment of this concept-"first tier" adjudication by the project design
professional-had been discredited in many eyes due to perceived conflict
of interest.
But if the owner's own engineer or architect was disqualified from the
evaluative role, what about a "standing neutral"-a third-party expert? The
latter would, of course, be a professional engineer or other uninterested
person of proven construction experience who could competently evaluate
the bona fides of a claim for additional work, allegations of delay or
unforeseen conditions, and thus encourage the dropping or settling of the
claim. Better yet, the neutral could be brought on board at the beginning of
construction and familiarized with the job and its primary participants-
primed to hit the ground running at the first hint of controversy. Better still,
if it could be economically justified, would be to provide for a standing
panel blending several expert perspectives (primarily, if not entirely, non-
legal perspectives).
Thus, it came to be that a growing number of public and private
projects, particularly large engineered jobs such as tunnels, roads, bridges
and process plants, employed standing neutrals or dispute review boards for
the purpose of rendering summary opinions on project claims and
205 C. Brooker & Layers, supra note 111, at 525 (showing that in an extensive
survey of construction industry in United Kingdom, over half of respondents expressed
concern over lawyer control of conflict resolution and desired processes which would
reduce or eliminate the role of lawyers).
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controversies at or shortly after their genesis. 206 Proponents claim such
processes have proven extremely successful in preventing lingering and
proliferating job disputes which can have disastrous consequences for
progress and productivity. 20 7 They also suggest that the mere presence of a
readily available expert tribunal strongly discourages frivolous claims or
defenses and results in early settlement or abandonment of claims. 208
The ultimate proving ground for the dispute review board concept will
be the nation's most ambitious project, the Boston Central Artery/Tunnel
Project, better known regionally as the "Big Dig." 209 The contractual
framework for this ten-to-fifteen year, multi-billion-dollar megaproject was
largely claims-driven: the planners anticipated between ten and twenty
thousand disputes under more than seventy-five interrelated construction
contracts (as well as design, insurance, eminent domain and workers'
compensation disputes). 210 Under the circumstances, snowballing claims
206 See TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON CONTRACTING PRACTICES OF THE
UNDERGROUND TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH COUNCIL, AvOmI'NG AND RESOLVING
DISPUTES DURING CONSTRUCTION: SUCCESSFUL PRACTICES AND GUIDELINES 14 (1991)
[hereinafter AvOIDiNG AND RESOLVING DISPUTES]; see also Stipanowich, Beyond
Arbitration, supra note 2, at 125-126; John R. Kohnke, Dispute Review Boards, in
ADR: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO RESOLVE CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES 267 (Alan E. Harris
et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter ADR: A PRACTICAL GUIDE]; Lawrence D. Harrod,
Preventing Disputes with DRBs: Atlanta's Clayton Improvement Project, 20 PUNCH
LIST, Summer 1997, at 1; Charles Molineaux, Views of a DRB Expert, 20 PUNCH LIST,
Spring 1997, at 1; Michael C. Vorster, Dispute Review Boards as an ADR Technique,
in Charting the Course to the Year 2000-Together! (Oct. 18, 1994) (on file with
author); James P. Groton & William R. Wildman, The Role of Job-Site Dispute
Resolution in Improving the Chances for Success on a Construction Project, 12
CONSTRUCTION LAW., Aug. 1992, at 1.
207 See Harrod, supra note 206, at 4-5.
208 According to a construction manager on Atlanta's Clayton Improvement
Project, "cooperation was heightened during DRB meetings" because "neither party
wanted to appear foolish or intransigent before th[e] panel of experts." Herrod, supra
note 206, at 5. See also AvOIDING AND RESOLViNG DISPUTES, supra note 206, at 7
("There is an obvious desire to not appear uncooperative or foolish in front of the
Board.") But see Richard F. Smith et al., Dysfunctional ADR: Tips to Avoid the Pain,
16 CONSTRUCTION LAw., Oct. 1996, at 29-30 (describing potential problems with
DRBs, as where panel is not fairly balanced in membership).
209 See Anthony E. Battelle, The Growing Impact of AD[R] on the Construction
Industry: "Real Time" Dispute Processing on the Boston Central Artey/Tunnel Project,
15 CONSTRUCTION LAw., Nov. 1995, at 13.
210 See id.
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could quickly overwhelm the economic and human resources of the public
authority-controversy needed to be carefully managed and, effectively,
nipped in the bud.
After much deliberation, project planners settled upon a custom-
designed contractual conflict resolution system which included several tiers
of pre-litigation "filters": negotiations by project staff, followed by
negotiations at a higher level of management, then a nonbinding
determination on the merits by the state's authorized representative and,
finally, a dispute review board. The typical Artery/Tunnel contract calls for
a Dispute Review Board (DRB) made up of two neutral technical panelists
specialists, and a panel chair with "significant dispute resolution
experience," perhaps, but not necessarily, a lawyer.21' Panelists are
appointed at project startup, permitting them to become familiar with
project personnel, technical aspects and progress. DRB operating rules
minimize formality and "eliminate all vestiges of legal hearing process"
such as lawyer argument and examination of witnesses while maximizing
the flexibility of the panel to control the gathering of information. 212 At the
conclusion of the inquisitorial process, the panel deliberates and produces a
recommendation, complete with supporting rationale, for the project
director.
In setting up the DRB, process designers sought a "real time" dispute
resolution system which requires parties to "assess their positions and work
out their strategies before knowing whether the contract is going to end up
in a profit, loss, or break-even situation" while facts are still fresh,
witnesses are still available and legal bills are minimized. 213
All indications are that the Artery/Tunnel scheme has worked well so
far. Moreover, at least during the early years of construction, the much-
vaunted prophylactic effect of an in situ panel appears to have carried over
into the Artery/Tunnel. With more than twenty percent of construction
complete, and more than 1,500 claims processed, only a handful reached
the DRB, 2 14 and none have gone to court.
The concept of early neutral evaluation (at least, models involving
industry experts) has broad appeal not only among design professionals, but
211 The Artery/Tunnel planners acknowledged that DRBs often exclude attorneys
as panelists, but concluded that construction lawyers skilled in informal conflict
resolution might add value to the DRB. See id. at 15.
212 See id. at 16.
213 See id.
214 See id. at 14.
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among construction contractors as well. This was the clear message of
recent industry-wide surveys co-sponsored by the Associated General
Contractors (AGC) and DPIC, a leading insurer of design professionals.
Despite having little experience with the process, industry actors generally
ranked the approach higher than mediation, the better-publicized favorite of
attorneys. 215 Indeed, implicit in this choice is a rejection of the legal system
and the strategies of legal professionals-a recurrent theme in treatments of
DRB processes. 216
Variants of early neutral evaluation also have significant support
overseas. In recent years, British and international construction contracts
have incorporated the role of interim adjudicator to render temporary
decisions on payment matters and other disputes. 217 Under the JCT 81, for
example, the adjudicator can address adjustments in the contract sum,
render interpretations of the contract and make determinations of
entitlements to time extensions or damages. In this role the adjudicator acts
"as an expert and not an arbitrator." The adjudicator's determination is
final and binding on the parties unless referred to arbitration. 218
2 15 See Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration, supra note 2, at 145-154, 179 (noting
that attorneys perceived mediation as the most effective approach for achieving a wide
variety of goals, while design professionals and contractors tended to evaluate early
neutral evaluation more highly); see also RISK MANAGEMENT STUDY, supra note 188, at
9-10 (noting that among 200 large design firms responding to survey, preferred method
of dispute resolution is early neutral evaluation).
216 See, e.g., AvowING AND RESOLVING DISPUTES, supra note 206, at 15. A
candid perspective on the anti-lawyer sentiments comes from Robert J. Smith, a well-
known Madison, Wisconsin construction attorney who stresses that he is also a civil
engineer "who advises clients and, as engineers do, tries to solve problems."
Molineaux, supra note 206, at 5. Smith, a major DRB advocate, acknowledged the
"visceral distaste" most "construction people" share for lawyers:
Lawyers are the professionals everyone loves to hate so there is a serious edge to
lawyer jokes. Like most people, engineers don't particularly like being cross-
examined and challenged and, on top of that, they see the legal procedures standing
in the way of getting to a resolution.... Most DRB people would find [the active
participation of lawyer advocates] abhorrent.
Id.
217 See generally Bruce Bentley, Adjudication Procedures: A Temporary
Diversion?, in FENN & GAMESON, supra note 65, at 187.
2 18 The precise legal effect of this provision has apparently been modified by
recent legislation in the United Kingdom, including a law making "adjudication"
mandatory in construction contracts. See generally Phillip Capper, Arbitration and
363
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The Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE) New Engineering Contract
provides for the identification of an adjudicator who is an officer of the
Authority associated with the letting or managing of the Contract-a
throwback to traditional approaches. 21 9 In this role the adjudicator reviews
actions of the owner's project manager or supervisor and may overrule the
former and order payment of damages or a correction of time. Again, the
adjudicator acts as an expert and not as an arbitrator; again, his
determination may be appealed to arbitration by either party. 220
As with "engineered" approaches in the U.S., such procedures are
intended to provide "rough and ready" determinations of rights without the
formalities of trial, and by the vehicle of an ever-present honest broker to
discourage frivolous positions and encourage realistic settlements short of
legal process.
C. The Multiple Modes of "Mediation"
1. A Good Idea From the Court System
For all the efforts of engineers to foster the culture of the DRB, it
appears that, in this as in other settings, trend-setting honors must go to that
increasingly ubiquitous alternative, mediation.221 The much-heralded recent
unveiling of a mediation provision as the jewel in the crown of the 1997
American Institute of Architects (A.I.A.) contract documents222 represents
yet another high water mark for a movement which swept courthouses and
communities across the country. Its ubiquity reflects the universality of its
attraction as a uniquely flexible, portable and facilitative approach to
negotiations at any time during or after the emergence of conflict. Properly
conducted, mediation entails few risks and great prospective benefits which
may transcend the legal issues on the table.
Adjudication After 1996: Practice, Procedures and Opportunities, 13 CONSTR. L. J. 369
(1997).
219 See generally Martin Barnes, The New Engineering Contract-An Update, 13
INT'L CONSTR. L. REV. 89 (1996).
220 Again, recent British legislation will affect the enforcement of this provision.
See generally Capper, supra note 218.
221 See generally Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration, supra note 2, at 84-85, 91-
124, 131-135, 140-142, 145-164, 166-182 (discussing perceived advantages,
limitations of mediation and analyzing recent industry experience).
222 See infra Section VI.C.
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As planners and participants in the judicial realm discovered, a
structured negotiation with the assistance of a third-party facilitator is a
very flexible concept which adapts easily to the needs of the negotiating
parties. It may or may not involve formal presentations and may be
conducted in any mutually agreeable venue. It may or may not involve
lawyer participation and is often described as speedier and less expensive
than more elaborate conflict resolution techniques.
As a facilitated settlement negotiation, mediation tends to fall within the
scope of evidentiary rules protecting communications made during the
course of settlement discussions. Coupled with appropriate language in the
agreement to mediate and judicial use of the "caucus" (ex parte sessions
between the mediator and individual parties which permit the sharing of
confidential information), mediation tends to be among the most private of
conflict resolution techniques. 223
Compared to a number of other dispute resolution procedures such as
mini-trial, summary jury trial and nonbinding arbitration, all of which tend
to emphasize predicting what will happen in later adjudicatory proceedings,
mediation permits a consideration of the full range of issues the parties
bring to the table, such as business or relationship considerations or
communication problems. Mediation is, in short, the intervention strategy
most clearly and directly targeted toward interest-based bargaining. 224
Perhaps most importantly, mediation provides parties with the
opportunity to take a primary role in structuring solutions to their own
problems-solutions limited only by the imagination and willingness of the
parties, their counsel and the mediator. The participation of the parties in
the outcome enhances the likelihood that they will accept and live up to it.
Finally, by bringing the parties to the table and generating light when
previously only heat existed, mediation may reopen channels of
communication in ongoing relationships, a particular advantage when
controversy threatens progress midway through a construction project.225
Long a fixture in the collective bargaining arena, mediation gained
widespread popularity as the premier instrument of the community justice
and court-connected ADR movements. Its gradual adoption as a consensual
conflict resolution mechanism in construction disputes was prefigured by its
use in hundreds of state and federal court-connected conflict resolution
223 See Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration, supra note 2, at 84-85.
224 See infra Section VI.C.
225 See Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration, supra note 2, at 86.
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programs. 226 Having come to understand the value of mediation in the
judicial setting, attorneys sought to transfer their experience to private
contexts. Within the space of a few years, mediation clauses began
appearing in standard industry documents in the United States and
Canada-a trend culminating in the incorporation of mediation in the latest
AIA standard documents. 227 Today, mediation is probably the most
common form of third-party intervention in construction conflicts-thanks,
ironically, to borrowings from the court system by attorneys.
2. What Do We Know About Mediation?
What do we know about mediation in this setting? Recent research
gives us some general information about its operation and hints of more;
word-of-mouth anecdotes remain the chief source of details for most users.
But the most significant data, touching upon the specific styles, strategies
and tactics of mediators, is also the most elusive.
As was true of its manifestation in the court-annexed setting, mediation
is a vague concept which covers a range of approaches. Recent studies tell
us that mediation has been rapidly embraced by construction attorneys,
many of whom purport a willingness to recommend its use in most or all
cases. 228 They tend to view the process as a cost-effective means of
resolving conflict229 with few downsides. The construction attorneys'
perceptions are supported by reported experiences with the process. 230
226 See PLAPINGFR & STMNSTRA, supra note 24, at 4.
227 See generally Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration, supra note 2, at 84-85
(discussing mediation under U.S. contracts); Robert Knutson, Standard Canadian
Construction Contracts, in COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN CONSTRUCTION LAW: THE SWEET
LEcTUREs 37, 42-43 (A. Martin Odams ed., 1995) (discussing mediation under
Canadian Construction Documents Committee CCDC 2).
228 See Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration, supra note 2, at 91-94.
229 See id. at 94 n. 142.
230 Relatively few attorneys responding to an American Bar Association Forum on
the Construction Industry survey reported experiences involving revelation of trial
strategy, sharing of confidential information, or delays and disruptions to the conflict
resolution process. See id. at 121. According to a later survey by the same organization,
reported mediations resulted in twice as many "positive" as "negative" experiences.
Most of the time, moreover, there were significant savings of cost or time associated
with this form of conflict resolution. See id. at 168-169, 176-178. Compare Peter
Goetz & Frank Muller, Viewpoint of Peter Goetz & Frank Muller, in ALTERNATwE
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According to data from the construction bar, the great majority of
mediators are attorneys or retired judges. 231 Although construction lawyers
appear to be aware of the potential value of mediation in helping parties to
maintain an ongoing relationship, the focus is most often on a monetary
settlement. A 1991 survey of mediation experience among the construction
bar revealed that nearly all reported mediated resolutions involved some
form of monetary settlement, while relatively few resulted in other
solutions such as an agreement to perform work. 232 A later industry-wide
survey revealed that attorneys tended to evaluate the success or failure in
terms of quick, economical resolution of discrete disputes rather than in
terms of its impact on communications or relations between parties or
procedures for handling future conflict. 233
Finally, it is apparent that much of construction mediation practice is at
variance with the "purist" facilitative model taught in most mediator
training programs. Considerable evidence exists of the use of evaluative
techniques in mediation. One of the most striking findings of recent
industry studies is that in the great majority of construction mediations, the
mediator offers "views regarding factual or legal issues." 234 What is more,
the use of such techniques had a statistically significant correlation to
higher settlement rates235-not the only measure of success in mediation,
but certainly one most construction parties tend to emphasize. Because the
mediators in the reported cases were nearly always attorneys, it is probable
that their evaluations addressed legal issues.
Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that the most prominent
construction mediators-most, if not all, of whom are attorneys-tend to
DIspuTE RESOLUTION IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 185 (Robert F. Cushman et al.
eds.) (1990) (discussing mediation costs).
231 See Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration, supra note 2, at 116. An ABA Forum on
the Construction Industry survey revealed that approximately 86% of mediators in
reported cases were attorneys (65%) or retired judges (21%). See id.
232 See id. at 120.
233 See id. at 171-176. Responding to the same survey, however, design
professionals and contractors who described negative experiences in mediation placed
relatively more emphasis on the failure to preserve or improve communications or
relations between the parties. See id.
234 See id. at 118.
235 See id. at 122-124.
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employ personal evaluations at some point in the proceedings. 236 The
model is not unlike that employed by many personal injury mediators,
although in this context the factual schemes and legal issues tend to be
much more complex.
While drawing conclusions is always hazardous in the absence of
complete information, 237 it appears that as currently practiced, construction
mediation tends to be lawyer-driven. It is usually a process resorted to not
to sustain a relationship or improve communications in the interest of
keeping a project going, but to achieve the limited purpose of sorting out
the damages in the wake of an irretrievably broken relationship. In such
cases, interest-based discussions quickly give way to hard-dollar
negotiations.
There are, to be sure, exceptions, and timing may have much to do
with it.2 38 When a major public housing project threatened to shut down as
236 What is becoming clear, moreover, is that evaluation means very different
things to different people. In a presentation to the A.B.A. Forum on the Construction
Industry, Professor Eric Green made it clear that he views evaluation, meaning "the
mediator's prediction of how the actual judge, jury or arbitrator(s)... will decide the
case," as a primary element in the mediator's strategic arsenal. Eric D. Green,
Successful Mediation of Construction Claims, Construction Advocacy & All That Jazz,
ABA Forum Annual Meeting 8 (Apr. 25, 1997) (on file with author). He indicated,
however, that such predictions should be reserved until other approaches had been
exhausted and distinguished this form of evaluation from a personal judgment of the
issues, which he categorized as inappropriate. See id. But another construction neutral,
in describing his own approach to mediation, explains:
After receiving all relevant materials... and permitting each party a separate,
private opportunity to present its best case, the mediator is prepared, with the
parties' consent, to present proposed settlement terms for separate
consideration by each party. [If the parties consent to go forward, the mediator
then presents the proposed settlement terms.]
Kenneth Feinberg, Viewpoint of Kenneth Feinberg, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY, supra note 230, at 192, 195. See also
George Marcus & Paula Marcus, Fact-Based Mediation for the Construction Industry,
ARB. J., Sept. 1987, at 7 (describing mediation procedure in which neutrals meet with
the parties, then conduct fact-finding, technical analysis and expert evaluation, before
issuing a report to the parties); Smith et al., supra note 208, at 31 (describing
widespread practice of mediators giving advisory opinions, and limits on such activities
in some jurisdictions).
237 Isn't that, after all, one of the concerns about opinion-giving in mediation?
238 Evaluative mediator Kenneth Feinberg notes that while mediation might be used
to resolve disputes during construction, "[A]ll the construction disputes I have mediated
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a result of multiple controversies, a public housing authority and the
general contractor sought to retain an arbitrator. For a number of reasons,
however, it became clear that the immediate interests of the parties would
be better served by a form of intervention focused not on responsibility for
past events but on the future progress of the job.239 The result was an
ongoing facilitation over a period of months, centered on weekly project
meetings. The neutral's facilitative role consisted of mediating current
conflicts and helping the parties to anticipate and address future issues.
These efforts permitted the successful completion of the project while prior
claims were held in abeyance.
Likewise, situations exist where a mediator may find it possible to
expand the pie to enhance the value to all parties to a construction-related
dispute. A recent example involved a major business which terminated a
contractor for default after a dispute over the quality of work. In mediation,
it quickly became apparent that the contractor was anxious to continue the
relationship with the customer, and that the customer's remedial
alternatives were much more expensive. It then became a matter of
ascertaining whether and under what circumstances the customer would
permit remedial work to be done by the original contractor-a possibility
which became a reality with some assistance from the contractor's surety
and technical input from engineers on both sides. The mediated settlement
incorporated the terms of a new contract which included repair work as
well as other improvements.
Again, however, these are not the usual cases. By the time mediation is
sought in most disputes, legal representatives have become involved and
engage the mediator in the same "litigotiation" mode in which mediators
are often utilized in court-connected programs. The attorneys usually turn,
not surprisingly, to one of their own as a neutral. 24° In making the selection
were controversies that arose after completion of the project." Feinberg, supra note
236, at 192 n.34.
239 Prior to agreement on the shift of neutral roles, the author made clear to the
parties that functioning as a facilitator entailed likely prejudice to the role of arbitrator.
240 For example, Leslie King O'Neal, a partner in the Orlando law firm of Holland
& Knight and the chair of the American Bar Association Forum on the Construction
Industry, the nation's largest organization of lawyers with construction practices, selects
mediators based on "[k]nowledge of construction law and construction process-
preferably from having handled complex construction cases; good mediation skills;
[and] good communication skills." Letter from Leslie King O'Neal to Thomas J.
Stipanowich 2 (July 14, 1997) (on file with author). Mark Anderson, Vice President for
a major consulting service to the industry, Hill International, Inc., looks for
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they talk to other attorneys and, increasingly, to the would-be mediators
themselves, to get some kind of idea about what kind of mediator they will
be. 24 1
But the kind of information they want is elusive. They want to know
what kind of value a given mediator will add to the process. Measuring a
mediator's performance is particularly tricky, since rarely does anyone see
all of the mediator's efforts; even mediators have a hard time explaining
what they do. Inevitably, in the search for a convenient method of
describing "value added," there will be some discussion of whether the
mediator helped settle cases.
In many cases, this process will produce a nominee who places a
premium on getting the case settled, whatever it takes. The individual is
likely to employ evaluative techniques, at least to the extent of conveying
predictions of the likely outcome of adjudication on the merits. The
confidence with which she speaks the language of legal process and the
mechanics of construction claims enhances her reputation in the eyes of the
lawyers, who transmit their perceptions to their clients and others. (Of
course, she is immeasurably aided in this respect if she is already a legal
specialist of some standing.) 242
Unquestionably, the mediator will be aided in the task of achieving
settlement by reputation, for success breeds success. If I have it on good
"[e]xperience [with the same] type of project, and familiarity with the fundamentals of
construction claims (as manifested in the concepts of causation, liability and damages)."
Letter from Mark Anderson to Thomas J. Stipanowich 3 (July 13, 1997) (on file with
author).
241 Leslie O'Neal states, "My most important consideration is my experience with
the provider or the experience of partners, friends, [and] colleagues. If I don't know the
[mediator], I solicit as much information as possible from others who have had
experience with him or her." Letter from Leslie King O'Neal to Thomas J.
Stipanowich, supra note 240, at 2. Mark Anderson echoes, "Identifying seasoned,
qualified and competent mediators remains largely a personal relationship and referral
industry. It is often advisable to interview shortlisted candidates." Letter from Mark
Anderson to Thomas J. Stipanowich, supra note 240, at 4. As the in-house counsel for
RTKL, a major international A/E firm based in Baltimore, notes, "Often you can speak
with references.., and determine the [mediator] style you prefer in advance of
mediation. If references are not available, it is often possible to speak to the mediator,
and determine... his style and approach." Letter from Karen Koenig Blose (Aug. 8,
1997) (on file with author).
242 As Leslie O'Neal observes, "Knowledge [of construction cases] helps in many
ways, including the parties' willingness to listen to the mediator's comments." Letter
from Leslie King O'Neal to Thomas J. Stipanowich, supra note 240, at 2.
370
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authority that the royal touch cures scurvy and a variety of other maladies,
I might believe just enough to permit myself to be healed. If we begin to
accept that the itinerant "professor" can conjure music from a band of
novices, then music may be what we hear when we heed his admonition to
"concentrate." It is only a matter of time before present trends produce a
class of lawyer/"super-mediators" who, in the manner of Gerry Spence,
claim a long, unbroken string of "victories" at the negotiation table.
Many attorneys and clients may be perfectly satisfied with this
approach. Better, say advocates, to make their presence felt than to be
mere message carriers. 243 But such tactics, applied indiscriminately, may
take a significant toll on users and their relationships. As one insider
complained:
Unfortunately, [the practice of judging mediators by their ability to bring
about a settlement] has placed significant pressure on mediators and the
mediation process to settle the case, often at any and all costs. The result
[is that] a process... which was created to allow for the amicable and
reasoned resolution of disputes... often becomes a death sentence... to
the parties' relationship and.., leaves the parties with nothing good to
say about the process or the mediator other than "... at least it is
over."244
An example involving a leading architectural-engineering (A/E) firm
illustrates the downside of indiscriminate emphasis on a hard-driven dollar
settlement. Engaged in a two-party dispute with a major contractor, the
firm sought mediation partly in hopes of enhancing communications with
the other party. They chose a mediator who was a construction attorney
with considerable mediation experience and many references.
Unfortunately, the parties insufficiently explored the mediator's style and
strategies and their appropriateness to the parties' goals. At the end of the
day, the mediator had settled the dispute, but at a cost. According to the
A/E firm's attorney, the only contact between the parties consisted of short
presentations before the mediator. The mediator quickly summarized the
parties' respective positions and, having apparently reached his own
conclusions about the bona fides, separated the disputants and spent the rest
243 Ms. O'Neal summarizes, "I have had worse experiences with mediators being
too passive than too aggressive." Letter from Leslie King O'Neal to Thomas J.
Stipanowich, supra note 240, at 2.
244 Letter from Mark Anderson to Thomas J. Stipanowich, supra note 240, at 4.
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of the day "beating on the parties" to achieve a settlement. To the client's
horror, no opportunity existed to enter into a mutual discussion or seek a
consensus of any kind-only a "shuttlecock dickering" over dollars.
Despite a dollar settlement, the client emerged with no intention to repeat
the mediation experience.
If a leading A/E firm represented by sophisticated counsel has this kind
of experience in mediation, one wonders what is happening in the great run
of cases. Clearly, users and their attorneys need a good deal more
education about the range of mediator styles and strategies, permitting
meaningful inquiries of prospective neutrals.
Unfortunately, current data does not provide specific guidance
regarding the use of evaluation in mediation. Evaluative mediators are
apparently sought out a good deal of the time by attorneys and parties in
construction cases. It is obvious, however, that opinions must be offered
with care, because they may fix positions in negotiating and undermine the
neutral's ongoing facilitative role. Different approaches with substantially
different implications include: one-on-one queries regarding "worst case"
scenarios; hard, close and confidential interrogations about the risks and
costs of litigating a particular matter, including decision tree analysis; and
judgments from the hip in joint sessions.
We need to know a lot more about mediator techniques, and either do a
better job of providing guidance to prospective users or ensure that they
receive better counseling. 245 At the same time, we need to consider the
effect of timing on mediation and whether more proactive use of the
process, closer to the emergence of conflict and prior to initiation of
litigation or arbitration, is feasible. The opportunity to visit these and other
questions may be presented by recent changes to standard industry
contracts.
D. Mediation Becomes the Status Quo
For many years, the mounting complexity of standard form contracts
and increasing formality and intricacy of contractual provisions governing
the handling of claims and controversies have been at odds with traditional
business practice in the construction industry, which puts a high priority on
245 In an attempt to develop a better appreciation of mediator methods, the National
Association of Securities Dealers now requires would-be mediators to provide
recommendations from at least four individuals who have observed their mediation
techniques. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC., NASD
MEDIATION: AN ALTERNATIVE PATH To RESOLVING SECURmES DISPuTES 7 (1995).
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resolving disputes quickly and informally to prevent disruption or
derailment of long-term relationships.3 In striving to address with a
lawyer's precision every possible contingency in the claims cycle, the
authors of the 1987 edition of primary AIA documents lost sight of the
need for "machinery to work things out." 247 The growing gap between
rules and reality-the perceived imbalance between the benefits and cost of
existing processes-has given momentum to the movement toward less
formal, more efficient alternatives for resolving disputes, such as mediation
and dispute review boards.248
In the past decade, there has been a growing recognition that industry
contract documents should place greater emphasis on the use of informal,
nonadjudicative techniques rather than rely so heavily on adversary
procedures. The incorporation of mediation and other approaches in
standard form contracts is a logical result of parallel developments in courts
and agencies, the initiatives of several leading industry organizations249 and
the founding of an interdisciplitary coalition supported by all sectors of the
industry. 250 At least one major industry insurer has for some time offered
financial incentives for precontractual efforts to avoid disputes and post-
dispute efforts to settle. 251
The 1997 edition of the American Institute of Architects contract
documents requires mediation "as a precondition to arbitration or any legal
246 The importance of personal relationships in the construction contracting
business is borne out by the vast numbers of personal references in corporate
biographies, which read more like extenuated corporate "begats."
247 Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration, supra note 2, at 73.
248 See generally id. See infra Parts V-VI.
249 In 1996, numerous industry bodies joined in a Declaration of Principles for
Prevention and Resolution of Disputes in the Construction Industry, an unprecedented
commitment to cooperative, systematic approaches to conflict avoidance and resolution.
See DART Declamation Signed at Historical Ceremony, DART NEWSLETTER, Spring
1996, at 1,3.
250 The Dispute Avoidance and Resolution Task Force (DART), founded as a
three-year pilot program in 1991, did much to raise the consciousness of the industry. In
1994, the American Arbitration Association took over funding and administration of the
program.
251 The positive experience of DPIC, one of two leading errors and omissions
carriers for architects and engineers, with its mediation referral program is described in
Goetz & Muller, supra note 230, at 175. See infra note 268 (describing partnering
incentives).
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or equitable proceeding. ,,252 Although one may have reservations about an
all-purpose boilerplate requirement of this kind, on balance it is probably a
very positive development. The incorporation of a provision requiring
mediation of conflicts in the 1997 AIA documents will reinforce current
trends toward the use of mediation (and, perhaps, other forms of
intervention) and will underline the need for better understanding of the
process, the roles of neutrals and the timing of intervention. 253
By identifying mediation as a step in the claims process between an
architect's decision (the old "first-tier" determination) and arbitration, a
progression that usually begins soon after issues arise, the drafters have
enhanced the possibility that mediation will occur early enough to mitigate
the impact of a dispute on the project and on contractual relationships. The
effect, to put it another way, is a deliberate, facilitated "loop-back" to
negotiation after the first, brief rights-based analysis.254 Thus approached,
mediation might avoid the "litigotiation" motif which is so prevalent when
intervention commences only when the relationship is over and prospects
for integrative solutions are significantly narrowed.
Under the new AIA contracts, mediation is to be conducted under the
AAA rules unless the parties agree otherwise. 255 Among other things, these
rules establish a mechanism for mediator appointment with the assistance of
2 52 AIA A201, supra note 112, § 4.5.2; AMERICAN INsnTUTE OF ARCHTECTS
DocuMENT B141, CoNRAcT BETWEEN Tm OWNER AND ARcHrrEcr (1997)
[hereinafter AIA B141] § 1.4.3.4.1. See Paul M. Lurie, Construction Mediation Under
the 1997 AIA Documents, AIA Contract Documents: Generation Next (Oct. 23-24,
1997) (on file with author).
253 Although our focus it on process issues, another reform introduced by the AIA
drafting committee may have an even more profound, long-lasting effect on claims
practice and conflict resolution in the construction arena. The 1997 owner-contractor
agreement incorporates a mutual waiver of consequential damages-long the driver of
construction claims and controversy. See AIA A201, supra note 112, § 4.3.10.
Although it is likely that legal advocates will use all of their ingenuity to find ways
around these limitations, the enforcement of the mutual waiver could substantially
reduce the financial incentive for parties and their lawyers and claims consultants to
spend tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars to wage a major campaign in pursuit of
lost dollars. See Stipanowich, Rebuilding Construction Law, supra note 11, at .
254 Cf URY ET AL., supra note 14, at 52-56.
255 See AA A201, supra note 112, § 4.5.2; AA B141, supra note 252,
§ 1.4.3.4.1.
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a disinterested neutral administering organization and set out basic ground
rules for the mediation. 25 6
Hopefully, rather than encouraging a "one-size-fits-all" mentality, the
commitment to mediate will stimulate a range of proactive solutions,
including not only earlier, more integrative mediated bargaining, but also
early neutral evaluation and DRB-type programs, with or without attorneys.
Ideally, such considerations would play a part in deliberate front-end
planning. The increasing use of such processes will in turn permit the
gathering of a significant body of empirical information regarding specific
applications. "The lessons of experience should be summarized and
communicated to those charged with selecting procedures to be used in
specific contractual settings. Major emphasis should be placed on helping
users and their legal representatives to understand the range of styles and
approaches employed by third-party intervenors.
Finally, the incorporation of mediation as a part of the AAA claims
resolution process reinforces the need to think in broader terms about the
entire schema of conflict resolution-and not just of solitary processes. The
stepped process unveiled by the AIA, and the AAA's resulting unification
of construction mediation and arbitration procedures in a single document
under the heading of Construction Industry Conflict Resolution
Procedures, 257 reflect the emerging notion of a conflict resolution system
which provides a range of intervention tools, employed alternatively or
successively, to meet the priorities of particular users.
Although the AIA/AAA approach provides an industry-wide template,
similar approaches are increasingly employed by individual organizations in
structuring their own commitments. A growing number of major U.S.
companies are developing carefully designed multistep ADR processes or
"filtering systems" for particular long-term contractual relationships. 258 As
256 In response to the AIA's formal incorporation of the AAA Construction
Industry Mediation Rules in its claims procedure, the AAA published those procedures
in a single pamphlet with its Construction Industry Arbitration Rules. See AAA
PROCEDURES, supra note 149, Rules M-1 to M-17.
257 See id.
258 See generally BUILDING ADR, supra note 102 (summarizing efforts of
corporate ADR programs by BASF Corporation, Chevron, CIGNA, Eaton Corporation,
Ford Motor Company, Motorola, and many other companies); David Mulford,
Establishing and Implementing a Corporate ADR Program, in ADR: A PRAcncAL
GUIDE, supra note 206, at 371 (outlining systematic approach to ADR planning for
organizations with many outstanding contracts and large volume of related disputes).
One would expect to see the widest range of possibilities in the case of long-term
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previously discussed, a multi-phased ADR program was devised for the
nation's largest construction project, the Boston Central Artery/Tunnel
Project. 259
Another example from the construction arena is offered by a major
institutional owner in Canada. British Columbia Hydro (BC Hydro),
frustrated with its inability to handle project claims and controversy by
expanding contract verbiage, established an ADR program that begins with
face-to-face negotiation and progresses, if necessary, through the following
increasingly formal steps: an initial decision by a BC Hydro representative,
a review of the initial decision by a standing neutral and, ultimately, an
appeal to binding arbitration. 260 In the first three years of operation, BC
Hydro used the system in 119 contracts involving $55 million in
construction. Forty-seven disputed claims were processed through the
system; all but twelve were negotiated face-to-face. Only two reached the
"standing neutral," and all were settled prior to binding arbitration. 261
Although the specifics vary, all of these systems tend to share the
following key features: (1) an initial emphasis on face-to-face negotiation
contractual relations within a firm, including individual employment contracts. In mid-
1993, Brown & Root, one of the nation's largest contracting firms initiated a "four-
option" dispute resolution program for handling employment disputes. See also Internal
Employee Pamphlet, The Brown & Root Dispute Resolution Program (June 15, 1993)
(on file with author). The program involves a stepped plan-incorporating both internal
procedures and external, independently administered procedures-that bears some of the
earmarks of conflict resolution procedures traditionally employed in collective
bargaining agreements. First, employees who believe they have a grievance are
encouraged to take their problem through the company chain of command. They have
the opportunity to speak with a confidential adviser, and in some cases may also be
approved to receive monetary support for legal consultation. If this in-house process
fails to resolve the matter, the workers may call for a conference with a company
representative and dispute resolution program administrator to discuss various
mechanisms for handling the problem. In the case of legally protected rights such as
protection from discrimination or harassment, the employees are directed to AAA-
sponsored mediation and, if necessary, arbitration. The Brown & Root plan, although
built around a sequence of fixed procedural steps, is variegated to address the range of
potential problems that are likely to arise in the workplace. It also incorporates dynamic
elements including a confidential adviser and other informal in-house mechanisms for
charting specific solutions. See also Rockwell International, Employee Issue Resolution
Process (incorporating similar stepped process).
259 See supra text accompanying notes 209-214.
260 See generally Paul Sandori, ADR in Canadian Construction Contracts, Charting
the Course to the Year 2000 Together! (Oct. 18, 1994).
261 See id. at 18-20.
[Vol. 13:2 1998]
THE MULTI-DOOR CONTRACT AND OTHER POSSIBILITIES
among key participants in the transaction, sometimes including "stepped
negotiation" arrangements in which negotiations move up the
organizational chain, further and further from intimate, day-to-day
involvement with the transaction; (2) at some point, the introduction of
third-party intervention strategies aimed at facilitating interest-based
bargaining and providing outside perspectives on rights and power issues,
all with the aim of encouraging resolution of conflicts short of binding
adjudication; and (3) if all else fails, resort to binding arbitration or
litigation. 262
As with any ADR process, careful planning is required to avoid
problems. Given the wide range and diversity of contractual arrangements,
great care must be taken in adapting the process to the circumstances. 263 As
Stewart Macaulay once observed, "[a]ny technique of dispute avoidance or
settlement will only be invoked if it is advantageous after the potential
benefits and costs are balanced." 264
With multi-step programs, moreover, the possibilities of unanticipated
procedural dilemmas are magnified. 265 The first of what will undoubtedly
be numerous judicial decisions dealing with the special problems of
262 The approaches tend to follow some of the basic principles described by Ury,
Brett and Goldberg, including placing additional focus on party interests, providing low-
cost assessments of relative rights and power elements as "backups" to negotiation and
arranging procedures in a low to high-cost sequence. See generally URY ET AL., supra
note 14, ch.3.
263 See Clyde W. Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78
YALE L.J. 525, 568 (1969). Industry-oriented "helps" have been developed by various
groups. Construction lawyers have offered specific guidelines for retrofitting different
ADR techniques into standard industry boilerplate. See generally Robert G. Taylor &
Buckner Hinkle, Jr., How to Use ADR Clauses with Standard Form Construction
Industry Contracts, 15 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 42 (Apr. 1995); cf DISPUTE RESOLUTION
CLAUsEs: A GuEDE FOR DRAurERs OF BusuIss AGREEMENTS, CPR LEGAL PROGRAM
(1994). A much-publicized "engineered" contribution, predictably, was a computer-
assisted mathematical model for predicting the likelihood of disputes on a project. See
Boutte, et al., Disputes Potential Index: A Cholesterol Test, 1994 CII Conference.
Although both are helpful, neither of these tools provides a sufficient basis for
determining the suitability of a particular process for particular circumstances. A recent
attempt at developing an aid for this purpose is a computerized ADR "Suitability
Screen." See CPR INSTITUTE FOR DisPUTE RESOLUTION, CPR ADR SurrABnry
SCREEN (1996).
264 Macaulay, Elegant Models, supra note 77, at 510.
265 See Letter from Sharon F. Daily to Carl Ingwalson (May 9, 1995) (collection of
seemingly innovative but unworkable ADR provisions) (on file with author).
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multifaceted ADR provisions appeared only three years ago. 2 6 6 The key to
proper ADR planning and, indeed, the best possible grounding for any
long-term contractual relationship, may lie in facilitated "partnering."
V. TOWARD THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT: PARTNERING
A. Ritualizing Relational Attributes
Contemporary profiles of the industry indicate that construction firms
reporting a higher level of profitability tend to be committed to project
management and systems approaches such as total quality management
(TQM).267 A common component of construction TQM processes is
"partnering," a concept derived in part from the recent Japanese/American
experience. 268 Partnering formalizes the following aspects of enterprise
planning traditionally employed by successful contracting entities: getting to
know your contracting partner; identifying common goals and discussing
specific plans and expectations; and establishing clear channels of
communication and fail-safe mechanisms for resolving potential
problems. 269 Partnering was first utilized extensively in the public works
arena,270 and has been championed by multi-disciplinary industry
266 See, e.g., Belmont Constructors, Inc. v. Lyondell Petrochemical Co., 896
S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (under terms of multi-door ADR provision in
contract for construction of new chemical plant, arbitration could not be compelled if
parties agreed to an alternative procedure such as mediation).
2 67 See DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION, A JOINT PRoJECT OF DELOITE & TOUCHE
AND THE ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS OF AMERICA 3 (1993).
268 The term partnering was also used to describe contracting strategies employed
in the U.S. manufacturing and distribution sector in the 1980s; such strategies involved
"highly structured agreements between companies to cooperate to an unusually high
degree to achieve their separate but complementary objectives." E. Lynn Cook & Donn
E. Hancher, Partnering: Contracting for the Future, 6 J. OF MGMT. IN ENGINEERING
431, 432 (1990). See generally James C. Anderson & James A. Narus, Partnering as a
Focused Market Strategy, 33 CAL. MANAGEMENT REV. 95 (1991); Frank K.
Sonnenberg, Partnering: Entering the Age of Cooperation, 13 J. OF Bus. STRATEGY 49
(1992).
269 See generally Cook & Hancher, supra note 268.
270 See, e.g., NORMAN C. ANDERSON, WASmNGTON STATE DEP'T OF
TRANSPORTATION, MANAGING CONFLICT ON CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS (PARTNERING)
(1992) (describing early state D.O.T. partnering program, first developed in late1989);
IWR WORKING PAPER, supra note 59 (describing the pioneering efforts and increasing
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organizations such as the Construction Industry Dispute Avoidance and
Resolution Task Force (DART)271 and the Construction Industry Institute
(Cn).272
Partnering represents yet another step in the "upstream" progression of
deliberate third-party intervention in construction contract relationships-
from binding adjudication (arbitration) to settlement of conflict (mediation,
nonbinding evaluation) to facilitated planning of long-term relationships.
Partnering, founded on the notion that early engagement has the greatest
ability to influence costs,273 sets the stage for ongoing collaborative effort-
use of partnering by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, CONSTRUCTION DIVISION, PARTNERING: A NEw
CONCEPT FOR ATTAINING CONSTRUCTION GOALS (1991); Mark E. Appel, Partnering:
New Dimensions in Dispute Prevention and Resolution, ARB. J., June 1993, at 47-48
(discussing use of partnering in government contract processes); John G. Bickerman,
Partnering in the Construction Industry: Teaming Up to Prevent Disputes, 9 PRoB. &
PROP., Apr. 1995, 61 (discussing use of partnering by U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
and by private companies such as Shell Oil, Union Carbide, DuPont, Procter & Gamble
and IBM).
27 1 See BUILDING SUCCESS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: A GUIDE TO PARTNERING IN
THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY, REPORT OF THE DISPUTE AVOIDANCE AND RESOLUTION
TASK FORCE OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION (1996) [hereinafter DART
REPORT].
272 A number of CII publications extol many benefits of partnering. See generally
IN SEARCH OF PARTNERING EXCELLENCE, SPECIAL PUBLICATION 17-1, PARTNERING
TASK FORCE, CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY INSTITUTE (1991) [hereinafter PARTNERING
EXCELLENCE]; PRE-PROJECT PLANNING: BEGINNING A PROJECT THE RIGHT WAY,
PREPARED BY Tim CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY INSTITUTE PR-PROJECT PLANNING
RESEARCH TEAM, Publication 39-1 (1994) [hereinafter PRE-PROJECT PLANNING]; TEAM
BUILDING: IMPROVING PROJECT PERFORMANCE, PREPARED BY TIm CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY INSTITUTE PROJECT TEAM BUILDING TASK FORCE, Publication 37-1 (July
1993). See also CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY INSTITUTE STRATEGIC PLANNING
COMMITTEE, ASESSMENT OF CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY PROJECT MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES AND PERFORMANCE 8 (1990) (concluding that "strategic project organizing"
may result in potential gross savings of up to 20%). At least one major insurer of design
professionals programmed incentives into its errors and omissions policies to encourage
the use of partnering processes. See generally Partnering, in DPIC COMPANIES, INC.,
THE CONTRACT GUIDE: DPIC's RISK MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK FOR ARCHITECTS AND
ENGINEERS (Supp. 1994) [hereinafter DPIC HANDBOOK].
273 See PRE-PROJECT PLANNING: BEGINNING A PROJECT THE RIGHT WAY,
PREPARED BY THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY INSTITUTE PRE-PROJECT PLANNING
RESEARCH TEAM, Publication 39-1 (1994).
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for solidarity, reciprocity and trust in a long-term relationship274-by
bringing primary project participants together to discuss thoroughly all
facets of the project and their relationship. Successful partnering educates
team members-owners, contractors, design professionals, major
subcontractors and primary third parties (such as insurance underwriters or
lenders)-about their partners' business practices and expectations,
sharpens risks, clarifies lines of communication, anticipates problems and
seeks the commitment of project leadership to common goals and
collaborative problem solving. Partnering, then, acknowledges that in long-
term relationships the traditional arms-length model of dealing must give
way to a mutual commitment to shared (or complementary) goals in an
atmosphere of mutual trust and cooperation. 275 Partnering ritualizes the
establishment of relational bonds and better equips team members to
confront the uncertainties of performance in a flexible yet principled
manner. Although partnering practices are still largely confined to the
construction industry and the manufacturing and distribution sectors, the
model may be of significant benefit in other long-term relationships.
A recent canvas of industry groups revealed widespread positive
perceptions of partnering among design professionals, contractors and
lawyers, 276 although relatively few attorneys claimed direct experience with
the process outside of public procurement. 277 Architects, engineers and
contractors viewed project partnering as superior to mediation, dispute
review boards, arbitration and other discrete ADR processes when it came
to reducing the time and cost associated with conflict resolution, 278
reducing the likelihood of future disputes, 279 opening channels of
274 See PARTNEMG EXCELLENCE, supra note 272, at iv; cf. Macneil, supra note
76, at 348-349.
275 See Cook & Hancher, supra note 268, at 433; Smith et al., supra note 208, at
30. One lawyer with partnering experience defines the process as "the express
recognition of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Kimberly A. Kunz,
Counsel's Role in Negotiating a Successful Construction Partnering Agreement, 15
CONSTRUCTON LAW. 19, 19 (1995).
276 See Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration, supra note 2, at 144-79.
277 See id. at 145. Partnering, like industry-inspired ADR processes such as DRBs,
is often described as a reaction to the perceived over-legalization of the construction
process. Lawyers are not often prominent players in such processes, although there are
notable exceptions. See generally Kunz, supra note 275.
278 See Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration, supra note 2, at 148-49.
279 See id. at 150-151.
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communication, 280 preserving or enhancing relationships among project
participants281 and meeting job budgets. 282 Reports of actual experiences
with partnering also reflected significantly more positive experiences than
did summaries of mediation and other ADR processes. 283 Reported
"positive" results usually included: preserving or improving
communications or relations among parties, reducing the cost or delay
associated with conflict resolution, resolving conflicts and establishing
procedures for handling future problems. 28 4 A majority within each
professional group predicted increasing use of partnering in the coming
years28 5 and expected their own agency or organization to encourage use of
the process. 286
B. Successful Project Partnering
Most discussions of partnering at the project level focus on a facilitated
workshop conducted at the beginning of a construction project. 287
Participants include representatives of the owner, the contractor and other
"stakeholders"-individuals closely affiliated with the project as well as key
decision makers higher in the organization. A typical multi-day partnering
session might begin with training and exercises focusing on interpersonal
communication, "disputing" styles and management of conflict. 28 8 The
280 See id. at 151.
281 See id. at 151-152.
282 See id. at 152.
283 See id. at 171.
284 See id. at 172; see also PARTNmNG EXCELLENCE, supra note 272, at 8-10,
17-18 (describing relational benefits identified by respondents to CII survey and
summarizing many identified benefits of partnering); ANDERSON, supra note 271, at 14-
21 (detailing responses to Washington State Department of Transportation survey on
partnering effectiveness); cf. Appel, supra note 271, at 47 (describing results of 1989
construction industry survey on expectations of partnering).
285 See Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration, supra note 2, at 154-156.
286 See id. at 158-159.
287 See ANDERSON, supra note 270, at 3-5, 12-13; Robert A. Shearer et al.,
Partnering: A Commitment to Common Goals, Disp. RESOL. J., June 1995, at 30;
Appel, supra note 270, at 48-49. Although most initial partnering workshops are one or
two days long, the Corps of Engineers reports workshops extending as long as four
days. See IWR WORKING PAPER, supra note 59, at 19. Obviously, extended sessions of
the latter kind are unlikely to be cost-beneficial except on large projects.
288 See IWR WORKING PAPER, supra note 59, at 20-21.
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agenda also includes discussion of the project mission, the specific
performance objectives and expectations of companies and individuals and,
in some cases, the development of a specific dispute resolution process for
handling conflict on the project.2 9 The initial partnering session often
concludes with the signing of a project charter setting forth the team's
mission and specific goals-a document which may be displayed
prominently at the project site.290
To be effective, however, partnering must involve far more than a
discrete event in the life of a project; it must permeate and become an
integral part of project relationships. While the inaugural workshop is often
described as the "centerpiece" of partnering, it must reflect a commitment
of the highest levels of management that is transmitted through the ranks to
the level of field personnel. 291
Second, the initial partnering conference must be something more than
a simplistic "Getting to Yes" drill: a feel-good exercise which results in
collective intonation of general platitudes-and business as usual during
performance of the contract.292 Successful partnering is, after all, about
addressing the real needs of team members and reinforcing the values of
reciprocity, solidarity and trust which must animate successful partnerings.
It is therefore essential that the workshop treat real project planning
issues,293 allowing project participants to state their respective requirements
in frank and specific terms and to model the behaviors that will sustain
those ends in the long term. Thus, a workshop agenda might involve
detailed treatment of: (1) project roles and responsibilities (beginning with
project planning and proceeding chronologically through design,
procurement, construction and project closeout); (2) plans for the
distribution of project documents; (3) the project schedule, with emphasis
on activities critical to project completion; (4) the design process, including
289 See ANDERSON, supra note 270, at 12-13.
290 See Appel, supra note 271, at 50-51.
291 See PARTNERING EXCELLENCE, supra note 272, at 6; Bickerman, supra note
270 at 63. Because it involves "multi-level interfacing," partnering can minimize the
adverse effects of project personnel turnover. See Cook & Hancher, supra note 268, at
434.
292 See Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration, supra note 2, at 163 n.298.
293 See IWR WoRKING PAPER, supra note 59, at 23 (describing partnering session
for local flood protection project sponsored by Army Corps of Engineers in which
"partners tested out their new partneringship by tackling concrete technical problems");
see also Appel, supra note 270, at 49-50.
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current design status, outstanding issues, schedule of design reviews and
information required to complete the design; (5) procurement, including the
status of subcontracts, the bidding process for remaining subcontracts and
owner-supplied or owner-required equipment; (6) the construction process,
including safety procedures, preconstruction conferences and other
meetings, temporary utilities, construction administration and status
reports; (7) the payment process, including pay request forms and
supporting materials, and project accounting procedures; (8) the handling
of changes to the project design, including what constitutes a change, forms
for the ordering of changes, procedures for equitable adjustment of the
contract price and time, and approval procedures; (9) project closeout
procedures, including the development and execution of punch lists for
correcting or completing the work, definitions of substantial completion and
final completion; (10) the preparation of operations and maintenance
manuals and training, and start-up procedures for process equipment; (11)
warranty periods for goods, systems or services; and (12) the preparation
of record documents for the project.294 Key elements of these facets of the
project may be summarized in the written record of the meeting, or
"partnering notebook," along with the main partnering agreement or
"charter." These elements, reviewed periodically during regular meetings
of team members and evaluation, 295 will become the "measuring sticks" for
implementation of the partnering plan during performance of the work.2 96
The initial partnering conference is also the ideal platform for
exploration of a structure for long-term governance of the relationship,
including a variegated conflict resolution scheme. 297 The result might be a
conflict resolution system that places initial emphasis on. informal, face-to-
face problem solving and integrative bargaining, followed by settlement-
294 A format for a well-integrated partnering program is described in Kunz, supra
note 275.
295 See DART REPORT, supra note 270, at 8.
296 See Shearer et al., supra note 287, at 31-32.
297 See Appel, supra note 271, at 50; Bickerman, supra note 270, at 61. There are
those, such as Professor Williamson, who question the ability of techniques such as
partnering, which embody general commitments to joint profit-maximization, to address
"the proclivity of human agents to make false and misleading... statements" and to
appropriate as much of the gain as possible. Williamson, Transaction Cost, supra note
78, at 241-242. In light of such tendencies, successful partnering should also address
the establishment of "[g]overnance structures which attenuate opportunism and
otherwise infuse confidence." Id. at 242.
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oriented interventions (mediation, nonbinding evaluation, dispute review
boards), and, ultimately, adjudication (often some form of binding
arbitration). Of course, such efforts come face-to-face with the natural
tendencies of new partners to bask in the sunshine of a dawning
relationship and avoid addressing the sharp realities of the future. Yet if not
in the conducive environment of partnering, where?298
It is often said that partnering must be carefully distinguished from the
process of establishing legal rights and responsibilities between team
members. 299 But the present model is heavily derivative of its roots in
public procurement, where federal and state requirements place numerous
strictures on bidding and contract terms. 300 There is no reason why, for
example, private parties may not use the initial partnering conference as the
forum for discussion of contractual risk allocation or other contract
obligations in light of the overriding needs of the relationship. 30'
In a similar vein, more attention should be given to the value of
including transactional counsel in the partnering conference. Although it is
clear that partnering represents an attempt to restore principal parties to
center stage in approaches to conflict and to limit the role of legal
professionals, many lawyers are beginning to understand the importance of
participating as members of the partnering team.3°2 Indeed, it makes sense
to include legal counsel in an in-depth discussion of project conflict
management and performance goals-and better acquaint them with the
personalities that will translate the written integration into flesh and
blood. 303
298 The logical connection between partnering and the development of a relational
conflict management scheme has been largely overlooked. See IWR WORKiNG PAPER,
supra note 59, at 94.
299 See ANDERSON, supra note 270, at 9 (commenting that partnering is not a
substitute for the terms of the written contract).
300 See id. at 10.
301 See Bickerman, supra note 270, at 61. The mechanisms for contract
modification should be followed in making appropriate changes to legal rights and
obligations.
302 See Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration, supra note 2, at 154-160 (showing recent
data that indicates that a majority of construction attorneys favor training in partnering
concepts, and expect their firm or organization to encourage its use); see also
Bickerman, supra note 270, at 64 (arguing that attorneys may profitably play roles in
partnering).
303 For insightful perspectives on the roles of lawyers in partnering, see Kunz,
supra note 275. See also Claramargaret H. Groover & James P. Wagner, Advocacy in
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C. Beyond Project Partnering
Even before the evolution of project partnering, a number of prominent
institutional owners, contracting and design firms understood the benefits of
facilitated group decision making and strategic initiatives which transcend
individual projects or contracts. 3°4 Partnering strategies are often perceived
as a quicker, more flexible and less risky means of responding to market
opportunities than vertical integration. 305 The level of planning and
commitment varies directly according to the scope and duration of the
relationship;306 in some cases, the partnering agreement may itself
approximate the contractual framework of a joint venture. 307
The principle of facilitated collaborative problem solving has
applications on all levels. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, long in the
forefront of experimentation with facilitated conflict management, has
"partnered" with major professional associations for the purpose of
developing joint standards or guidelines for design or construction and for
the development of constructive approaches to job site conflict. It has also
engaged in consensus building initiatives with members of the public,
Partnering-Do Lawyers Have a Place at Partnering?, ABA Forum on the Construction
Industry Annual Meeting, New Orleans, La., (Apr. 24, 1997) (on file with author).
At the conclusion of a partnering session which I facilitated, counsel for one of the
primary participants informed me that his involvement in the process provided him with
unique insights into the workings of the relationship for which he had negotiated a
contract. He found the perspectives immensely valuable.
304 See PARTNERING ExcELLENcE, supra note 272, at 18-22; see also IWR
WORKING PAPER, supra note 59, at 24-27, 41-70 (describing use of partnering by
Corps with professional associations and other groups, and consensus-building among
different groups of stakeholders).
305 See PARTNERING EXCELLENCE, supra note 272, at 18-22; see also Cook &
Hancher, supra note 268, at 438; c. Anderson & Narus, supra note 268 (describing
partnering strategies by suppliers of goods and services).
306 See Cook & Hancher, supra note 268, at 438-440, 442-445 (discussing time
and preparation required for effective strategic partnering, and guidelines for strategy
development and implementation). Some early applications of partnering involved
ongoing relationships and joint ventures on a series of individual construction projects.
See also PARTNMuNG EXCELLENCE, supra note 272, at 29-35 (setting forth guidelines
for selecting a partner).
307 See Cook & Hancher, supra note 268, at 439-440.
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environmental groups, agencies and other groups concerned with or likely
to be affected by anticipated Corps initiatives. 30 8
Another result of the enculturalization of partnering may be the
evolution of dynamic conflict management systems which are closely
intertwined with the relationships they govern and are personified by a
relational conflict manager combining the roles of the partnering facilitator
and post-conflict intervenor. 30 9
VI. BEYOND THE MULTI-DOOR CONTRACT: A SYSTEMATIC,
DYNAMIC APPROACH TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
A. The Movement Toward Dynamic, Systemic Approaches
In a few short years, conflict resolution in the construction industry has
moved from a traditional, relatively static, arbitration-focused "system in
crisis" to more variegated approaches placing deliberate early emphasis on
interest-based bargaining and less costly, more dependable methods of
injecting perspectives on rights and power issues into the discussion. At the
same time, industry-based TQM approaches have inspired a mini-culture of
"partnering," emphasizing the importance of articulated common goals,
more effective communication and reinforced solidarity, reciprocity and
trust-in essence, addressing the roots of conflict.
The industry is uniquely poised to bring together all of these elements
to produce conflict management approaches that embody all of the
attributes of the multi-door courthouse-a systematic treatment of conflict
308 See IWR WORKING PAPER, supra note 59, at 24-27, 41-70. In addition to
assisting with a number of in-house initiatives for a large design/build firm (including,
among other things, task forces addressing the respective roles and responsibilities of
design professionals and construction personnel, site safety issues, scheduling concerns
and information systems), I have facilitated cooperative efforts between a contractor and
its major subcontractors and suppliers to address common problems associated with
project completion, post-construction building operations and long-term purchasing
strategies. Solutions include modifications to standard form contracts and corporate
operating guidelines as well as informal structures for ensuring communications
between contracting parties.
309 Thus far, the possibilities described in Part VI have not been widely grasped
even in sectors where partnering has become a part of the culture. See IWR WORIUNG
PAPER, supra note 59, at 30, 94 (describing widespread use of partnering in Corps of
Engineers projects, and the failure to exploit possible links between partnering and the
development of ADR processes).
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that permits close tailoring of the process to the problem and responds
dynamically to the changing circumstances of disputing parties. Realization
of the vision of a multi-faceted facilitation of a complex commercial
relationship throughout its lifespan is now well within reach, but has rarely
been achieved in practice.
B. A Lesson from Hong Kong: The Dispute Resolution Adviser
A system put in place on a Hong Kong construction project in the
waning days of 1991, a synthesis of all the foregoing elements, represented
a quantum leap in the evolution of contractual dispute systems. 310 The
contract for the renovation of Queen Mary Hospital, a venerable 56-year-
old edifice, required intricate demolition and construction services to be
performed while keeping the hospital and operating theatres operational-a
complex and challenging scheme likely to prove a hotbed of conflict. 311
The project owner, the Hong Kong Government's Architectural Services
Department (ASD), desirous of strict budget control, required a system
which would identify and resolve disputes in the shortest possible time and
prior to completion of the project. ASD retained the services of an
international team of consultants to develop an appropriate dispute
resolution system for the project.312
The consultants first spoke confidentially with project participants
(including pre-qualifled contractors) regarding the nature of the project,
their objectives and concerns and potential areas of dispute. 313 The result
was a report setting forth specific recommendations for project organization
and administration aimed at avoiding or minimizing areas of dispute. These
included tight time frames for jobsite decisionmaking and handling of
claims, and the establishment of a flexible, dynamic dispute resolution
system centered upon the figure of a Dispute Resolution Adviser (DRA). 314
The resulting agreement called for joint appointment of a neutral, a
construction expert possessing dispute resolution skills as the DRA at the
310 See Colin J. Wall, The Dispute Resolution Adviser in the Construction Industry,
in FENN & GAMESON, supra note 65, at 328.
311 See id.
312 See id. at 328-29.
313 See id. at 333-334.
314 See id. at 334-335.
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time the construction contract commenced. 315 A default mechanism was
established for independent appointment of a DRA should the parties fail to
agree on an appointee. The DRA's fees were to be shared equally between
the owner and general contractor. 316
The DRA's first function was to meet with job participants to explain
and build support for a cooperative approach to problem solving on the
project. Among other things, the DRA was to discuss basic rules of
communication and attitudinal changes necessary to avoid adversarial
positions.317 Thereafter, the DRA was to make monthly visits to the site for
the purpose of consulting with project participants on the status of the job
and facilitating discussions respecting any conflicts which arose since the
last visit. The DRA was given considerable flexibility in managing such
discussions. 318
In the event of a formal challenge to a project decision, certificate or
evaluation, the parties were given four weeks to negotiate pertinent issues
(with or without the assistance of the DRA).319 In the event the problem
remained unresolved, a party's written notice of dispute would trigger a
more formal stage of dispute resolution in which the DRA had freedom to
employ any of several methods of third-party-assisted dispute resolution
including mediation, mini-trial and expert fact-finding. The proceeding
would involve site level representatives and would be conducted with the
assistance of the DRA or a qualified third party.320
If assisted site level negotiations failed, the DRA was to prepare a
report identifying the key issues in dispute, the positions of the parties, and
the perceived barriers to settlement and making either a recommendation
for settlement or a nonbinding evaluation of the dispute. The report would
be used by senior off-site representatives of the parties in further
negotiations, perhaps assisted by the DRA.
Should matters not be resolved within fourteen days of the issuance of
the DRA's report, the DRA would set into motion a short-form arbitration
procedure or other mutually acceptable means recommended by the
315 See id. at 335-336.
316 See id. at 338.
317 See id. at 334-35.
318 See id. at 336.
319 See id. at 336.
320 See id. at 336-337.
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DRA. 321 The arbitrator would be appointed by the parties; failing their
agreement, the DRA would make the selection.
The DRA procedure worked well. Despite the usual problems and
several hundred owner-ordered changes, no disputes reached the stage of
nonbinding evaluation.322 The DRA system has since been applied on at
least one other hospital project for the same owner.323
C. A Proposal: The Conflict Management System
The planners of St. Mary's Hospital and their able consultants came to
recognize that in the relational sphere, conflict resolution is properly
approached not as an event or set-piece intervention, but as a process
inextricably intertwined with the relationships that evolve along with the
physical design, procurement and construction of the building. Their
solution embraces a number of the following elements which might be the
hallmarks of a contractual conflict management system:
(1) a comprehensive program which commences with the contractual
relationship(s) and extends throughout the life of the relationship(s);
(2) the active involvement of key contract participamts in "partnering," in
initial program design and, ultimately, in the resolution of conflict;
(3) the establishment of a variegated conflict resolution scheme that
incorporates a series or selection of strategies consistent with the parties'
goals; and
(4) an independent adviser who, either alone or as part of a larger team or
organization, advises, models, teaches, facilitates and provides the human
backbone for the entire program.
1. A Conflict Resolution Program
The recent success of partnering processes demonstrates that effective
management of conflict in a relational system begins at the beginning of the
relationship324 and contemplates a continuity of effort throughout its
lifespan. Traditional ADR is a discrete event, a reactive, set-piece
321 See id. at 337-338.
322 See Colin J. Wall, The Dispute Resolution Advisor: A New Approach to
Preventing and Resolving Construction Disputes, DART NEws, Aug. 1993, at 1.
32 3 See id. at 2.
324 See supra Part V.
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intervention by a third party who steps in to arbitrate, render an advisory
evaluation or mediate a particular set of issues and then steps out. As a
result, the intervention strategy may be brought into play too late in the
game to take advantage of integrative solutions, the intervenor may lack an
adequate or helpful perspective on the context of the conflict and the
lessons of the intervention (such as the cooperative style modeled by a
mediator) may vanish with the intervenor when the intervention ends.
Better, therefore, to address conflict management prospectively, to
inculcate basic principles of collaborative problem solving and to make
conflict resolution strategies part of a systematic and continuous plan. The
key, of course, is the parties.
2. Active Involvement by Key Participants
Partnering facilitators and ADR systems designers collectively
acknowledge that active involvement by key participants is a critical
element in successful conflict management approaches. 325 As partnering
teaches, conflict may be avoided, muted or constructively channeled by
initially educating primary participants regarding differing conflict styles,
by modeling the principles of integrative bargaining, by identifying
common goals as well as the personal ends of key personnel and by
deliberate discourse on the "give-and-take" mechanics of performance.
Such discussions may also address contractual risk allocation and other
issues which sow the seeds of discontent and raise efficiency concerns, thus
setting the stage for more successful teamwork during execution.
In addition to permitting the parties to design a conflict management
scheme that is most appropriate to their specific needs, problem solving
exercises and facilitated "concertation" 326 help to ingrain in participants a
model for subsequent interactions. Contracting partners are, in effect, given
the tools to be effective team members. Application of these tools not only
reduces the need for later third-party intervention, but also makes it more
likely that low-end interventions (such as mediated negotiation) will bear
fruit. Such empowerment in primary actors may also reduce the perceived
need for legal counsel.
325 See supra Section V.A.2.
326 See C. A. Leads, The French Approach to Handling Conflicts and Negotiating:
Certain Notable Features, in FENN & GAMESON, supra note 73, 151, 158-159.
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3. A Variegated, Flexible System
Another lesson of effective conflict management is that systemic
planning is a matter of evolution from the ground up. Such a principle
stands in stark contrast to the boilerplate approaches so frequently adopted
as part of a standard industry contract and imposed unreflectively on a
relationship. As we have seen, serious dissatisfaction with traditional
"cookie-cutter" approaches stimulated experimentation with new
intervention strategies such as dispute review boards327 and mediation328
(and even led to new, more variegated boilerplate!329), as well as project
partnering schemes. 330
The St. Mary's Hospital experience demonstrates the effectiveness of a
deliberate front-end "conflict diagnosis" and system design with the
participation of the parties. Partnering workshops offer an ideal platform
for such discussions, which might be finalized by a "design committee"
consisting of a facilitator and representatives of the major parties. 331
Judging from present trends, it is likely that the resulting system would
be a stepped system placing initial emphasis on face-to-face negotiations as
well as third-party intervention strategies, appropriately reinforcing the
preeminent role of party self-determination and underlining the importance
of interest-based bargaining. There might also be some form of a low-cost
advisory mechanism to inform negotiations regarding "rights boundaries"
and power issues, followed by a "loop-back" to negotiations.
Because it is sometimes vitally important to vindicate rights, 332 the
system should also describe the method for final adjudication of disputes, if
necessary; even here, however, it may be possible to make arrangements to
take account of other ends or values, such as continued performance and
preservation of relationships.
While the final product will be a template of conflict resolution
strategies, some flexibility should be retained for the sake of addressing
327 See supra Section IV.B.
328 See supra Section IV.C.
329 See supra Section IV.D.
330 See supra Part V.
331 See URY ET AL., supra note 14, at 69-70.
332 See Macaulay, Elegant Models, supra note 77, at 512 (quoting Laura Nader,
Forums for Justice: A Cross-Cultural Perspective, 31 J. op Soc. IssuEs 151, 159
(1975)).
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particular needs and changing circumstances. In this and other ways, the
Conflict Manager plays a pivotal role.
4. The Conflict Manager
The backbone of a relational conflict management system is a neutral
who performs a variety of facilitative roles during the course of a
relationship. Because of this actor's ongoing identification with the
transaction, she might be described as a "Friend of the Contract," or
"Contract Helper;" or, in recognition of her plenary role with respect to
conflict resolution, a "SuperNeutral." There is also the all-purpose (if more
prosaic) sobriquet "Facilitator." On the St. Mary's Hospital project, the
more straightforward designation of a "Dispute Resolution Adviser" was
used. .Preferred here, however, an identifier consistent with the active,
hands-on role of the neutral: "Conflict Manager."
The Conflict Manager's (CM's) role would begin as early as possible in
the contractual relationship, commencing with the facilitation of initial
partnering workshops involving owner, design professionals, prime
contractor(s) and key subcontractors. In this setting the CM would perform
all of the usual roles of a partnering facilitator, including educating
participants regarding conflict styles, modeling integrative bargaining
approaches and assisting the parties in reaching a consensus on the goals
and- principles animating the relationship. 333 Project participants would
have an opportunity to establish a foundation of trust, solidarity and
reciprocity by facilitated group discussion of a range of performance issues.
At this stage, moreover, the CM would assist representatives of key
participant groups in conducting a "conflict diagnosis" for the job and
advise the group regarding dispute processing alternatives. With the CM's
assistance, the group would develop a specific conflict management system
for the project.334
333 In this way, the process promotes on the transactional level the educational and
disciplinary goals of contract law in society at large. See generally LAWRENCE
FRiEDMAN, CONTRACr LAW IN AMERCA 184 (1965). It also provides a framework for
accommodating the dominant objective of rational actors in commercial relationships-to
reduce the risk of contingencies over which a party has control, and to permit
"adjust[ment] to future circumstances in order to maximize the expected value of their
contract." Scott, supra note 78, at 615.
334 The role of facilitator might also involve a broader role in contracting issues.
For example, the CM might play a part in realistic risk identification and allocation at
the negotiation and drafting stage in the interest of maximizing efficiency and
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The CM's role would continue during the performance of a
construction contract. Like the DRA on the St. Mary's Hospital project, the
CM might make monthly visits to the site to consult with key participants
on the status of the job and mediate conflicts that arose since the prior
visit. 335 As mediator, the CM would help to define issues, encourage
mutual understanding and assist the parties in exploring possible solutions.
Although the failure of mediated negotiation to achieve a satisfactory
solution may activate the next stage of the management program, such as
submission to early neutral evaluation or a dispute review board, the CM
may still have an important role to play in paving the way for further
process. The CM may, for example, help the parties identify the issues to
be addressed, assist in structuring limited discovery to elicit relevant
information and fine-tune ADR procedures. The most important assistance
provided by the CM, however, may be in the selection of neutrals-both in
helping to identify neutrals with the proper qualifications and in serving as
a buffer between the parties and the neutrals with respect to appointment
and payment matters. 336 Although here the CM's role would remain
essentially facilitative, it would be possible for the parties to authorize the
CM to break procedural impasses by making process-related decisions. 337
minimizing unproductive conflict later in the job, or identify overlaps or gaps in the
contract documents. The CM may be responsible for making certain that lines of
communication are established between and within organizations and disciplines, and
may even facilitate the choice of an appropriate contract and procurement strategy for
the job.
Such efforts, however, may increase the possibility that the facilitator's own efforts
become the focus of disputes, and the facilitator a de facto party. Such concerns may
augur in favor of limiting the scope of the facilitative role.
335 See supra text accompanying note 316; see Wall, supra note 310, at 336.
336 A major source of difficulty with respect to so-called "party-arbitrators"-
arbitrators appointed by and paid by a single party-is that it is well-nigh impossible to
avoid entirely predispositions on the part of the arbitrator, who is aware of the source of
the appointment and payment. See m MACNEL Er AL., supra note 155, § 28.4. If the
parties desire to have a tripartite panel in which they have a unilateral voice in selecting
one of the arbitrators, but truly desire neutral arbitrators, it would be advisable to have
a third party-in this case, the CM-make contact with the prospective arbitrators and
arrange for payment without informing them of the source of their appointment. I have
performed this function as a neutral facilitator.
337 In relational contracting, a perceived advantage of binding arbitration is that it
provides a mechanism for addressing contingencies not covered by the agreement. After
the fact, the arbitrator could step in to resolve the case in a manner consistent with the
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A final facet of the CM's ongoing role is evaluative. From time to time
during the course of performance and at its conclusion, the CM would elicit
feedback from project participants and assess the workings of the conflict
management system. The CM's findings may result in major modifications
or slight adjustments to the program. Ultimately, lessons learned on the job
would factor into future programming for conflict.
D. Some Questions Raised by the Proposal
1. Cost Concerns
Obviously, the transaction costs associated with any form of third-party
intervention must be carefully considered. 338 The recent experience of
California with judicially appointed private discovery referees illustrates the
potential costs of extensive private management of the process. 339 In that
context, there are complaints that the enormous cost of private referees
gives great leverage to those who can afford to bear the additional costs of
management.
Given the high cost of disputing in construction contracting, a proactive
approach to conflict requiring a front-end investment of time and dollars is
probably justified on most large projects. The additional cost associated
with ongoing third-party facilitation is also likely to be relatively small in
light of time and dollars saved by avoiding extended dispute resolution
processes, especially if such facilitation is limited to those situations when
the parties (who are themselves trained in collaborative problem solving)
truly need the services of an intervenor. 340 The experience of various
organizations with project partnering support these conclusions. 341
intent of the parties and pertinent commercial or relational norms. Likewise, arbitrators
have broad authority with respect to procedural matters. See id. § 32.1.2.
If deemed appropriate, the parties might apply the same principle to the resolution
of procedural issues arising under the conflict management system. That is, failing a
facilitated understanding on particular issues, the parties might leave it to the CM to
arbitrate the matter. Whether it would be necessary to comply with the typical
formalities of binding arbitration, including a formal award, is another matter.
338 See Macaulay, Elegant Models, supra note 77, at 508.
339 See Reuben, supra note 69, at 57-58.
340 The issue of who pays the cost is addressed infra.
341 See IWR WORKING PAPER, supra note 59, at 31 (noting that cost data from
Corps of Engineers projects demonstrates potential cost-effectiveness of parmering on
large projects), 86-90 (noting that limited cost data from Corps of Engineers suggests
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The viability of conflict management systems on small projects is a
closer question. Parties to minor, short-term relationships may not find it
cost-beneficial to devote significant time and energy to partnering exercises
and programming for conflict at the outset. It may be necessary, therefore,
to adopt or adapt programs developed by industry organizations, by counsel
for the transaction or by in-house templates. Even here, however, the
principles of programmed conflict management may be effectively applied,
and disputes involving relatively small amounts of money can be efficiently,
and effectively resolved utilizing stepped approaches and creative
facilitation addressing process issues such as document exchange. 342 Private
practitioners, like creative judges, are increasingly learning that in addition
to traditional mediation, neutral facilitators may play an important role in
managing the exchange of information and setting the stage for conflict
resolution. 34 3
2. Enforceability of the Conflict Management Program
Various practitioners have been curious as to the enforceability of
various aspects of the conflict management program. More sophisticated
attorneys would make a point of comparison with the statutory framework
cost-effectiveness, tangible benefits of various ADR processes), 34-35 (noting that
partnering may be effectively employed in "abbreviated form" on smaller projects), 15
(reporting that when "when conflicts... occur [on a Corps of Engineers project], a
well-established orientation towards joint problem-solving often enables staff to resolve
them before they escalate").
342 See Gerald B. Kirksey & Lawrence M. Watson, Jr., How to Resolve a
$100,000 Construction Claim ... for Something Less than $100,000 (in fees and costs),
1997 ABA Forum on the Construction Industry Annual Meeting, New Orleans, La.,
April 24, 1997.
343 See id.; see also Ronald H. Kahn, A Mediation Protocol for the Complex Case,
Presentation to Division 1, ABA Forum on the Construction Industry Annual Meeting,
New Orleans, La. (on file with author).
Where parties have an ongoing relationship involving a series of relatively small
contracts, the transaction costs associated with more extensive front-end procedures may
be more easily justified. Some early applications of partnering involve ongoing
relationships and joint ventures on a series of individual construction projects. See
PARTNmmUG EXCELLENCE, supra note 272, at 21-28 (discussing partnering
opportunities for small businesses and projects).
395
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that exists for the specific enforcement and facilitation of agreements to
arbitrate and resulting awards. 344
Clearly, the arbitral component of any dispute management agreement
would be as enforceable as any executory agreement or submission to
arbitration. The enforceability of other aspects of the program are less
certain, although a growing number of decisions have specifically enforced
agreements to mediate and other processes involving third-party
intervention. 345
If the system is to work, however, it should not depend heavily upon
coercion. Rather, the parties should see a mutual benefit in adherence to
the tenets set forth in the conflict management agreement and, when
necessary, accept the process determination of the CM as a matter of
respect for the system and the individual filling that role.
3. Qualifications and Standards for CMs
Inevitably, the tidal wave of reform promoting officially sanctioned
ADR has been followed by a chorus of calls for standards for the selection
and training of neutrals and for ethical standards governing their
performance. 346 The advent of the CM, whose facilitative role transcends
the discrete dispute and involves substantial input into the very program
under which he operates, is likely to reinvigorate debates regarding
professional qualifications and standards.
a. Filling the role of CM
Candidates for the role of CM will come from varied professional
backgrounds. In the construction arena, early prospects will include
attorneys and expert consultants.
With each passing month, more legal professionals are identifying ADR
roles as a part of their professional practice. The quiet revolution in court-
connected conflict resolution has created regional markets for mediators of
varying expertise, and a small but growing cadre of construction lawyers
are marketing their services in nonadvocacy roles (usually as mediators).
344 See generally III MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 155.
345 See supra note 266.
346 See Wade Lambert, Calls Increase For Guidelines On Mediation, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 22, 1993, at B1.
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The integration of neutral roles into traditional law practice brings with it
new issues relating to conflict of interest and other ethical dilemmas, 347 but
is nevertheless a welcome development for many attorneys whose talent
and temperament favor collaborative problem solving. Based on evidence
to date, their perspectives and their approaches to conflict management
programming are likely to be heavily influenced by their professional
preoccupation with legal issues and their experience in legal processes. 34 8
Multi-disciplinary consulting firms, long a fixture in construction
claims practice, are anxious to retool to stay abreast of developments in the
conflict resolution market. Such organizations are, along with a host of new
entrants to this easy-entry field, advertising partnering consultation and
more extensive facilitative services. 349 As products of the construction
industry, their emphasis is likely to be much less legalistic than their
attorney counterparts, and they may downplay or even discourage attorney
participation in conflict management.
347 This has prompted the development of guidelines for attorneys acting as
neutrals. See infra note 353.
348 See supra Sections uI.A, llI.B., IV.B., IV.C. The most extreme proposal for
lawyer involvement in conflict management was advanced by Boston attorney
Christopher Noble. See generally Christopher L. Noble, Project Counsel: An
Alternative Paradigm for Construction Law Services, 1996 Construction Industry
Superconference (Dec. 13, 1996) (on file with author). Noble's "project counsel"
would, among other things, work with the owner and others to help identify "goals,
objectives, financial resources, management and technical capabilities," help select the
proper project delivery system, advise on and facilitate the selection of other project
participants, draft key contracts, facilitate the team-building (partnering) process, select
dispute resolution processes, address risk management issues, assist in project closeout
and function as a resource in the resolution of post-construction disputes. See id. at 5.
The concept has much in common with the Conflict Manager concept, but goes
much further in the direction of melding the concepi of neutral facilitator with that of
project attorney. In light of professional ethical concerns, lawyers are probably better
advised to opt for the neutral's cap or the advocate's cap, but not both at once. On the
other hand, there is much of value in the Project Counsel concept; of particular
significance is its recognition that attorneys should be part of the project team and
should, if possible, be involved from the outset in conflict management efforts.
349 See generally Ozzie Bermant, A Proactive Approach to Organizational Conflict,
in RESOLVING CoNFLicr: STRATEGIS FOR LOCAL GovERNMENT (Margaret S. Hermann
ed., 1994); Irvin Richter, The Project Neutral: Returning Control of Disputes to the
Parties, 8th Annual Construction Superconference (April 21, 1994) (on file with author)
(describing Hill International's ADR offering).
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Because the CM should generally be limited to a facilitative role in
designing and carrying forward the conflict management program,350 the
assistance of other individuals will be needed if the program calls for early
neutral evaluation, a dispute review board or binding arbitration. Clearly,
having access to a pool of prospective neutrals with appropriate credentials
will be an important marketing tool for the CM, suggesting a new
opportunity for well-organized providers who command such human
resources on a regional or national basis, such as an American Arbitration
Association or a JAMS/Endispute. Again, however, the conflict
management system turns traditional "administered ADR" on its head:
instead of a reactive, post-conflict intervention in which the disputing
parties are initially assisted by a low-level ministerial staffer, the CM
approach addresses conflict proactively with the assistance of a
sophisticated facilitator who stage-manages a range of intervention
strategies. 351 Such individuals will require relatively wide experience in
conflict resolution, broad training, which encompasses the spectrum of
facilitation and ADR specialties, and exceptional personal and
administrative skills.
There is as yet no single national organization that provides
construction neutrals-arbitrators, mediators, evaluators and facilitators-of
proven quality and which offers the full range of auxiliary services
necessary to facilitate the full spectrum of construction-related disputes,
including conflict management system services of the kind just described.
The AAA continues to make significant strides in this direction, but is,
frankly, encumbered by the very size and scope of its operation. The ideal
would be a close-to-the-ground operation, based regionally, that provides a
roster of sophisticated and well-trained professionals from all construction-
related disciplines. The group should be organized into multi-disciplinary
teams with credentials ranging from facilitation of group decisionmaking,
including project partnering, to system design, mediation and nonbinding
evaluation and binding arbitration. Such an approach can probably be cost-
350 See supra Section VI.C.4.
351 Of course, to make the CM process more cost-effective, it is likely that many
of the functions performed with the assistance of the CM, such as contacting
prospective neutrals or setting up sessions, could be performed by staffers working
under the guidance of the CM.
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effective, but must somehow address the immediate hurdle of acceptance
by a critical mass of users. 352
4. Ethical Issues
Confidence in the conflict management process requires that the CM
and other participating third-party intervenors are perceived as performing
their functions impartially and with integrity. 353 To the extent that the CM
plays a part not only in facilitating negotiations regarding substantive
project issues but also performs a central role in program design and
neutral selection, her function is both extremely sensitive and difficult to
classify in traditional terms.
The sensitivity of the CM's ongoing role demands care in selection and
payment arrangements. Practically speaking, an owner may find it
necessary to arrange for the involvement of a particular CM even before a
construction contractor and other parties have been engaged. Nevertheless,
the contractor and other primary stakeholders should have an opportunity
to accept or reject the CM after being informed of potential conflicts of
interest and should be given the option of paying a portion of the CM's fee.
Another issue relating to renurneration involves the reasonableness of
the CM's expenditures. Because of the broad discretion enjoyed by the CM
from the inception, the CM bears a special responsibility to avoid
unnecessary expenses in the management of the program.
Moreover, the CM must exercise care in assuming rules for which she
is unsuited. There may be circumstances in that issues arise which demand
expertise beyond that of the CM3 54 and even require the empanelling of
multiple neutrals.
The CM should also avoid situations which imperil the central
facilitative role. Circumstances will undoubtedly arise in which a CM is
asked to render a nonbinding recommendation or make a binding arbitral
352 A major advantage enjoyed by the AAA and a corresponding hurdle for all
would-be providers is the AAA's incorporation in dispute resolution provisions of major
industry contract prototypes.
3 See, e.g., JOINT COMMnTEE ON STANDARDS OF CONDucT, STANDARDS OF
CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (1994), Art. II; CENTER FOR DisPuTE SETTLEMENT,
INSTITUTE OF JuDIciAL ADMIN., STANDARDS FOR COURT-CONNECTED PROGRAMS
§ 8.1.a; cf. generally Ill MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 155, at ch. 28 (discussing legal
and ethical rules mandating arbitrator impartiality).
354 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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award regarding one or more substantive issues in dispute. Although there
is no absolute legal, practical or ethical bar to the CM playing either of
these roles, at a minimum the parties should be informed regarding the
difficulties associated with a mixed role. 355 Even when both parties have
asked the CM to assume an evaluative role, however, the potential harm to
the facilitative role may augur against such action.
Setting aside other concerns associated with mixing the roles of
mediator and adjudicator, the rendition of an arbitration award (and even a
nonbinding evaluation) may have a significant effect on the relationship of
the CM with the parties. Traditionally, commercial arbitrators are
appointed to resolve a single set of issues between parties. Once arbitrators
have heard evidence and rendered a final award addressing the issue(s),
they are functus officio: their official powers and duties and their
relationship with the dispute are at an end.356 So, too, ends their affiliation
with the parties, unless the parties have agreed otherwise. This approach
insulates arbitrators from post-award approaches or attacks by the parties
and safeguards the finality of awards. Although dissatisfaction with the
decision may cause at least one party to find fault with the decisionmaker,
that consequence is trivial if the parties cease the relationship of judge and
supplicant and the decisionmaker has passed from the scene. The dynamic
is different where the arbitrator retains authority to facilitate other matters
after an award is rendered. Unhappiness with the last award may well
diminish a party's respect for the neutral and the process, and make it less
likely that the parties will fully cooperate in subsequent informal processes.
As previously noted, the successful execution of the CM function demands
that the neutral enjoy the trust and cooperation of all parties; when these
are compromised, the CM cannot operate effectively.
The best solution may be for the CM to avoid the role of adjudicator in
favor of the more limited role of "evaluation/arbitration facilitator." This
function would include advising the parties respecting the choice of
evaluators or arbitrators, discussing procedural options (such as the choice
of location and the desirability of an opinion accompanying the award) and,
where necessary, serving as arbiter of these process issues.
355 See Lou Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 WIs. L. REv.
23-30; Joseph Stulberg, A Civil Alternative to Criminal Prosecution, 39 ALB. L. REV.
359, 367 (1975); Exploring Alternatives to the Strike, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Sept.
1973, at 33.
356 See III MACNEL ET AL., supra note 155, § 37.6.1.1.
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Ultimately, the uniquely broad role of the CM will probably demand
the development of special standards of conduct. At a time when increasing
emphasis is being placed not only on ethical standards for individual
neutrals 357 but also on the ethical obligations of agencies administering or
sponsoring ADR services, 358 those considering ethical standards for CMs
may find it appropriate to draw upon both strands of development.
In addition, consideration should be given to an effective institutional
framework for education, self-policing and quality assurance. One
possibility might be a National Academy of Commercial Neutrals-a select
group of individuals from the United States and abroad with established
credentials relating to various ADR functions, including a CM group. The
National Academy would publish standards for practice and opinions
dealing with discrete ethical issues, and maintain and provide pertinent
information on its membership and police infractions of standards by its
members.
E. Socialization
Assuming the conflict management program gains currency in one or
more relational settings, one must expect that it would have a profound
effect upon relationships. The principles and values underlying the
facilitative structure will, to one degree or another, be inculcated in
primary actors within the affected system. 359
Companies and institutions which deal frequently with conflict are
becoming increasingly sophisticated regarding dispute resolution
alternatives. As they become more and more familiar with the features and
appropriate uses of partnering, mediation, third-party evaluation and other
approaches, they may perceive less and less necessity for strategic
357 See, e.g., Proposed Model Rule (of Professional Conduct) for The Neutral
Lawyer (Reported by Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Chair, CPR-Georgetown Commission on
Ethics and Standards in ADR), Oct. 2, 1997 revision (on file with author).
358 See, e.g., Glenn Koch, AAA Adopts Ethics Code, Disp. RESOL. TIMEs, Fall
1997, at 1 (discussing new AAA Code of Ethics for Employees); Elizabeth Plapinger,
Best Practice Standards for ADR Provider Organizations: A First Try, Oct. 3, 1997
Draft (on file with author).
359 Hume long ago spoke of a learned "sentiment of morality in the performance of
promises"; that is, that actors may be socialized to appreciate the practical significance
of living up to their word. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Vol. II, Book V,
in MoRRis, supra note 113, at 206-207.
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intervention by a CM. In the construction arena, project managers and
others who must establish and manage relationship networks for projects
may also become adept at structuring their own disputing systems. Large
companies are likely to adapt ADR policies as a result of total quality
management programs. 360 In particular, insurers may offer guidance in and
incentives for the use of such approaches.
Looking ahead ten years, leading construction lawyers foresee
continuing changes in the realm of conflict resolution as well as other
challenges to traditional practice models. 361 Early indications are, however,
that the construction bar is rapidly embracing the new language of dispute
360 See generally Kimberly McCandless, Establishing a Total Quality Approach to
Alternative Dispute Resolution for Insurers, 41 DAKE L. REv. 711 (1992) (proposing
that insurers employ TQM principles in dispute resolution programs).
361 See Stipanowich, Facilitator's Report, supra note 102. As chair of the Forum
on the Construction Industry, Atlanta attorney John Hinchey recently described the
construction bar as a "profession in search of itself." John W. Hinchey, A Profession in
Search of Itself, CONSTRUCTION FORUM NEws (ABA Forum on the Construction
Industry, Chicago, II.), Apr. 1997, at 1, 2.
An even greater challenge to practitioners is economic. As a revolution in project
delivery systems has required contractors and design professionals to repackage and to
bundle their services, and in some cases to assume a major portion of the financial risk
of construction and operation, lateral-thinking clients have naturally wondered why the
same should not be asked of their legal advisors. The day of the blank check for legal
services, as for all professional services, is waning; in the new day, "zealous advocacy
at all costs" will be supplanted by a more careful weighing of costs and benefits. "Total
war" strategy will often give way to more measured approaches to conflict resolution
and more emphasis on planning and prevention of debilitating conflict. In the new era,
moreover, a growing number of nonlawyers claim to offer better, more economical
alternatives to managing construction industry business relationships. See Noble, supra
note 348, at 5. A number of law firms are negotiating with major corporate clients
regarding the formation of strategic alliances under which the parties negotiate a lump
sum fee for all legal services during a specified period. See Interview with John W.
Hinchey, Immediate Past Chair, ABA Forum on the Construction Industry, in Banff,
Alberta (June 21, 1997); see also Marcia Coyle, Feds Clear Flat-Fee Scheme for
Building Industry; Firms Offer Low Rates and Incentive Not to Go to Court, NAT'L
L.J., Feb. 3, 1997, at A7 (noting that the antitrust division of the Department of Justice
cleared a "flat fee dispute avoidance plan," under which participating law firms would
guarantee to represent clients from all stages of a construction project-from contract
planning through performance-for a flat fee which would be fully refundable if a client
elected to litigate or arbitrate to resolve a project-related dispute).
402
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resolution, if not its spirit.362 With customary resiliency, attorneys are
seeking to claim the new tools-mediation, early neutral evaluation, dispute
review boards and even partnering-as their own. In recent years, attorneys
familiar with arbitration have often forsaken administered arbitration in
favor of handling administrative details on their own363 and, for better or
worse, have also made their mark on mediation.364 Ultimately, they may
claim much of the advisory and facilitative role of the CM. The question is
not so much whether these processes will render attorneys obsolete, but
rather how "colonization" by bench and bar will affect conflict
management programs. 365
VII. CONCLUSION
In the two decades since the unveiling of the multi-door courthouse
concept, there has been considerable progress in the direction of conflict
resolution systems that brings to bear multiple intervention strategies with
the aim of tailoring the process to the problem and responding to the
changing dynamics of conflict. For a variety of political, perceptual and
practical reasons, however, experimentation in the court system has rarely
followed the precise lines of the original pluralist vision. The most
significant developments include variations upon the single broad theme of
mediation and the employment of magistrate judges and other neutrals as
ADR specialists who advise, facilitate and direct pretrial conflict resolution.
As one might expect, the private sphere offers an even more fertile
ground for the evolution of conflict resolution systems tailored to the needs
of disputants and responsive to the dynamics of conflict. Particularly
362A recent survey sponsored by entities of the American Bar Association
reflected thai nearly 60% of responding construction attorneys desired training in
"partnering" approaches. See Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration, supra note 2, at 157.
363 See supra Section III.C.
364 See supra Section IV.C.
365 "Colonization" is an apt description for the series of developments by which
attorneys transform a process utilizing the tools they know best, usually those derived
from their experience with litigation in an adversary system. As we have seen, lawyers
altered the nature of many forms of commercial arbitration by importing into the
process many of the features of traditional litigation: prehearing motion practice
(addressing issues of enforceability or scope of the agreement to arbitrate), discovery,
objections regarding the handling of evidence and extenuated appeal processes.
Attorneys identified their own brethren as a chief source of delay to the process. See
Stipanowich, Rethinking Arbitration, supra note 73, at 461.
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amenable to systematic approaches are long-term contractual relationships,
such as contracts for building design and construction, which hinge upon
relational values such as solidarity, reciprocity and trust.
In the construction arena, evolution has been moderated and shaped by
the industry's traditional conflict resolution approaches including early
evaluation by design professionals and binding arbitration, by the
limitations of predispute contract drafting and by differing perspectives
among primary actors. Nevertheless, recent years have witnessed an
inexorable progression in the direction of dispute review boards and other
evaluation approaches, mediation and other informal, relatively low-cost
intervention strategies aimed at facilitating settlement. Further upstream,
the industry has focused attention on the root causes of conflict and,
through partnering programs, has reinforced relational values from the
beginning of the relationship.
Although few have recognized the opportunities, all of the pieces are in
place for the development of comprehensive conflict management systems,
coterminous with the contractual relationship, which involve active
participation and commitment by key parties from the outset, the
establishment of a variegated conflict resolution scheme incorporating
strategies consistent with relational goals, and the "human backbone" of the
plan, the Conflict Manager, who inculcates key values, models collaborate
problem solving approaches, advises on conflict resolution strategies and
facilitates their implementation. Such systems, which hold obvious promise
for major construction contracts, may also be applied in other kinds of
contractual relationships, including partnerships and joint ventures.
Hopefully, the principles of proactive, deliberate conflict management will
permeate contract planning approaches in these and other venues.
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